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Abstract
A Study on the Effect of New Technologies on Supply Chain Coordination
Ce´sar Augusto Rodrı´guez Gallegos, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2019
In this globalized economy, the fierce competition in the market, added to the increasingly
exigences from customers demanding products with more added value and lower prices, force or-
ganizations to be always at the vanguard to maintain their positioning in the market. One critical
ingredient for maintaining the competitive advantage is the acquisition and implementation of new
technologies for achieving process and product enhancement. This is specially the case for high-
tech industries in sectors like aerospace, pharmaceutic and telecommunication, to name but a few.
But investment in new technologies is a challenging decision due to their complexity for implemen-
tation and the cost involved. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to understand the effect of new
technologies on the performance of the acquiring company and on its supply chain. Although the
existence of an ample number of empirical studies in the current literature describing the relation
between supply chain (SC) operation and new technologies acquisition, analytical research on this
matter is quite scarce. In this thesis, our objective is to model and analyze the effect of new tech-
nologies on the SC members performance. We propose two main directions of research: (1) impact
of technology transfer among SC members; and (2) impact of technology investment in the SC. In
the first direction, we consider that an existing technology in the supply chain is transferred from
its owner to a different member in the system. In the second direction, we assume that the new
technology is independently acquired by an organization in the supply chain, i.e. obtained from a
third-party or through internal R&D. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of new technologies on
the performance of different system structures. On the first stream of research, we discuss the effect
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of technology transfer on a one-supplier one-manufacturer supply chain system involving technol-
ogy transfer and market sharing. We consider the technology transfer decision to be made by the
manufacturer, the key technology owner, as the decision affects its market share. It is proposed three
models for analyzing the system performance: (i) a supply chain without technology transfer, (ii) a
supply chain with technology transfer but without supplier’s market sharing, and (iii) a supply chain
with technology transfer and supplier’s market sharing. Findings show that the optimal profit of
the manufacturer in a supply chain with technology transfer and market sharing is typically greater
than those without technology transfer or market sharing. The analysis also provides the conditions
for the manufacturer to enhance technology transfer when the supplier’s market is open to the fi-
nal products. On the second stream of research, we explore the impact of technology investment
on supply chain coordination. We first investigate the optimal pricing and technology investment
decisions in a system consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers. On one hand,
the manufacturer is required to invest in new technologies in order to improve its performance. On
the other hand, the retailers compete in the same market with different products. We determine
the conditions at which the cost-revenue sharing contract and the two-part tariff contract are capa-
ble of coordinating the one-manufacturer two-retailer supply chain system. Lastly, we analyze a
system consisting of multiple complementary suppliers and a single manufacturer. It is assumed
that the suppliers are required to invest in new technologies in order to participate in the supply
chain negotiations. While the manufacturer initially offers a wholesale price contract to the suppli-
ers. We compare both the decentralized and centralized settings, and show that if the supply chain
members decide to cooperate and coordinate the system, they could increase the overall expected
profit by at least 1/3 compared to the non-cooperative scenario. We then find that although the cost-
sharing contract is unable to coordinate the system, the cost-revenue sharing contract is capable of
coordinating the multi-supplier and single-manufacturer supply chain. Moreover, we establish the
conditions at which the cost-revenue sharing contract offers a win-win profit scenario to all parties
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1.1 Overview and Problem statement
According to Forbes (2018), the manufacturing sector is fundamentally changing. Increasingly
industries are turning their competitive advantage focus from a cost-reduction strategy to a more
robust high-tech manufacturing. Cutting-edge technologies enable companies to develop advanced
processes and products which offer higher levels of productivity and quality, and that are better
perceived by the end customer. Recognizing the significance of this transition, a number of na-
tions have already aligned their efforts to support their manufacturing sector on becoming global
high-tech manufacturing leaders. We can mention examples like the China’s Made in China 2025
Program, and the European Union’s Industry 4.0 Program (Subcommittee on advanced manufac-
turing, 2018). As reported by McKinsey Global Institute (2017) the manufacturing sector in U.S.
currently represents 35% of the productivity growth, 60% of exports, 70% of R&D in the private
sector , 9% of employment and 12% of GDP. This report suggests that by 2025, with the contri-
bution of state-of-the-art technology, U.S. manufacturing industry could augment their value up to
US$530 billion which represents a 20% increase, in addition to add 2.4 million jobs to the economy.
U.S.-based manufacturing companies have taken note on this potential benefits. A survey from The
Boston Consulting Group (2015) reveals that 72% of the large-size companies interviewed have
plans to invest in new advanced technologies in the next five years. Table 1.1 presents a summary
of some of the exponential new technologies in manufacturing.
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Table 1.1: Worldwide market of exponential new technologies (source: Deloitte (2018))
Investment Expected investment
Technology Sector 2016 (US$ billion) 2021 (US$ billion)
Additive manufacturing Aerospace, automotive 13 36
Advanced materials Aerospace, automotive 195 283
Advanced robotics and Manufacturing, health care 92 225
cognitive automation
Digital design, simulation, Computer-Aided Design 25 45
and integration
Energy storage Electronics, transportation 37 54
We can consider different sources when referring to new technologies acquisition, i.e. external
and internal sources of technology. Examples of external sources are the merge and acquisition
of tech-companies, and the acquisition of avant-garde equipment or intellectual property. An ex-
ample of internal sources is the development of new processes or products through internal R&D.
According to Thomson Reuters (2016), from the 46,055 merger transactions taken place worldwide
on 2016, 13% (US$487.63 billion) were acquisitions of high-tech companies. Value only surpassed
by merges in the energy and power sector. We can mention cases like Qualcomm’s US$39 billion
purchase of NXP Semiconductors (The New York Times, 2017), Ulta acquisition of QM Scientific
and GlamST (Digiday UK, 2019), and Intel’s US$13.8 billion purchase of Mobileye (J.P. Morgan,
2018). Compared to latter case, purchase of new high-tech equipment or intellectual property re-
quires smaller size investment, but could bring considerable benefits to the company. As example,
when Airbus suffered a shortage of relatively inexpensive parts bought from a supplier, that caused
potential production and revenue losses to the company, Airbus decided to invest on a 3D printer to
manufacture the pieces in-house, saving the company at least 50 days of supply lead times (Strat-
egy&, 2017). Lastly, investment on internal R&D is seen as critical in the manufacturing industry.
Forbes (2018) reported that 86% of the top 100 companies investing into R&D worldwide belong to
the manufacturing sector. Among them it is worth to mention General Electric efforts to build an en-
gine piece using new technologies on additive manufacturing that decreases its weight by 25% and
increases its durability by 5 times, and Ford investment on digital design, simulation, and integration
technologies for developing aluminum castings used for engines, that had helped the company to
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save more than US$120 million and reduced the development time by 15%-25% (The Boston Con-
sulting Group, 2015). To illustrate the magnitude of investment on R & D, Figure 1.1a shows the
private-sector investment per country, and Figure 1.1b presents the investment per industry sector
on 2018.


























(a) Private-sector expenditure in R&D per country
(source: Unesco (2018))

































(b) Expenditure in R&D per company (source: Strat-
egy& (2018))
Figure 1.1: Expenditure in R&D (2018)
Although acquisition of new technologies can become a critical factor of competitive advan-
tage for industries in sectors like aerospace, pharmaceutic and telecommunication, investment on
new technologies is a challenging decision due to its complexity for implementation and the cost
involved. Hence, it is of utmost importance to understand the impact of new technologies on the
performance of the acquiring company and on its supply chain. In order to investigate how tech-
nology can help the economy to increase efficiency and productivity across industries, we aim to
answer the following questions through our research:
• Does new technologies acquisition offer benefits to supply chain members?
• Is it possible to coordinate a supply chain system in presence of technology acquisition deci-
sions?
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• What is the impact of the coordination contracts on the pricing and technology investment
decisions of the system?
• Can the coordination contracts be designed to offer a win-win scenario for all agents of the
negotiation?
1.2 Acquisition of new technologies in the supply chain
Traditionally, supply chain management has centered its attention in studying how materials,
monetary funds and information influence the competitive advantage of the SC agents (Cerchione
& Esposito, 2016); but a fourth dimension, knowledge, has become an increasingly important factor
to be considered (Jiabin, Lili, & Dongmei, 2010; Kang & Jiang, 2011). The field of knowledge
management makes a clear distinction between information and knowledge (Erickson & Rothberg,
2014). Information is seen as descriptions that support the understanding of a specific subject and
that is explicit and easily transferred (Rowley, 2007). There exist a vast literature on analytical
studies that tackle the impact of different types of information on SC performance and how its
accessibility can be of benefit for the SC members. Table 1.2 summarizes some of these works.
Knowledge stands a step further from information as the accumulation of learning, expertise
and know-how useful for the problem solving process but that at the same time poses more diffi-
culties when being managed and shared (Rowley, 2007). Battistella, De Toni, and Pillon (2016)
highlighted that the SC knowledge consists of four basic components, one of them been the techno-
logical component. This latter is the subject of our research. Technology is not limited to tangible
elements like equipment or tools, but it could also refer to intangible aspects like experience and
skills. Table 1.3 presents examples of different expressions of technology.
Global competition makes the acquisition of new technologies crucial for the success of any firm
(Kumar, Luthra, & Haleem, 2015). Due to the increasingly technological complexity and shortened
life-cycle of products, organizations are compelled to continually invest in new technologies to
maintain their positioning in the market (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009). Technology is seen as a
key element for competitive advantage (Reisman, 2005) that can lead companies to access wider
4
Table 1.2: Literature on information in the supply chain
Information Author
Demand forecast Ha, Tong, and Zhang (2011)
Leng and Parlar (2009)
T. Li and Zhang (2015)
Rached, Bahroun, and Campagne (2015)
Production plan Huang, Lau, and Mak (2003)
Inventory level Rached et al. (2015)
H. Zhang, Nagarajan, and Sosˇic´ (2010)
Order quantity Xue, Shen, Tan, Zhang, and Fan (2011)
Shipment information Scott (2015)
C. Zhang, Tan, Robb, and Zheng (2006)
Lead time F. Chen and Yu (2005)
Rached et al. (2015)
Quality level H.-c. P. Choi, Blocher, and Gavirneni (2008)
Wu, Zhai, Zhang, and Liu (2011)
Xue et al. (2011)
Product return information J. Chen (2011)
R. Yan and Cao (2017)
Cost information Gu¨ler, Ko¨rpeog˘lu, and S¸en (2018)
markets, sales increment, cost reduction, brand enhancement, to name but a few (da Silva, Ko-
valeski, & Pagani, 2019; Kumar et al., 2015). And its benefits are not limited only to the owner of
the technology but they can be translated into the performance improvement of the SC as a whole
(Kang & Jiang, 2011). On the other hand, management of new technologies can result challenging
because of its complexity and high cost (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009; Gu¨nsel, 2015), specially for
high-tech industries (Battistella et al., 2016). In this thesis, we study the effect of technology acqui-
sition in the SC performance. Specifically, we consider two main sources of new technologies: (1)
the acquisition of a new technology through its transfer among SC members; and (2) the acquisition
of a new technology through the investment on its own R&D or third-party source outside the SC
5
system.
Table 1.3: Examples of different expressions of technology
Technology aspect Example Technology aspect Example






1.2.1 Transfer of technology among supply chain members
As discussed by Tatikonda and Stock (2003), a SC can be categorized depending on the elements
flowing in the system as either a: product/component SC; or a technology SC. In Chapter 2, we
consider that the system under study not only involves the flow of products, but that a main objective
is the transfer of technology between members. Due to the fact that the performance of a company
is tied to that of its suppliers (Ishizaka & Lo´pez, 2018),OEMs are constantly motivated to improve
its suppliers’ capabilities (El Ouardighi & Kim, 2010; Niosi & Zhegu, 2010) so that they can obtain
parts and components with higher quality and lower cost. Suppliers, in turn, are also encouraged
by the OEM to invest and adopt new technologies. Technology transfer is an essential process
in latter scenario because it favors the diffusion and implementation of new technologies between
SC members in a fraction of the time and cost required by its original developer (Goldstein, 2006).
In our research for Chapter 2 we define two main players in our analysis, a technology source
entity (the OEM) and a technology recipient entity (the Supplier) who are engaged into interfirm
negotiations to attain the transfer of new technologies.
1.2.2 Investment on technology in the supply chain
Different from technology transfer, a SC under technology investment deals only with the flow
of product/component among the members of the system. In this case, the technology is utilized as
a tool to attain system enhancement, i.e. for meeting manufacturing regulations (Bai, Chen, & Xu,
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2017), amelioration of the quality level (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009; Chakraborty, Chauhan, &
Ouhimmou, 2019), etc. Because the required technology is not part of the system, its acquisition is
achieved either through its own R&D or through a third-party technology supplier outside the SC. In
Chapter 3 and 4 we study the impact of technology investment considering different features. Firstly,
Chapter 3 reviews a downstream SC in which the OEM solely decides the level of investment in
new technologies, as it interacts with an oligopoly formed by two Retailers. Secondly, Chapter 4
studies an upstream SC system where multiple Suppliers make decisions on the level of technology
investment they will engage for the components manufactured for the OEM.
Table 1.4 presents a summary of the features considered in the thesis.
1.3 Motivation and Research objectives
In this globalized economy, the fierce competence in the market, added to the increasingly
exigences from customers demanding products with more added value and lower prices, force or-
ganizations to be always at the vanguard to maintain their positioning in the market. One critical
ingredient for maintaining the competitive advantage is the acquisition and implementation of new
technologies for achieving process and product enhancement. This is specially the case for high-
tech industries in sectors like aerospace, pharmaceutic and telecommunication, to name but a few.
But the acquisition of new technologies is a challenging decision due to its complexity for imple-
mentation and the cost involved. Therefore, it becomes critical for the industry sector to determine
the effect of new technologies on the performance of the acquiring company and on its supply chain.
There exist a vast literature that empirically describes the benefits of new technologies implemen-
tation on supply chain systems, but analytical research on this matter is quite scarce. In this thesis,
our main objective is to model and analyze the impact of new technologies on the supply chain
members performance and to demonstrate how it can lead to the coordination of the system. The
specific research objectives of this thesis include:
• Study the effect of technology transfer in a supply chain influenced by market sharing. We
introduce a one-supplier one-manufacturer system under production yield uncertainty and
review the impact of technology transfer and market sharing on the order quantity decision.
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Table 1.4: Summary of the features considered in the thesis
Feature Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Technology acquisition Through transfer among SC members X
Through investment X X
Technology acquisition agents Single agent X X
Multiple agents X
Supply chain decision Technology level X X X
Order quantity X
Retail price X X
Wholesale price X X
Randomness Demand X X
Production yield X
Supply chain category 1 OEM’s upstream X X
OEM’s downstream X
Supply chain category 2 Product / component X X X
Technology X
Supply chain structure One-supplier one-manufacturer X
One-manufacturer two-retailer X
Multi-supplier single-manufacturer X
Market structure Monopoly X X
Oligopoly X
Findings Profit benefit X X X
System coordination X X
Win-win condition X
Bargain analysis X
• Investigate the effect of a manufacturer’s investment decision on new technology on a supply
chain formed by one manufacturer and two retailers influenced by uncertain demand.
• Study the effect of multiple suppliers’ investment decisions on new technologies on the per-
formance of a two echelon supply chain. We consider a system affected by uncertain demand
and analyze the behavior of the pricing decisions for both the manufacturer and suppliers.
8
1.4 Contributions
This thesis presents a number of main contributions in modeling and analyzing the effect of
new technologies on SC performance that differentiate our research from the existing literature.
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• We demonstrate that a supply chain system under technology acquisition decisions can achieve
coordination, and we prove the specific conditions under which different contract agreements
are capable of coordinating the system.
• We show that under particular conditions coordination of the supply chain can lead to a re-
duction on pricing decisions, and at the same time can lead to an increment on the level of
technology acquisition.
• We prove that certain coordination contracts can be designed to reach a win-win state for all
agents of the negotiation.
Specifically, the contributions from Chapter 2 are:
• We find that for each of the considered scenarios, there exists an optimal profit level which is
a concave function on the optimal order quantity.
• We prove the required condition for finding the optimal order quantity, and also show the
benefit for the manufacturer to include supplier’s market sharing into the negotiation in setting
up the supply chain.
• For the considered supply chain systems, we demonstrate that for any level of technology
transfer, the optimal order quantity and therefore the optimal profit are always higher when
the supplier is willing to share some of its market with the manufacturer than the case that
market share is not part of the negotiation. In addition, we also notice certain behaviors of the
proposed models with respect to technology transfer.
• We present the necessary conditions for reaching the optimal technology transfer level even
when the supplier’s market sharing is not included in the supply chain structure.
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From our findings, the main contributions in Chapter 3 are:
• We demonstrate that a one-manufacturer two-retailer SC system under technology investment
can achieve coordination, and we prove the specific conditions under which the CR contract
and the TPT contract are capable of coordinating the system.
• We show that coordination of the supply chain can lead to a reduction on the pricing decisions,
i.e. wholesale price and retail price, and at the same time can lead to an increment on the level
of the technology acquisition decision.
• Through a numerical example we observe that both the CR and TPT contracts can reach a
win-win state for all agents in the supply chain.
The main contributions from Chapter 4 are:
• We prove that if the SC members decide to cooperate and coordinate the system, they could
increase the overall expected profit by at least 1/3 compared to the non-cooperative supply
chain.
• We find that under particular conditions, coordination of the SC can lead to a reduction on
the retail price, and also to an increment on the level of technology acquisition.
• We demonstrate that although the CS contract does not offer the necessary incentives to
coordinate the SC, the CR contract proves to reach perfect coordination of the system.
• We prove that there exist a feasible solution for LBφi ≤ φi ≤ UBφi that offers a win-win
condition for both the manufacturer and the suppliers in the CR contract.
• We show that through bargaining analysis it is possible to determine the optimal negotiation
ability of each SC member.
• The numerical example shows that as the number of suppliers involved in the negotiation in-
crease, benefits on profit and level of technology acquisition further improve when compared
to the decentralized scenario.
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The results of the research shown in this thesis have been presented in the following conferences:
(a) 21st Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS)
(Quebec city, Canada, July 2017).
(b) 2019 International Conference on Intelligent Transportation and Logistics with Big Data &
the 7th International Forum on Decision Sciences (Windsor, Canada, July 2019), where it was
nominated as a candidate for the best paper award.
(c) INFORMS Annual Meeting (Seattle, United States, October 2019).
In addition, three journal articles were used in the body of this thesis and are currently under
review in the following research Journals:
(a) Computers & Industrial Engineering (August 2019).
(b) International Journal of Production Economics (September 2019).
(c) Production and Operations Management (September 2019).
1.5 Organization of the thesis
Chapter 1 provides an overview and a summary of the problem statement, objectives and con-
tributions of this thesis. The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we introduce a supply chain model consisting of one supplier and one manufac-
turer to study the impact of technology transfer and market sharing in the negotiation. We consider
that the manufacturer is the owner of the key technology who decides whether or not to transfer
it to the supplier depending on the openness of the supplier’s market to the manufacturer’s final
products. In Section 2.1 we present a brief introduction, followed by a review in Section 2.2 of the
literature relevant to technology transfer in one of the pillar high-technology industrial sectors, the
aerospace sector. The problem description and model formulation is shown in Section 2.3, followed
by a detailed analysis of the optimal decisions in Section 2.4. A numerical example is provided in
Section 2.5 to illustrate the model and the analytical results. Summary and conclusions are drawn
in Section 2.6.
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In Chapter 3, we review the impact of new technologies on supply chain coordination by in-
vestigating the optimal pricing decisions and technology investment decision in a one-manufacturer
two-retailer system. After the introduction in Section 3.1, a review of the literature relevant to tech-
nology investment and supply chain coordination is presented in Section 3.2. In section 3.3, we
describe the base model and illustrate the supply chain structure. Section 3.4 is dedicated to the
equilibrium analysis. In section 3.5, we set out the cost-revenue sharing contract and the two-part
tariff contract, and determine the coordination conditions for the supply chain participants. In Sec-
tion 3.6, we use a numerical example to discuss the impact of each contract on the supply chain
performance. Lastly, the conclusions are given in section 3.7 followed by future research directions.
In Chapter 4, we analyze a multi-supplier single-manufacturer supply chain system impacted by
technology investment decisions. We first give a brief introduction on Section 4.1, followed by re-
view of the current research on technology acquisition in the supply chain and contract coordination
mechanisms in Section 4.2. In section 4.3, we introduce the base model and explain the structure
of the supply chain model proposed. Section 4.4 is dedicated to the comparison of the decentral-
ized and centralized scenarios in this system. In sections 4.5 and 4.6, we present the cost-sharing
contract and the cost-revenue sharing contract, respectively, and study the conditions at which the
supply chain members can attain the system coordination. In Section 4.7, we develop a numeri-
cal example to discuss the managerial insight of our findings. Finally, the conclusions and future
research directions are given in section 4.8.
Lastly, In Chapter 5, we summarize the main conclusions and future research directions of this
thesis in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
12
Chapter 2
Technology Transfer in a One-supplier
One-manufacturer Supply Chain
Chapter 2 discusses the effect of technology transfer on a supplier-manufacturer relationship
in a supply chain system involving technology transfer and market sharing. We consider the tech-
nology transfer decisions to be made by the original equipment manufacturer, the key technology
owner, as they affect its market share. This chapter proposes three models for analyzing the ef-
fect of technology transfer: (i) a supply chain without technology transfer, (ii) a supply chain with
technology transfer but without supplier’s market sharing, and (iii) a supply chain with technology
transfer and supplier’s market sharing. A numerical example with sensitivity analysis is presented
to illustrate the theoretical findings and analytical results. We show that the optimal profit of the
original equipment manufacturer in a supply chain with technology transfer and market sharing is
typically greater than those without technology transfer or market sharing. The analysis also pro-
vides the conditions for the original equipment manufacturer to enhance technology transfer when
the supplier’s market is open to the final products. The proposed supply chain model is illustrated
with applications in aerospace industry and it can be extended for solving similar problems in other




The aerospace and defense industry is one of the main pillars of U.S. trade that in 2017 generated
$143 billion in sales representing alone 9 percent of American exports (SpaceNews, 2018). On
2018, Boeing sold $101 billion and gave job to more than 150,000 employees worldwide (Boeing,
2018a). A fifth of the commercial aircrafts manufactured by Boeing on 2014 were sold to China, and
it is forecasted that in twenty years Boeing fleet will triple in the country, with expected sales of $950
billion (The Washington Post, 2015). With these considerations, in recent years Boeing has moved
forward to strength its commercial relations with China. On 2018, Boeing opened its first 737s
completion facility in the Asian country, a joint venture with the Chinese state-owned aerospace
company COMAC (Reuters, 2018), as part of the requirements for a $38 billion 300-plane order
of 737 airplanes placed by Chinese airline companies (Bloomberg, 2015). This joint venture is an
example of how Chinese companies can access Boeing technology in exchange of sharing a larger
portion of its local aerospace market (The Washington Post, 2015). For the past ten years India has
been considered as the world’s largest importer of aerospace and defense equipment. Nowadays,
the country is under negotiations with different companies worldwide for a $20 billion 110-fighter
aircraft order. Boeing has offered India to build a new facility in the country for manufacturing its
F/A-18 Super Hornet if it obtains this order. In addition, Boeing has moved forward partnering with
the Indian companies Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. as part of the
agreement (Bloomberg, 2019). The decision of Boeing comes because of the requirement of the
Indian government that the majority of the planes bought from this contract have to be assembled in
the country, as a national effort to make foreign partners transfer state-of-the-art technology to their
local counterparts (The New York Times, 2018). In the case of Airbus, this year China has decided
to place an order of 290 A320 planes and 10 A350s aircrafts summing a total of US$ 35 billion
(South China Morning Post, 2019). For the last decade, Airbus has been assembling its A320s in
China (Yahoo Finance, 2019), but this deal came thanks to an offer of Airbus to expand a production
line in Tianjin that will include a completion center for its A330s (Bloomberg, 2018). All of these
are some examples of how technology transfer can play a crucial role in supply chain negotiations
as an effective tool for further accessing the market demand in foreign nations.
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Although the existence of an ample number of empirical studies that describe the relation be-
tween supply chain performance and the transfer of new technologies between supply chain parties,
analytical research on this matter is quite scarce. In this chapter, our aim is to model and analyze the
impact of technology transfer on the supply chain members performance. Furthermore, this chapter
intends to open the discussion on how technology transfer and market sharing interact at the time
when supply chain actors engage into negotiation. More specifically, this chapter discusses how a
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is concerned with the impact of technology transfer on its
profit and market share. While the supplier is more interested in accessing the OEM’s technology
through the contract. We propose a mathematical model to describe this supply chain system and
present the sufficient conditions for a favorable scenario where technology transfer takes place in
the negotiations.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. After the introduction, a review of the
literature relevant to technology transfer in the aerospace sector is presented in Section 2.2. The
model formulation is shown in Section 2.3, followed by a detailed analysis of the optimal decisions
in Section 2.4. A numerical example is provided in Section 2.5 to illustrate the model and the
analytical results. Summary and conclusions are drawn in Section 2.6.
2.2 Literature review
In the past several decades, emerging economies have sought various ways to shift from labor-
intensive manufacturing to more value-added functions in global supply chains for healthier and
more economical development. Such changes, however, require advanced technological know-hows
and avant-garde level of specializations (Eriksson, 2011; McGuire, 2011). Aerospace industry, for
example, is often considered as one of the strategic and high value-added industry sectors for devel-
oping as well as developed countries (Dostaler, 2013). In the past 50 years, the world commercial
aircraft manufacturing industry has been dominated by major competitors in the US and Western
Europe. Economical benefits and technological advancement have motivated different nations to
venture in the development of this industry (Goldstein, 2006) with new players arising in Asia,
Eastern Europe and Latin America (McGuire, 2011).
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Commercial airplanes are manufactured typically in low volumes and have long life cycles
(Eriksson, 2011). State-of-the-art technology is crucial for success and it requires intensive expenses
in research and development (Eriksson, 2011) with financial returns taking place after long time pe-
riods (McGuire, 2011). Demand is often volatile and purchasing decisions are frequently influenced
by economical, financial and political considerations (Eriksson, 2010). In addition, aerospace prod-
uct development and manufacturing are highly regulated by national and international authorities
(McGuire, 2011) due to the rigorous quality requirements in the sector (Dietrich & Cudney, 2011),
making the lead time from design to market much longer than that of non-aerospace products.
In today’s world, only few nations have the necessary means to sustain the whole aircraft in-
dustry (Eriksson, 2010) with international aerospace supply chains dominated by very few original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Similar to other supply chains, aerospace supply chains are
organized in different tiers. OEMs are at the top of these chains such as Airbus and Boeing domi-
nating the market of mainline and transcontinental commercial aircraft. Bombardier and Embraer
are the main OEMs dominating the regional jet market. The OEMs outsource manufacturing and
certain design functions to Tier 1 suppliers which provide aircraft subsystems and components. Tier
1 suppliers may in turn outsource certain activities to Tier 2 companies. Raw material suppliers are
typically at the bottom of such supply chains (Eriksson, 2010).
Investment required for an aerospace project is often difficult to sustain by an OEM alone.
To survive in this highly competitive industry, an OEM may follow an integrated low-cost strat-
egy. Supplier’s presence in the aerospace sector is becoming increasingly relevant (Morton, Dainty,
Burns, Brookes, & Backhouse, 2006). It has been noticed that commercial aerospace industry is
changing (Dostaler, 2013) from OEM dominated supply chains to more cooperative partnerships
(Wagner, Ohlhausen, Vilsmeier, & Bennion, 1999) with risk and revenue sharing among the parties
at different tiers (Rose-Anderssen, Baldwin, & Ridgway, 2011). As it evolves, higher level of tech-
nology and financial sharing among major project partners has been observed (Rose-Anderssen et
al., 2009).
When an OEM decides to launch a new model or upgrade an existing one, product design, de-
velopment, manufacturing, assembly and services may take place in different countries (Eriksson,
2011). Therefore, the OEM will mainly focus on core activities such as design, system integration
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and marketing, with manufacturing and other activities taking place around the globe (Monroy &
Arto, 2010). On the other hand, this practice has been considered as an opportunity for suppliers
in emerging economies to gain technology advancement (Monroy & Arto, 2010; Niosi & Zhegu,
2010). Similar to the OEMs, many aerospace suppliers also face challenges of high level competi-
tions on safety, quality, performance, and cost-effectiveness in manufacturing aerospace parts and
components (Dostaler, 2013). Due to the fact that the performance of a company is tied to that of its
suppliers (Ishizaka & Lo´pez, 2018), many OEMs have motivated to improve its suppliers’ capabil-
ities in all these aspects (El Ouardighi & Kim, 2010; Niosi & Zhegu, 2010) so that they can obtain
parts and components with higher quality and lower cost. Suppliers, in turn, are also encouraged by
the OEM to invest and adopt new technologies. If not successful, a supplier may be removed from
the supply chain system (Dostaler, 2013).
In this type of supply chains, Tier I suppliers can be less interested in building under license,
but desire to participate in more active ways for accessing the state-of-the-art technology (Niosi
& Zhegu, 2010). In other sectors, it is possible to acquire advanced technology by starting with
lower quality components and moving to higher level products. In aerospace industry, however,
this approach can be difficult or impossible due to extensive regulatory and certification procedures
required for aerospace design, manufacturing and testing processes (McGuire, 2011). A common
strategy used by Tier I suppliers to acquire advanced technology from OEMs is through political
influence (Rose-Anderssen et al., 2011). Supplier’s country may decide to buy significant number
of an OEM’s aircraft if certain important parts and components are designed and manufactured in
the supplier’s country (Buzacott & Peng, 2012). This will not only generate local jobs but also
help local suppliers to absorb foreign technologies (Eriksson, 2010). A local government may
also demand that the OEM transfer some part of the technology to the suppliers in exchange for
further opening the local market to the OEM (McGuire, 2011; Rose-Anderssen et al., 2009). After
the project is complete, the local suppliers may implement the more advanced foreign technology
for subsequent understanding and assimilating to make it own with much reduced time and cost
of research and development (Goldstein, 2006). But in addition outsourcing has proven to be a
fundamental strategy for the manufacturing firms worldwide (Kaur, Singh, & Majumdar, 2018), and
this is not exception for the OEM. Outsourcing design and manufacturing with technology transfer
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may also help the OEM to capture a larger portion of the market outside the supplier’s country
since the final product will have its cost reduced and quality improved as the supplier progresses
with the transferred technology (Aamer, 2018; Niosi & Zhegu, 2010). Therefore, OEM’s outsource
to the supplier results in a mutually beneficial approach for both members of the supply chain
(Gunasekaran & Irani, 2010).
Partnership with suppliers involving technology transfer, however, can be a risky approach for
the OEM in the global competition as technology transfer can also lead to the loss of its competi-
tive advantage over the supplier which may have plan to becoming a new OEM in the near future
(Buzacott & Peng, 2012; Dolgui & Proth, 2013; McGuire, 2011). In addition, technology of one
OEM transferred to a supplier may be used by the latter in producing parts for other OEMs compet-
ing in the same market (Nasr, Kilgour, & Noori, 2015). Consequently, an OEM may safeguard its
sensitive information from competitors by investing in just few high qualified supply chain partners
(Rose-Anderssen et al., 2009). In certain situations, instead of monitoring the supplier, trust and
commitment are necessary in this type of supply chain partnership to avoid opportunistic behavior
(Monroy & Arto, 2010; Rose-Anderssen et al., 2011). Risk and revenue sharing is another way to
obtain commitment of the links in the supply chain (Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997). Risk and
revenue sharing partnership can be seen as a win-win model as the OEM can increase sells while
the supplier has access to its cutting edge technology (Eriksson, 2010).
2.3 Problem Description and Model Formulation
This chapter considers a two level supply chain consisting of an OEM and a supplier. We
assume that there is no forced compliance required on the supplier in the considered supply chain
(Cachon, 2003). In such supply chains, both supplier and OEM are subject to the risk caused by
product quality variations and hence have more opportunities for various forms of sharing, such as
revenue sharing (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005), risk sharing (Chick, Mamani, & Simchi-Levi, 2008),
or information sharing (Ren, Cohen, Ho, & Terwiesch, 2010). Technology transfer discussed in this
chapter is one of these cooperation mechanisms. In this section, we first consider a simple case and
assume that there is no technology transfer from the OEM to the supplier. Then it is presented two
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extended models considering technology transfer from the OEM to the supplier.
2.3.1 Supply Chain without Technology Transfer
In presenting the first model, the primary focus will be on the OEM. Let w be the wholesale
price of the products from the supplier, r be the retail price of the products the OEM will charge
to its end customers. Let X be a random variable representing the quality level of the products
delivered by the supplier, and f(x) be its probability density function with µ = EX . Let T be the
size of the entire market for the products and s be the OEM’s share of the market. Hence the OEM’s
market demand is sT . Finally let q be the quantity of the products that the OEM decides to order
from the supplier so that the OEM’s profit ΠOEM will be maximized.
ΠOEM = EX (rmin{sT, qX} − wqX) . (1)
2.3.2 Technology Transfer without Supplier’s Market Sharing
This chapter now assumes that the OEM owns certain special technology, which, if fully trans-
ferred to the supplier, would improve supplier’s capability in product quality and production cost. It
is further assumed that the OEM may not transfer the whole technology to the supplier for different
reasons, however, decides to transfer part of the technology to the supplier. Let α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) de-
note the percentage of the technology that will be transferred. As results the transferred technology
will improve the quality level X as well as lower the wholesale and retail prices of the end product.
Let w(α) and r(α) be the new wholesale price and retail price, respectively. Let Xα be the ran-
dom variable representing the new quality level, and fα(x) be its probability density function with
µ(α) = EXα. From the above mentioned assumptions, we have µ(α) ≥ µ. Due to the lowered
product cost and higher product quality, the total market size should be improved. Let T (α) be the
new total market and s(α) be the OEM’s new share of the market. Hence the OEM’s new market
demand is s(α)T (α) with s(α)T (α) ≥ sT . Finally, let Q1 be the OEM’s new order quantity. Then
the OEM chooses the optimal Q1 to maximize its profit Π1OEM corresponding to the level α of
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technology transferred to the supplier.
Π1OEM = EXα (r(α) min{s(α)T (α), Q1Xα} − w(α)Q1Xα) . (2)
Clearly, the optimal order quantity depends on α, denoted by Q1(α).
2.3.3 Technology Transfer with Supplier’s Market Sharing
We further assume that the supplier’s local governments have influences on the local market
that the OEM has targeted. Due to the OEM’s technology transfer to the local supplier, the local
market now is open to the OEM’s end products. Assume that the size of the local market is H and
the OEM’s portion of H can be expected at Yα as the result of its technology transfer. In other
words, this influenced market share is not strictly bonded and Yα is a random variable. Let gα(y)
be the probability density function of Yα and EYα = λ(α). This chapter also assumes that λ(α)
is an increasing function of α. In this case, the market demand for the OEM is s(α)T (α) + HYα.
Finally, let Q2 be the OEM’s order quantity in this supply chain system. Then the OEM will choose
the optimal Q2 for the given level α of technology transfer and the given supplier’s market share Yα
to maximize its profit Π2OEM.
Π2OEM = EXα,Yα (r(α) min{s(α)T (α) +HYα, Q2Xα} − w(α)Q2Xα) . (3)
Similarly to that in Section 2.2, Q2(α) is used to denote the optimal order quantity, which is a
function of α.
2.4 Analysis of Optimal Decisions
In this section we derive several basic properties of the three models introduced in the previous
section. For notation simplicity, the next two functions are sometimes used: k(α) := w(α)µ(α)r(α) and
h(α) := s(α)T (α). The notation k := k(0) = wµr and h := h(0) = sT are also used when
appropriate.
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2.4.1 The Optimal Order Quantities and Profits
Proposition 1. We have the following properties concerning to the optimal order quantities and
profits:




xf(x)dx = k. (4)
(2) For any given 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, with quality level being a random variable Xα, Π1OEM is concave




xfα(x)dx = k(α). (5)
(3) For any given 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, with quality level being a random variable, Xα and supplier’s






xfα(x)gα(y)dxdy = k(α). (6)
Proof. Below we prove Point (3) as an example. Proofs for the first two points are similar.








By setting this partial derivative to 0, (6) is obtained.













This implies that Π2OEM is concave on Q2.
Let q denote the optimal order quantity that satisfies (4), this chapter next study the relationship
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between Q1(α) and q. Naturally, it is expected that Q1 is greater than or equal to q if the OEM
transfers some of its technology to the supplier. In addition, Q1(α) should increase as α increases
in a certain range.
Proposition 2. For any given 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the optimal order quantity Q1(α) will increase if the






h′(α) ≥ Q21(α)k′(α). (7)






h′(0) > q2k′(0). (8)










This provides the result by letting Q′1(α) ≥ 0.
The condition (7) can easily be satisfied when h′(α) ≥ 0 and k′(α) ≤ 0 hold simultaneously.
In the numerical example presented in the next section, we can see that this indeed is the case. In
general, h(α) is concave and first increasing then decreasing, while k(α) is convex and decreasing.
Hence in most practical applications, the condition (7) should naturally be satisfied. Since the
profits Π1OEM and Π
2






It is interesting to mention that Proposition 2 shows to the participants of the negotiation that i)
with the given α the highest possible optimal order quantity is not reached, but at the same time that
ii) there exist a positive incremental tendency of the optimal order quantity with that given α. All
this will encourage participants of the supply chain to further increase the percentage of technology
transfer in the negotiation.
Proposition 3. For any given 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
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(1) Q2(α) > Q1(α);
(2) Π2OEM(α) > Π
1
OEM(α).
Proof. (1) Given α, by (5) and (6), we have
∫ 1







Applying the mean value theorem, there exists a 0 < ξ < 1, such that F (ξ) =
∫ 1












, hence Q2(α) > Q1(α).
(2) Given α, since Q2(α) is the optimal order quantity that maximizes OEM’s profit when supplier
shares some market Yα andQ1(α) 6= Q2(α), hence Π2OEM(Q2(α), α) > Π2OEM(Q1(α), α), where
Π2OEM(Q1(α), α) = EXα,Yα (r(α) min{h(α) +HYα, Q1(α)Xα} − w(α)Q1(α)Xα) .
Since HYα ≥ 0, we have that min{h(α) + HYα, Q1(α)Xα} ≥ min{h(α), Q1(α)Xα}, hence
Π2OEM(Q1(α), α) ≥ Π1OEM(Q1(α), α), therefore Π2OEM(Q2(α), α) > Π1OEM(Q1(α), α), as de-
sired.
As a simple summary of the above analysis, it is shown that Q2(α) > Q1(α) > q and
Π2OEM(Q2(α), α) > Π
1
OEM(Q1(α), α) > ΠOEM for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 in most cases. Propo-
sition 3 evidences to the OEM that any level of technology transfer is of benefit for the negotiation.
But it is important to remark that when designing the contract, the OEM should seek for the sce-
nario in which the supplier agrees on an increment of the market share, as this will be translated into
higher benefits.
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2.4.2 The Behavior of the Technology Transfer Models
As discussed in the previous section, both OEM and supplier are interested in knowing the val-
ues of αi that maximizes ΠiOEM(α) for i = 1, 2, respectively. In the following analysis we assume





respectively. By the nature of the considered problem, ΠiOEM(α) can achieve its maximal value
whenever Qi(α) does so, hence to analyze ΠiOEM(α), it is sufficient to analyze Qi(α). This sim-
plification enables us to be able to gain certain insightful understanding on the behavior of α1 and
α2 depending on other functions in the proposed models.
Proposition 4. If there exits one α0 ∈ (0, 1] such that k′(α0) = 0 and h′(α0) = 0 hold simultane-
ously, then α2 = α1 = α0.

























Applying the condition that k′(α0) = h′(α0) = 0, gives as result thatQ′1(α0) = 0 andQ′2(α0) = 0,
the concavity assumption then implies the assertion.
The condition in Proposition 4 may have slight chance to happen in certain situations while it
should be avoided by the supply chain parties in the negotiation for technology transfer in exchange
of market opening. The reason for this is that under this scenario, designing a contract with or
without an increment in the market share, will lead in both cases that the highest optimal profit is
obtained with the same level of technology transfer. And by knowing this, the supplier will not have
an incentive to increase the market share to the OEM.





> 0 for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then α2 > α1.
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Proof. If we consider the extreme case that the random variables take their expectation values with
full probability, it is obtained
Π1OEM = r(α) min{h(α), µ(α)Q1(α)} − µ(α)w(α)Q1(α),
and
Π2OEM = r(α) min{h(α) +Hλ(α), µ(α)Q2(α)} − µ(α)w(α)Q2(α).








µ(α) . By the assumption
that Qi(α) are concave and αi maximizes Qi(α) for i = 1, 2, we know that Q′1(α1) = 0 and







> 0, hence it is demonstrated






> 0 for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 has an intuitive interpretation. It in fact requires
that the supplier’s market sharing percentage Yα be increased faster than the increase of the quality
improvement resulted from the technology transfer. In contrast to Proposition 4, clearly this is a
desirable situation for the OEM. The above proposition states that under this situation the OEM
would be willing to transfer more technology to the supplier. This in turn, provides the incentive for
the supplier side to share more of its market for this increase level of technology transfer. Therefore,
this proposition gives us a simple description of the “win-win” situation. For example, the condition
in this proposition is satisfied in the numerical example in Section 2.5, hence it is expected by this
proposition that α2 ≥ α1, which is indeed verified there.
The above two propositions, as a whole, indicate certain conditions to be avoided and parameter
values to seek for in their negotiations to reach a “win-win” situation between the OEM and supplier
in the supply chain.
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2.5 Numerical Example







, (0 < i < 1), w(α) = w − w˜
d
αp, (0 < p < 1);
r(α) = r − r − w
m
αq, (0 < q < 1), s(α) = −uα2 + vα+ s;
T (α) = T (1 +
αe
n
), (0 < e < 1), l(α) = a+ (b− a)√α;
λα = λα




EYα = λ(α) =
λα
2
, f(x) = 6(x− a)(x− 1)(a− 1)−3;
fα(x) = 6[x− l(α)][x− 1][l(α)− 1]−3, gα(y) = −6λ−2α y(λ−1α y − 1).
Some interpretation of these functions are given below.
• w˜: This can be viewed as the difference between unit wholesale price and unit production
cost;
• s: This the OEM’s market share before technology sharing;
• s(α): Assume that s(α) is concave, for simplicity, in this chapter, a quadratic function is
used;
• l(α): Assume that the OEM requires that the products delivered from the supplier satisfy a
minimal quality level, denoted by this l(α). Hence l(α) ≤ fα(x) ≤ 1;
• a, b: They are the bounds of supplier’s quality level corresponding to no technology transfer
(α = 0) and full technology transfer (α = 1), respectively. Naturally, a < b with b close to
1.0;
• λ: This is the upper bound of the market that the supplier can share when full technology
transfer is realized (i.e., α = 1);
• f(x), fα(x), gα(y): It is assumed that they are all quadratic functions which are used to
approximate the normal distribution density functions;
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• d, h,m, n, p, q, e, i, u, v: These are constants. Their values determine the shape of the corre-
sponding functions.
Where the expected value of fα(x) (EXα) and gα(y) (EYα) increase with respect to α. Meaning
that an increment of technology transfer will lead to the improvement of quality and more willing-
ness from the Supplier’s country to open her market to the OEM respectively. c(α), w(α) and r(α)
reduce with respect to α. This behavior is expected because the improvement in technology leads to
quality enhancement and this latter to a reduction in scrap and rework. All of this being translated
into pricing discounts. On the other hand, T (α) and s(α) increase with respect to α. This can be
understood as the effect of pricing discount into the market. Where lower prices bring the attention
of more possible buyers and in addition better place the retailer in the market.
The quality lower bound amay vary for different industries. For example, in aerospace industry,
it can usually be high, say a = 90%. The value of λ is also industry specific and depends on
the supplier’s influencing power on his country’s market. If the supplier has strong influence on
the local market (e.g., when the supplier is directly related to the country’s government), λ can
be quite large. On the other hand, it could be very small if the supplier has only very limited
influence on the decisions regarding the country’s market. In particular, this chapter has assumed
that the supplier’s wholesale price changes according to a convex function, and the supplier’s market
sharing uncertainty follows a quadratic distribution to approximate the normal distribution. Since
in this example we have µ(α) = a+(b−a)
√
α+1










3λ(b− a)α3/2 + λ(1 + a)α
8
> 0, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
hence by proposition 5, we expect α2 > α1, which will be verified shortly.
2.5.1 Numerical data and Results
The data shown in Table 2.1 are used in the numerical example as parameters for the selected
functions.
In order to build a more realistic numerical example, it is considered as reference the information
available from one of the well-known aircraft manufacturers, i.e. Boeing company. The Earnings
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Table 2.1: Numerical Example Data - Function Parameters
Parameter a b d h m n p q e i u v
Value 90% 95% 2 3 3 8 1/2 1/2 1/2 3/4 0.20 0.26
release report from Boeing (Boeing, 2018b) showed that on the first half of 2018 the company
delivered worldwide a total of 378 commercial airplanes. This represented to Boeing $ 28,133 mil-
lions in revenue ($74,425,926/airplane). The Current market outlook report from Boeing (Boeing,
2017) forecasted that in the next 20 years (2017 - 2036) the global demand of aircrafts will reach
to 41,030 deliveries (2,052 deliveries/year), representing a total of $ 6.1 trillions in market value.
For the same period, this report forecasted that China alone will demand 7,240 aircrafts (362 air-
crafts/year) representing $ 1,085 billions. Additionally, a publication of Bidness Etc (Bidness Etc,
2015), mentioned that on 2014 Boeing owned 47% of the global commercial aircraft revenues. And
according to Crucial Perspective (Crucial Perspective, 2018), on 2018 45% of all aircraft owned by
China buyers will be built by Boeing.
Considering this information, the numeric example is modeled as follows. It is assumed that an
OEM and a Supplier engage into negotiation. On one side, the OEM is a powerful participant in the
aerospace market who is responsible of s= 45% of the T=2,500 aircraft sold yearly worldwide. On
the other side, the Supplier is considered as a champion manufacturer in her country and that pos-
sess considerable influence about the strategic decisions done by her government in the aerospace
sector. Knowing that the Supplier’s country is a critical customer that alone demands H=450 air-
planes/yearly, the OEM decides to partially transfer his technology to the Supplier. In exchange
the Supplier agrees to support an increase of at most λ= 30% of the OEM’s sales in her country.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the unit retail price is r= $75,000,000 and unit wholesale price is
w=$45,000,000. The decision for the OEM now is to decide which is the percentage of technology
α that should be transferred in order to maximize the benefits. A summary of this data is shown in
Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Numerical Example Data - OEM & Supplier information
Parameter r w w˜ T H s λ
Value $75,000,000 $45,000,000 $25,000,000 2,500 450 45.00% 30.00%
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After solving the model without technology transfer, i.e., with α = 0, the results are: q = 1, 175,
and ΠOEM = 32.95. Results presented in Table 2.3 are optimal order quantities Qi(α) and optimal
profits ΠiOEM(α), i = 1, 2, corresponding to different levels of technology transfer, i.e., for different
values of α with 0 < α ≤ 1.
Table 2.3: Optimal Order Quantities and Profits





(billion dollars) (billion dollars)
0.0 1,175 1,175 32.95 32.95
0.1 1,279 1,280 36.25 36.27
0.2 1,351 1,354 38.44 38.52
0.3 1,408 1,415 40.21 40.39
0.4 1,453 1,464 41.61 41.92
0.5 1,486 1,503 42.66 43.13
0.6 1,507 1,532 43.35 44.01
0.7 1,515 1,549 43.69 44.56
0.8 1,512 1,556 43.68 44.76
0.9 1,497 1,551 43.31 44.62
1.0 1,469 1,535 42.59 44.14
The results in Table 2.3 are also plotted to graphically compare optimal order quantities and
optimal profits as shown in Figures 2.1a and 2.1b, respectively. As can be seen from Figures 2.1a
and 2.1b, we have α1 = 0.7 < α2 = 0.8, for Q1(α1) = 1, 515 < Q2(α2) = 1, 556, and for
Π1OEM(α1) = 43.69 < Π
2
OEM(α2) = 44.76. The large values of profit obtained from this nu-
merical example result from considering only the cost of bought-out components (wholesale price
of the supplier) at the moment of calculating the optimal profit for the OEM. The other cost terms,
detailed in the work of S. G. Sturmey Sturmey (1964), are ignored from the analysis as they do
not affect the relation between the OEM and Supplier. From our results we show that by engaging
into a technology transfer agreement, the OEM could increase at most 28.94% of his aircraft orders
to obtain the maximum profit. And with the addition of the market shared by the Supplier, this
increase could reach to 32.43%. Furthermore, These results have in particular verified Proposition
3 and Proposition 5. They showed the benefits for both the OEM and the supplier to engage in a
technology and market sharing win-win cooperation.
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Without Supplier Market Sharing
With Supplier Market Sharing
(a) Comparison of Optimal Order Quantities












Without Supplier Market Sharing
With Supplier Market Sharing
(b) Comparison of Optimal Profits
Figure 2.1: Optimal results for Q∗ and Π∗
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Due to complexity of the proposed models, some of the analytical properties are difficult to
demonstrate on a general basis. The analysis below is intended to clarify some interesting phenom-
ena and insights through numerical analysis.
Results Sensitivity on Probability Density Functions
Both of the model of technology transfer without supplier’s market sharing (TS-1) and the model
of technology transfer with supplier’s market sharing (TS-2) have two random variables, Xα, the
product quality level, and Yα, the portion of the supplier’s home market offered to the OEM. Their
probability density functions are fα(x) and gα(y), respectively. In this analysis, we further use
another group of density functions with larger mean values to analyze their effects on the results of
the proposed models. These specific functions are given below.
f1α(x) = 6[x− 1][l(α)− 1]−3[4[x− l(α)] + [l(α)− 1]],











. The results using these function values are summa-
rized in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis - Modification on Probability Density Functions
Model Case α Q Π
(billion dollars)
TS-1 fα(x) 0.6 1,507 43.35
0.7 1,515 43.69
0.8 1,512 43.68
f1α(x) 0.6 1,488 45.65
0.7 1,497 45.86
0.8 1,495 45.72
TS-2 fα(x), gα(y) 0.6 1,532 44.01
0.7 1,549 44.56
0.8 1,556 44.76










α(y) 0.6 1,533 51.36
0.7 1,553 52.58
0.8 1,559 53.41
It can be seen from the results of the TS-1 model that the improvement of the expected quality
level lead to a reduction of the optimal order quantity q and an increased optimal profit Π due to the
reduction of the nonconformity production. As an example it is shown that Q(α = 0.7)= 1,515 for
fα(x) is greater than Q(α = 0.7)= 1,497 for f1α(x), but Π(α = 0.7)= 43.69 for fα(x) is less than
Π(α = 0.7)= 45.86 for f1α(x). The behavior of the optimal order quantity and profit from the TS-2
model is more complex due to gα(y). Using the same probability density function for quality level,
the larger expected market share in supplier’s country increases both the optimal order quantity q
and the optimal profit Π. For example, when Q(α = 0.7)= 1,549 and Π(α = 0.7)= 44.56 for fα(x)
and gα(y) are less than Q(α = 0.7)= 1,574 and Π(α = 0.7)= 49.57 for fα(x) and g1α(y). But when
the expected quality level is improved we can see a behavior similar to TS-1.
Concavity of Optimal Qi(α) and ΠiOEM(α)
The graphs in Figures 2.1a and 2.1b show that the optimal Q1, Q2, Π1OEM and Π
2
OEM are con-
cave functions of α. As discussed earlier, such phenomena depends on the relationship of different
functions used in the proposed models. Assume now, for example, the following 3 cases in which
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the OEM’s market share is described by the functions:

Case 1: s(α) = s− 1.2(α− 0.5)4 + 0.3(α− 0.5)2
Case 2: s(α) = s− α23 (1− α) + α(α+1)4
Case 3: s(α) = s− α35 + α
3
4
In Figure 2.2a it is shown the behavior of these market share functions with respect to α. The
optimal quantities are recalculated with results illustrated in Figures 2.2b, 2.2c and 2.2d. It is noticed
in these three cases that Q(α) is no longer a concave function of α. Case 1 shown in Figure
2.2b presents two local maximums for the optimal order quantity (Q1(α = 0.2) = 1, 278 and
Q1(α = 0.9) = 1, 340 for TS-1; and Q2(α = 0.2) = 1, 280 and Q2(α = 0.9) = 1, 394 for
TS-2). Similarly, case 2 shown in Figure 2.2c presents two local maximums for the optimal order
quantity (Q1(α = 0.3) = 1, 475 and Q1(α = 1.0) = 1, 476 for TS-1; and Q2(α = 0.3) = 1, 481
and Q2(α = 1.0) = 1, 542 for TS-2). On the other hand, the optimal quantity in case 3 is a
convex function of α with a maximum optimal order quantity at α=1.0 (Q1(α = 1.0) = 1, 440 and
Q2(α = 1.0) = 1, 505 for TS-1 and TS-2 respectively). Proposition 2 can be used to demonstrate
the multiple changes in tendency of Q(α) with respect to α.
Optimal α disparity for Qi and ΠiOEM
The numeric example presented in this section considers that both retail price and wholesale
price, denoted as r(α) and w(α) respectively, decrease in a similar proportion when α increases.
Now it is considered an unusual situation where w(α) decreases faster than r(α) decreases. This
situation may occur when, for example, the access to the advanced technology allows the supplier
to reduce rework or scrap leading to a reduction in the wholesale price. At the same time, however,
OEM-A does not or will not pass this cost reduction to its retail price. The following parameters are
redefined in this situation by setting d = 6, m = 12 and p = 2. Under these particular conditions an
interesting phenomenon is observed from the results in Table 2.5. As shown in this table, the largest
optimal order quantity Qi and the highest optimal profit value ΠiOEM are obtained with different
levels of technology transfer, denoted by αQi and α
Π
i respectively, for i= 1,2.
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(a) Cases of analysis for Market share (s)


















Without Supplier Market Sharing
With Supplier Market Sharing
(b) Case 1: Comparison of Q∗


















Without Supplier Market Sharing
With Supplier Market Sharing
(c) Case 2: Comparison of Q∗


















Without Supplier Market Sharing
With Supplier Market Sharing
(d) Case 3: Comparison of Q∗
Figure 2.2: Sensitivity Analysis - Modification on Market Share behavior
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Table 2.5: Sensitivity Analysis - Disparity for Qi and ΠiOEM





(billion dollars) (billion dollars)
0.0 1,175 1,175 32.95 32.95
0.1 1,277 1,278 35.3 35.32
0.2 1,348 1,351 37.14 37.22
0.3 1,406 1,412 38.74 38.91
0.4 1,450 1,461 40.11 40.41
0.5 1,483 1,500 41.28 41.73
0.6 1,504 1,528 42.24 42.88
0.7 1,513 1,546 42.98 43.82
0.8 1,510 1,553 43.49 44.55
0.9 1,494 1,548 43.75 45.05
1.0 1,467 1,529 43.74 45.31
As can be seen from Table 2.5, we have αQ1 = 0.7 < α
Q
2 = 0.8, α
Π





1 ) = 1, 513 < Q2(α
Q








2 ) = 45.31. These
results do not nullify Proposition 3 nor Proposition 5. Rather, they demonstrate that under certain
conditions, e.g., an unusual cost structure in the supply chain, it is possible that the highest optimalQ
and ΠOEM can be obtained at different levels of technology transfer such as α
Q
1 = 0.7 6= αΠ1 = 0.8
and αQ2 = 0.9 6= αΠ2 = 1.0.
2.6 Conclusion
Challenges from today’s globalized economy demand that multi-national OEMs implement new
strategies for entering new market and maintaining their presence in different countries. This chapter
discusses the possibility and related issues of using technology transfer as a tool to obtain market
share from the supplier’s country. We consider uncertain product quality level and market share
portions and proposed three related models for: (i) supply chains with neither technology transfer
nor supplier’s market sharing, (ii) supply chains with technology transfer but without supplier’s
market sharing, and (iii) supply chains with technology transfer and supplier’s market sharing. Each
of these models was analyzed with observations discussed. Results demonstrate that for each of
the considered scenarios, there exists the optimal profit level which is a concave function on the
optimal order quantity. The required condition for finding the optimal order quantity is developed.
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It is also shown the benefit for an OEM to include supplier’s market sharing into the negotiation
in setting up the supply chain. For the considered supply chain systems, we prove that for any
level of technology transfer, the optimal order quantity and therefore the optimal profit are always
higher when the supplier is willing to share some of its market with the OEM than the case that
market share is not part of the negotiation. We also notice certain behaviors of the proposed models
with respect to technology transfer. This chapter presents the necessary conditions for reaching
the optimal technology transfer level even when supplier’s market sharing is not included in the
supply chain structure. The OEM may attempt to avoid such situation as the supplier may not be
willing to open its market. On the other hand, it is also shown the presence of a favorable scenario
for the OEM in which the optimal level of technology transfer is higher when the access to the
supplier’s market is realized than otherwise. To reach this result, access to the supplier’s market
should be increased faster than product quality improvement through technology transfer. Under
this condition, the OEM is willing to engage in higher level of technology transfer as it will lead to
higher profit.
The research work presented in this chapter can be extended in several ways. First, it can in-
clude and analyze the supplier’s benefits in deciding the optimal OEM order quantity. A supply
chain system in aerospace industry, for example, normally consists of several different tiers of sup-
pliers. Therefore it is also of interest to study how technology transfer may affects multiple-echelon
supply chains. Finally, the models proposed in the present research are based on the assumption of
deterministic demand. It is of interest and practical importance to include demand uncertainties in
extending the models for practical applications.
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Chapter 3
Technology Investment in a
One-manufacturer Two-retailer Supply
Chain
Access to new technologies is a key factor of competitive advantage for many supply chains.
Chapter 3 explores the impact of technology investment on supply chain coordination. To be spe-
cific, we analytically investigate the optimal pricing and technology investment decisions in a sys-
tem consisting of one original equipment manufacturer and two competing retailers. On one hand,
the manufacturer is required to invest in new technologies in order to improve its performance. On
the other hand, the retailers act as Stackelberg followers, competing in the same market with dif-
ferent products. We find the conditions on which the cost-revenue sharing (CR) contract and the
two-part tariff (TPT ) contract are capable of coordinating the one-manufacturer two-retailer supply
chain. Moreover, through a numerical example we show that under specific conditions both the CR
and TPT contracts are capable of reaching a win-win-win state for all member of the supply chain
system. The work in Chapter 3 has been submitted and is currently under review on the International
Journal of Production Economics.
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3.1 Introduction
As reported by Forbes (2018), the manufacturing sector is fundamentally changing. It has been
noticed that a growing number of companies are switching their competitive advantage focus from
a cost-reduction strategy to more high-tech manufacturing strategies. Hence, regions like the Eu-
ropean Union or countries like China have already announced their efforts to support their industry
sector on becoming global high-tech manufacturing leaders (Subcommittee on advanced manufac-
turing, 2018). The Boston Consulting Group (2015) reveals that 72% of the large-size companies
are planning to acquire state-of-the are technology in the next five years. Table 3.1 shows a summary
of some of the current new technologies that are of interest in the industry sector worldwide.
Table 3.1: New technologies investment worldwide (source: Deloitte (2018))
Investment Expected investment
Technology Sector 2016 (US$ billion) 2021 (US$ billion)
Additive manufacturing Aerospace, automotive 13 36
Advanced materials Aerospace, automotive 195 283
Advanced robotics and Manufacturing, health care 92 225
cognitive automation
Digital design, simulation, Computer-Aided design 25 45
and integration
Energy storage Electronics, transportation 37 54
Companies can sought different alternatives when investing on new technologies, i.e. through
its acquisition from a third party company, through its internal R&D, among others. Forbes (2018)
reported that 86% of the top 100 companies investing into R&D worldwide belong to the manu-
facturing sector. Examples are General Electric and its efforts to build an engine piece using new
technologies on additive manufacturing that decreases its weight by 25% and increases its durabil-
ity by 5 times, and Ford investment on digital design, simulation, and integration technologies for
developing aluminum castings used for engines, that had helped the company to save more than
US$120 million and reduced the development time by 15%-25% (The Boston Consulting Group,
2015). Compared to internal R&D, acquisition of third party new high-tech equipment or intel-
lectual property requires smaller size investment, and at the same time could bring considerable
benefits to the company. As example, when Airbus suffered a shortage of relatively inexpensive
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parts bought from a supplier, potential production and revenue losses to the company were caused.
To tackle this issue, Airbus decided to invest on a 3D printer to manufacture the pieces in-house,
saving the company at least 50 days of supply lead times (Strategy&, 2017).
Although the potential benefits of new technologies acquisition on processes and product en-
hancement, investment in new technologies is a challenging decision due to their complexity for
implementation and the cost involved. Therefore, it become critical for the industry sector to deter-
mine the effect of new technologies on the performance of the acquiring company and on its supply
chain. Despite the existing of a vast number of empirical studies and reports reviewing the benefits
and drawbacks of new technologies investment on supply chain performance, analytical research
on this matter is quite scarce. In this chapter, our objective is to model and analyze the effect of
new technologies investment on the SC members performance. Specifically, we aim to answer the
following questions:
• Can a one-manufacturer two-retailer SC system be coordinated in presence of technology
investment?
• What is the impact of the coordination contracts on the pricing and technology acquisition
decisions of the system?
• If the CR and TPT contracts are used to coordinate the SC, can these contracts be designed
to offer a win-win scenario for all agents of the negotiation?
From our findings, the contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follow: (i) we demon-
strate that a SC under technology investment can achieve coordination, and we prove the specific
conditions under which the CR contract and the TPT contract are capable of coordinating the
system, (ii) we show that coordination of the supply chain can lead to a reduction on the pricing
decisions, i.e. wholesale price and retail price, and at the same time can lead to an increment on the
level of technology acquisition decision, and (iii) we observe that both the CR and TPT contracts
can reach a win-win state for all agents in the supply chain.
38
3.2 Literature review
Our research is closely related to two streams of literature: the literature on knowledge manage-
ment that studies the impact of technology in the SC, and the literature on SC coordination through
coordination contracts. We detail below the relevant literature and how our study relates to but
greatly differs from these streams.
3.2.1 Impact of technology investment in the supply chain
Global competition makes the investment in new technologies crucial for the success of any firm
(Kumar et al., 2015). Due to the increasingly technological complexity and shortened life-cycle of
products, organizations are compelled to continually invest in new technologies to maintain their
positioning in the market (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009). Technology is seen as a key element
for competitive advantage (Reisman, 2005) that can lead companies to access wider markets, sales
increment, cost reduction, brand enhancement, to name but a few (da Silva et al., 2019; Kumar et al.,
2015). And its benefits are not limited only to the owner of the technology but they can be translated
into the performance improvement of the SC as a whole (Kang & Jiang, 2011). On the other
hand, management of new technologies can result challenging because of their complexity and high
cost (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009; Gu¨nsel, 2015), specially for high-tech industries (Battistella et
al., 2016). Firms can access new technologies either through their internal development in their
R&D departments (Tatikonda & Stock, 2003), or thanks to their acquisition from external sources
(Brunswicker & Vanhaverbeke, 2015). Examples of new technologies in the SC can be quite diverse.
It can refer to any one or the combination of tangible aspects like materials, tools, equipment,
machinery; or intangible elements like skills, applied knowledge, methods, intellectual property,
among others (da Silva et al., 2019; Liu, Fang, Shi, & Guo, 2016; Reisman, 2005). An example
of analytical research regarding the impact of new technologies on SC performance can be found
in the work of Chakraborty et al. (2019). The authors examine the effect of new technologies on
product quality improvement and they demonstrate how collaborative contracts can be of benefit
for all SC members. Similarly, Bai et al. (2017) study how the investment in new sustainable
green technologies can contribute to the carbon emission reduction in a SC. Furthermore, they use
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contract coordination to determine the necessary conditions to maximize the SC profit. Bhaskaran
and Krishnan (2009) conceptualize and model the development process of new products between
two firms with different R&D capabilities and study how revenue, technological innovation and
investment sharing can benefit the overall performance of the SC system. In their research the
authors establish the conditions at which any of the proposed sharing mechanisms would be of
interest for the firms. Wang and Shin (2015) review a two-echelon SC system with a supplier and
manufacturer undertaking innovation initiatives. The authors formulated three contract scenarios for
the negotiation: wholesale price contract, quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and revenue-
sharing contract. They demonstrate that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates the SC, whereas
the other two contracts may reach coordination depending on specif conditions. Furthermore, the
authors extend the model to analyze the impact on SC performance when considering the existence
of two competing suppliers, and of two complementary suppliers in the system.
Although the existence of an ample number of empirical studies that describe the relation be-
tween SC performance and new technologies investment, analytical research on this matter is quite
scarce. In this chapter, our aim is to model and analyze the impact of new technologies investment
on the SC members performance and to determine how it can lead to the coordination of the SC
system. Furthermore, our aim is to prove that on specific conditions, sharing the cost of the tech-
nology investment among the SC parties could result into a win-win-win state for all agents of the
negotiation.
3.2.2 Supply chain coordination using cost-revenue sharing or two-part tariff con-
tracts
The field of SC management has widely examined the SC coordination. The reader is referred
to Chan and Chan (2010) for a detailed review on this topic. SC contracts is one of the main mecha-
nisms studied in the literature for achieving coordination. Among these contracts, the cost-revenue
sharing contract and the two-part tariff contract are well-known and extensively adopted in many
organizations. Kunter (2012) investigates a contract of royal payments between a manufacturer and
a retailer. The author demonstrates that SC coordination can be achievable if both parties engage
into marketing cost and revenue sharing efforts. Furthermore, he observes that the elimination of
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double marginalization is not a requirement for coordination. Bai et al. (2017) examine a sustain-
able SC formed by one manufacturer and one retailer with deteriorating items and under carbon
cap-and-trade regulation. The authors propose two coordination mechanisms in their research, the
revenue and promotional cost-sharing contract and the two-part tariff contract. They demonstrate
that both contracts are capable to reach coordination and they determine the win-win conditions for
the SC members. Moreover, the authors prove that the two-part tariff contract is more robust com-
pared to the revenue and promotional cost-sharing contract. H. Yang and Chen (2018) investigate a
manufacturer-retailer system undertaking carbon emission abatement efforts subject to carbon tax-
ation. The authors propose the cost, the revenue, and the cost-revenue sharing contracts to analyze
their impact on the SC negotiation. They find that under specific conditions the three contracts can
offer benefits to both parties while increasing the abatement level in the SC. Zheng et al. (2015)
explore the behavior of a supplier-retailer SC affected by demand disruption and marketing effort.
The study reveals the conditions at which the revenue and marketing cost sharing contract is ca-
pable to coordinate the SC in both the normal and the disrupted demand scenarios. Moreover, the
authors investigate the impact of the bargain power on the negotiation. Xie et al. (2018) examine
a closed-loop SC consisting on one manufacturer and one retailer. In their model they consider
that the manufacturer sells online, while the retailer conducts offline sales and recycles used prod-
ucts through the reverse-channel. The authors demonstrate that the revenue-sharing contract can
mitigate the online and offline channel conflict between the parties, whereas that the cost-sharing
contract can motivate the remanufacturing efforts of the retailer. T. Li, Zhang, Zhao, and Liu (2019)
investigate a two-echelon SC undertaking carbon emission reduction efforts. The authors propose
three coordination mechanisms to motivate participation of the manufacturer on green investment
initiatives, namely the cost-sharing, the revenue-sharing and the cost-revenue sharing contracts. In
addition, the basic contracts are further extended to consider the bargaining power of the SC agents.
Their findings suggest that the basic models are capable to coordinate the SC, while bargaining sce-
narios do not. Inaba (2018) analyzes a revenue and cost sharing contract as a mechanism to enhance
the remanufacturer-retailer SC. In this study the author investigates the scenario when the retailer
is the Stackelberg leader of the negotiation, and the one when the leader is the remanufacturer. Re-
sults from the numerical example show that in both cases the proposed contract can achieve a higher
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expected profit for the two parties.
The two-part tariff contract is another contract extensively adopted in industry. X. Li, Chen,
and Ai (2019) investigate a supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers and two com-
peting retailers where demand information asymmetry takes place. The authors propose a two-part
tariff contract with information asymmetry and demonstrate the conditions at which this contract
can offer a win-win scenario for both manufacturers and retailers. X. Yan (2015) examines a one-
manufacturer one-retailer SC subject to quality improvement efforts. The author proposes three
coordination mechanisms in his research, the two-part tariff contract, the revenue-sharing contract
and the effort cost sharing contract. He proves that these three contracts can improve the perfor-
mance of the SC, but that only the combination of the revenue-sharing contract and the effort cost
sharing contract can reach the coordination of the system. Hong and Guo (2019) investigate a two-
echelon SC where environmental responsibilities are considered. The authors model this system
using three contracts: the price-only contract, the green-marketing cost-sharing contract, and the
two-part tariff contract. They find that the two-part tariff contract offers higher environmental ben-
efits compared to the other two contracts and enables coordination of the SC. Biswas, Avittathur,
and Chatterjee (2016) explore the behavior of a one-supplier two-buyers SC considering complete
and partial decentralization under information asymmetry. Their study reveals that both the two-
part tariff and the quantity discount contract are capable of coordinating the system regardless the
SC structure. Shen, Xu, and Choi (2019) examine a one-manufacturer one-retailer make-to-order
system where two products are offered to the market. The authors show that the two-part tariff
contract and the revenue sharing contract can reach to SC coordination. Furthermore, they extend
their study by analyzing two cases: both products are substitutable in the market, and the retailer is
a risk averse agent. The authors prove that under these conditions both contracts can still coordinate
the system. Feng, Govindan, and Li (2017) investigate a two-echelon reverse SC consisting of a
recyclable dealer and a recycler. The authors propose the study of a dual-recycling channel, formed
by a traditional and an online recycling channel. They observe that a contract with transfer and
online recycling prices is able to coordinate the systems but it is disadvantageous for the dealer. The
authors prove that the two-part tariff contract and the profit sharing contract can coordinate the SC
and that at the same time offer a win-win scenario for both parties.
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The limited current literature investigating technology investment presents simple models, con-
sidering deterministic conditions or simple SC structures. In this work, we further approach to a real
SC scenario on which the existence of uncertainty plays a role in the negotiation and at the same
time a more complex SC structure, considering one-manufacturer two-retailer, is studied. More-
over, in this chapter, distinct from the above mentioned literature, we study the cost and revenue
sharing contract and the two-part-tariff contract considering important factors such as the positive
effect of technology investment in a technology-aware market and the associated costs.
Table 3.2 presents the literature positioning of our research.
Table 3.2: Literature positioning of this research
SC decisions SC characteristics Findings
Technology Retail Wholesale 1 manufacturer - Stochastic Coordination Win-win
Paper investment pricing pricing 2 retailers demand condition situation
Bai et al. (2017) X X X X X
Battistella et al. (2016) X
Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009) X
Biswas et al. (2016) X X X X
Brunswicker and Vanhaverbeke (2015) X
Chakraborty et al. (2019) X X X X
da Silva et al. (2019) X
Feng et al. (2017) X X
Gu¨nsel (2015) X
Hong and Guo (2019) X X X X
Inaba (2018) X X
Kang and Jiang (2011) X
Kumar et al. (2015) X
Kunter (2012) X X
T. Li et al. (2019) X X X X X
X. Li et al. (2019) X X
Liu et al. (2016) X
Reisman (2005) X
Shen et al. (2019) X X X X
Tatikonda and Stock (2003) X
Wang and Shin (2015) X X X X X
Xie et al. (2018) X X
X. Yan (2015) X X
H. Yang and Chen (2018) X X X
Zheng et al. (2015) X X
Our paper X X X X X X X
3.3 Base models
We consider in this chapter a supply chain (SC) consisting of one original equipment man-
ufacturer (OEM) who sells similar products to two competing retailers (Ri, where i=1,2). The













Figure 3.1: Schematic diagram of the SC operation
It is assumed that the OEM decides to acquire certain level of technology 0 < α < 1 to im-
prove its performance. This technology could be required by the OEM for meeting manufacturing
regulations (Bai et al., 2017), enhance quality level (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009; Chakraborty et
al., 2019), to name but a few. The new technology acquisition cost is denoted by η and it is consid-
ered to be a one-off investment (H. Yang & Chen, 2018). For analytical simplicity, we assume that
the investment on technology does not affect the cost structure of the system. Similar assumptions
can be found in the work of Chakraborty et al. (2019) and H. Yang and Chen (2018). After receiving
the customer’s order, Ri sends it to the OEM who follows a make-to-order (MTO) manufacturing
policy. The unit production cost and unit wholesale price for the final products are ci and wi re-
spectively. The unit retail selling price is pi. In addition, it is established that pi > wi > ci. These
inequalities assure the non-negative profit for the parties. It is further considered that the market
demand Di(pi, pj , α, ξi) is stochastic, price dependent (Chakraborty et al., 2019; Ghosh & Shah,
2015), and technology dependent (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009). It is formulated as:
Di(pi, pj , α, ξi) = di − θpi + γpj + βα+ ξi, (9)
where i 6= j, di > 0 is the base demand, θ > 0, γ > 0 and β > 0 are the demand sensitivity
coefficient to pi, pj and to α respectively, and ξi is the demand uncertainty with E[ξi] = 0 and
Var[ξi] = σ
2
i . Coincident to the work of T.-M. Choi, Ma, Shen, and Sun (2018), we assume θ > γ
to model that forRi the effect of modifying its own retail price pi has a higher impact on its demand
Di compared to a change in the retail price of the competitor pj . Similar to the work of H. Yang
and Chen (2018), we consider that all information is symmetric between the members, and that
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the market can accurately perceive the technology enhancement in the final products. In this work
we are interested on analyzing the investment on state-of-the-art technology which requires high
level investments. To assure this condition in our model, we assume that η > β
2
θ−γ . Finally, for the
negotiation, the OEM acts as the leader whileRi are the followers.
The sequence of decisions in this Stackelberg game is as follows: (1) theOEM decides the unit
wholesale price wi and the level of technology α to acquire; (2) knowing wi and α, Ri react by
deciding the unit retail price pi. Figure 3.2 depicts the model timeline.
t₁
OEM makes the 
contract offer.
Retailers decide whether 










OEM sets wᵢ, and sells 
products to Retailers.
Retailers sell products to  
the end consumers.
t.
Figure 3.2: The model timeline
Table 3.3 summarizes the notation used in this chapter.
With the base supply chain model established, we now proceed to formulate the profit functions
for each participant of the SC. First, Equations 10 and 11 present the profit and expected profit
functions forRi:
ΠWSRi (pi) =(pi − wi)(di − θpi + γpj + βα+ ξi), where i 6= j. (10)
Eξ[ΠWSRi (pi)] =(pi − wi)(di − θpi + γpj + βα). (11)
Similarly, Equations 12 and 13 show the profit and expected profit functions for the OEM,
respectively:
ΠWSOEM(w1, w2, α) =
2∑
i=1




Table 3.3: Notation used in the models
Notation Meaning
ci Unit production cost of product i
wi Unit wholesale price of product i
pi Unit retail price of product i
α Percentage of technology acquired (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
η Cost coefficient of technology acquired
Di Market demand forRi
di Base demand forRi
θ Retail price-dependence coefficient of demand
γ Competitor’s retail price-dependence coefficient of demand
β Technology-dependence coefficient of demand
ξi Uncertainty component of demand forRi
E[ξi] Expected value of demand uncertainty forRi
Var[ξi] Variance of demand uncertainty forRi
φi Technology-cost and revenue sharing percentage in the CR contract
ti Fixed cost charged toRi in the TPT contract
ΠOEM Manufacturer’s profit
ΠRi Retailer i’s profit
ΠSC Supply chain’s profit
WS Wholesale price contract
CR Cost-revenue sharing contract
TPT Two-part tariff contract
Eξ[ΠWSOEM(w1, w2, α)] =
2∑
i=1
[(wi − ci)(di − θpi + γpj + βα)]− 1
2
ηα2. (13)
Finally, Equation 14 presents the expected profit function for the SC:
Eξ[ΠWSSC (p1, p2, w1, w2, α)] =Eξ[ΠWSOEM(w1, w2, α)] + Eξ[ΠWSR1 (p1)] + Eξ[Π
WS
R2 (p2)] (14)
In addition, all proofs are shown in Appendix A.
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3.4 Equilibrium analysis
3.4.1 Optimal decisions for the decentralized supply chain
In this section we derive the optimal pricing and technology-acquisition decisions of the WS
contract by exploring the equilibrium of the negotiation game. Because Ri (i = 1, 2) are the
followers, we first find the optimal values for the retail price.
Proposition 6. For Ri, (i=1,2), with a given wholesale price wi and level of technology acquired
α, a unique Nash equilibrium exists for the retail selling price decision, and its optimal retail price
pWS∗i can be expressed as:
pWS∗i |w1,w2,α =
2θ (wiθ + di) + γ (wjθ + dj) + βα (2θ + γ)
4θ2 − γ2 . (15)
By replacing Equations 15 on Equation 13, we obtain the OEM’s expected optimization ob-
jective function at the equilibrium retail selling prices pWS∗i for given wholesale prices w1, w2 and
level of technology α. The OEM’s expected optimization objective function can be expressed as
Eξ[ΠWSOEM(w1, w2, α)] = Eξ[ΠWSOEM(pWS∗1 |w1,w2,α, pWS∗2 |w1,w2,α)]. Optimization of the latter ex-











Proposition 7. The Eξ[ΠWSOEM(w1, w2, α)] is a strictly concave function of wi and α; and the opti-
mal wholesale price wWS∗i and level of technology α





2η (2θ − γ) (diθ + djγ)− θβ2 (di − dj + (θ + γ) (ci + cj))
4 (θ + γ) [(2θ − γ) (θ − γ) η − θβ2] . (16)
αWS∗ =
θβ [d1 + d2 − (θ − γ) (c1 + c2)]
2 [(2θ − γ) (θ − γ) η − θβ2] . (17)
Proposition 7 demonstrates the concavity of Eξ[ΠWSOEM(w1, w2, α)] and therefore the existence
of an unique optimal wholesale price wWS∗i and optimal level of technology α
WS∗.
Proposition 8 is derived by replacing Equations 16 and 17 in Equation 15.
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Proposition 8. The Eξ[ΠWSRi (pi)] is a strictly concave function of pi; and the optimal retail price








wWS∗j θ + dj
)
+ βαWS∗ (2θ + γ)
4θ2 − γ2 .
(18)
3.4.2 Optimal decisions for the centralized supply chain
As a benchmark, we now assume that both Ri (i=1,2) and the OEM belong to the same cen-
trally coordinated system. Under this assumption, the profit and expected value of profit for the SC
can be expressed as:
ΠSC(p1, p2, α) =
2∑
i=1
[(pi − ci)(di − θpi + γpj + βα+ ξi)]− 1
2
ηα2. (19)
Eξ[ΠSC(p1, p2, α)] =
2∑
i=1
[(pi − ci)(di − θpi + γpj + βα)]− 1
2
ηα2. (20)
We proceed now to derive the optimal pricing and technology-acquisition decisions for the SC
in the centralized scenario.
Proposition 9. The Eξ[ΠSC(p1, p2, α)] is a strictly concave function of α and pi; and the optimal





d1 + d2 − (θ − γ) (c1 + c2)








2θη − β2) di + (2γη + β2) dj − (θ + γ)β2 (ci + cj)
4 (θ + γ) [(θ − γ) η − β2] . (22)
Proposition 9 implies that in the centralized SC, the optimal technology level α∗ and retail price
p∗i in the Stackelberg equilibrium uniquely exist.
3.4.3 Comparison of the decentralized and centralized supply chain models
A review of both the decentralized and centralized SC models lead us to the following interesting
observation:
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Proposition 10. The decentralized model can not reach coordination of the supply chain system.
Proposition 10 presents a clear incentive for all members to collaborate in the expectation to
reach the SC coordination. Next section shows 2 contracts designed to coordinate the SC, namely,
the Technology-cost and Revenue sharing (CR) contract and the Two-part tariff (TPT ) contract.
3.5 Coordination contracts
In this section we proceed to analyze the Technology-cost and Revenue sharing (CR) contract,
and the Two-part tariff contract (TPT ) to determine if they can achieve the supply chain coordina-
tion.
3.5.1 Analyzing the Technology-cost and Revenue sharing contract
For the CR contract it is now assumed that Ri is willing to share a fraction of the technology
cost paid by the OEM, i.e. η(1−φi)2 , and a fraction of its revenue, i.e. pi(1− φi), while on the other
hand the OEM agrees to reduce its wholesale price wi. Equations 23 and 24 present the profit and
expected value of the profit for Ri, respectively:








Similarly, Equations 25 and 26 show the profit and expected profit functions for the OEM,
respectively:





















In order to derive the optimal pricing and technology-acquisition decisions of the CR contract,
we first proceed to find the optimal values for the retail price.
Proposition 11. ForRi, (i=1,2), with given wholesale prices w1, w2 and level of technology α, its
optimal retail price pCR∗i can be expressed as:
pCR∗i |w1,w2,α =
(2θdi + γdj + βα (2θ + γ))φ1φ2 + θ (2θwiφj + γwjφi)
(4θ2 − γ2)φ1φ2 . (27)
In order to test if the CR contract of the decentralized model can reach coordination, we set
pCR∗i |w1,w2,α = p∗i . From these results we conclude that:
Proposition 12. TheCR contract leads to coordination of the supply chain system under technology
investment when pCR∗i = p
∗
i and α
CR∗ = α∗. Moreover, we find that:











2θη − β2) dj − (θ + γ) [(θ − γ) ηcj + β2ci]











2θη − β2) dj] > (θ + γ) [γ (2 (θ − γ) η − β2) cj − (4θ (θ − γ) η − β2 (4θ + γ)) ci] .
(29)
Proposition 12(a) shows that the optimal decision variables for both the OEM and Ri in the
CR contract can be aligned with those of the centralized system, allowing perfect coordination of
the supply chain. Furthermore, Proposition 12(b) reveals the necessary condition at which the CR
contract offers a feasible and realistic value of wCR∗i , i.e. w
CR∗
i > 0, to the OEM. Fulfillment of
the latter condition is crucial for the OEM to engage in the negotiation because it ensures that the
contract coordinating the supply chain does work close to a real-negotiation situation.
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3.5.2 Analyzing the Two-part tariff contract
For the TPT contract, we now consider that the OEM will charge a lower wholesale price wi
and a fixed cost ti toRi. In this contract, the profit and expected profit functions forRi are:
ΠTPTRi (pi) =(pi − wi)(di − θpi + γpj + βα+ ξi)− ti. (30)
Eξ[ΠTPTRi (pi)] =(pi − wi)(di − θpi + γpj + βα)− ti. (31)
Similarly, Equations 32 and 33 show the profit and expected profit functions for the OEM,
respectively:
ΠTPTOEM(w1, w2, α) =
2∑
i=1
[(wi − ci)(di − θpi + γpj + βα+ ξi) + ti]− 1
2
ηα2. (32)
Eξ[ΠTPTOEM(w1, w2, α)] =
2∑
i=1
[(wi − ci)(di − θpi + γpj + βα) + ti]− 1
2
ηα2. (33)
In order to derive the optimal pricing and technology-acquisition decisions of the TPT contract,
we proceed to find the optimal values for retail price.
Proposition 13. ForRi, (i=1,2), with given wholesale prices w1, w2 and level of technology α, its
optimal retail price pTPT∗i can be expressed as:
pTPT∗i |w1,w2,α =
2θdi + γdj + θ (2θwi + γwj) + (2θ + γ)βα
4θ2 − γ2 . (34)
In order to test if the TPT contract of the decentralized model can reach coordination, we set
pTPT∗i |w1,w2,α = p∗i . From these results we conclude that:
Proposition 14. The TPT contract leads to coordination of the supply chain system under tech-
nology investment when pTPT∗i = p
∗
i and α
TPT∗ = α∗. Moreover, we find that:
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2ηγ (γdi + θdj) + β
2γ [di − dj − (θ + γ) (ci + cj)]
4θ (θ + γ) [(θ − γ) η − β2] . (35)
(b) The TPT contract is able to coordinate the supply chain as long as Equation 36 holds.
2θci − γcj > (θ + γ) γβ
2 (ci + cj)− 2ηγ (γdi + θdj)− γβ2 (di − dj)
2 (θ + γ) [(θ − γ) η − β2] . (36)
Similar to the findings in the CR contract, Proposition 14(a) indicates that the optimal decision
variables for the OEM and Ri in the TPT contract can be consistent with the ones in the central-
ized system. Implying that the TPT contract can reach perfect coordination of the supply chain.
Moreover, Proposition 14(b) guarantees that the value of wTPT∗i is higher than zero, such that the
TPT contract coordinating the supply chain does work close to reality. Latter condition is vital for
the OEM at the time of deciding whether to engage into the contract negotiation or not.
3.6 Numerical analysis
In this section, we present a numerical example with sensitivity analysis in order to illustrate the
above theoretical findings and to gain some managerial insights.
3.6.1 Numerical example
For the example shown below, the corresponding parameter values are c1=60, c2=40, d1=400,
d2=200, θ=5, γ=3, β=20, η=3000. With this given data we calculate the optimal value for the
decision variables and the expected profit for the SC members. Computational results are shown in
Table 3.4.
We obtain the following observations:
(1) The profit in the centralized system and the corresponding level of technology acquisition are
10739.00 and 0.71, respectively. The profit in the decentralized system (WS contract) and






































































































































































































































































































































































































































when the OEM and both R1 and R2 decide to cooperate, the profit of the system could
increase by 9.97%, and at the same time the level of technology acquisition could raise by
42.86%. This occurrence can be explained due to the double marginalization effect appearing
in the decentralized system. Because the OEM decides to work independently, it tries to
maximize only its own profit by increasing the wholesale prices charged to R1 and R2. As
a result, both retailers react by increasing also their retail prices. At the same time, because
the OEM bares alone the cost of the new technology, its investment level is moderate. As
a consequence of this chain of actions, the market reacts adversely to the increment on retail
prices and moderate technological enhancement of the product by reducing the demand on
both products that translates in lower profit for the SC. On the other hand, in the centralized
system the three agents decide to work together as an unique entity. Consequently, a reduc-
tion on both retail prices is achievable and also an increment on the investment on the new
technology. Both decisions are beneficial to the end customer, who in return augment the
demand on both products and the total profit of the SC system.
(2) TheCR contract offers an incentive for the SC parties to cooperate. In the example it is shown
that when both retailers decide to share a fraction of their revenue and to bare a fraction of
the technology cost with the OEM, this allows the OEM to reduce the wholesale prices
charged to both R1 and R2, who respond by lowering also their retail prices. Thanks to this
cooperation the system is able to increment the level of technology acquisition allowing the
SC system to reach coordination and the same total profit as in the centralized system. The
example also shows us that the bargain power of each party during the negotiation is of utmost
importance when deciding the fraction of cost-revenue shared by R1 and OEM, and by R2
and OEM, denoted by φ1 and φ2 respectively. If the level of φi is too low, the resulting
negotiation is beneficial for the OEM but not for R1 neither R2. When φ1 and φ2 equal
to 0.5 and 0.6 respectively, the OEM increases its profit by 18.8% compared to the WS
contact, but R1 and R2 reduce their profit by 20.4% and 18.4% respectively. On the other
hand, a high level of φi will deteriorate the OEM profit but improve it for Ri. For example,
when φ1 and φ2 equal to 0.8 and 0.9 respectively, the OEM reduces its profit by 5.8%, but
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R1 and R2 augment their profit by 7.8% each. It is interesting to note that the right decision
on φi during the negotiation can result in a win-win-win state for all parties of the system.
This is evident in the example when φ1 and φ2 equal to 0.6 and 0.7 respectively. In this case,
theOEM increments its profit by 10.6%, and at the same time bothR1 andR2 increase their
own profit by 7.8%.
(3) In the case of the TPT contract, there exists a different coordination incentive. Here, each of
the parties agree to allow the OEM to charge a fixed cost in the negotiation, denoted by ti,
and in return theOEM decides to decrease the wholesale prices charged to both retailers. It is
interesting to note in the example that no matter the value of t1 and t2 assigned, the wholesale
prices remain unchanged while preserving the coordination of the system. Similar to the CR
contract, for the TPT contract it is also critical for the SC agents the decision made on t1
and t2. From the example we notice that when the values of t1 and t2 is too high, 2000 and
1000 respectively, the OEM benefits by improving its profit by 21.3%, while the profit of
R1 and R2 is reduced by 40.1% and 12.4% respectively. On the contrary, when the values
of t1 and t2 are set too low, 500 and 400 respectively, the profit of the OEM decrements by
6.7%, but forR1 andR2 it increases by 80.5% and 46.9% respectively. From the example we
notice that the TPT contract is also able to attain a win-win-win state for the three parties of
the negotiation. When the values of t1 and t2 are 1000 and 600 respectively, the profit of the
OEM increases by 2.6%, and at the same time the profits for R1 and R2 increase by 40.3%
and 27.1% respectively.
Previous observations explain that both proposed contracts are able to reach a win-win-win
state for all SC parties under certain conditions. In this numerical example to be specific, Figure 3.3
illustrates this occurrence. Sub-figure 3.3a presents the optimal profit for the SC agents for given
values of φ1 and φ2. Sub-figures 3.3b, 3.3c and 3.3d show the optimal profit forR1,R2 and OEM
respectively.
In the latter figures we can appreciate the plane formed by the values of φ1 and φ2 on which
the three SC agents obtain higher optimal profits compared to the decentralized system. Figure
3.4 shows that this plane has a trapeze shape delimited by the vertices (φ1= 0.84 ;φ2= 0.67), (φ1=
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(a) Optimal profit for SC in CR contract (b) Optimal profit forR1 in CR contract
(c) Optimal profit forR2 in CR contract (d) Optimal profit forOEM inCR contract
Figure 3.3: Optimal profit in CR contract
0.57;φ2= 0.67), (φ1= 0.60;φ2= 1.00) and (φ1= 0.57;φ2= 1.00). Hence, a CR contract designed
considering values of φ1 and φ2 inside this trapeze plane will benefit each of the members.
Figure 3.4: Win-win-win region in CR contract
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Figure 3.5 illustrates the existence of the win-win-win state in the TPT contract. Sub-figure
3.5a shows the optimal profit for the SC members for given values of t1 and t2. Sub-figures 3.5b,
3.5c and 3.5d present the optimal profit forR1,R2 and OEM respectively.
(a) Optimal profit for SC in TPT contract (b) Optimal profit forR1 in TPT contract
(c) Optimal profit forR2 in TPT contract (d) Optimal profit for OEM in TPT con-tract
Figure 3.5: Optimal profit in TPT contract
In the latter figures it can be noticed the plane formed by the values of t1 and t2 on which all
the SC parties benefit from the negotiation compared to the decentralized system. Figure 3.6 shows
that this plane has a trapeze shape delimited by the vertices (t1= 532;t2= 874), (t1= 1501;t2= 874),
(t1= 1399;t2= 0) and (t1= 1501;t2= 0). Thus, a TPT contract designed using values of t1 and t2
from inside this trapeze plane will result on higher profit for each of the SC parties.
We further investigate the effect of the parameters θ, γ, β and η using this numerical exam-
ple. We let RΠ = ΠSCΠWSSC
represent the benefit in profit when the SC agents cooperate, and we let
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Figure 3.6: Win-win-win region in TPT contract
Rα =
α∗
αWS∗ represent the increment on technology acquisition when the system attains coordina-
tion. Figure 3.7 shows the results obtained for values of θ from 4.6 to 7. We make the following
observations:
(1) From Sub-figure 3.7a it is noticed that variations on θ have a significant impact on reducing
the profit in both the centralized and decentralized systems. This is specially evident for the
OEM because in this numerical example it holds the largest portion of profit among the SC
parties.
(2) As θ increases, both the profit of the system and the level of technology acquisition decrease.
On the contrary, it is interesting to see in Sub-figure 3.7b that an increment of θ leads to higher
values of RΠ and Rα. We conclude that this takes place because as θ increases, the OEM in
the decentralized system is dissuaded faster to invest in the new technology compared to the
centralized scenario.
We also analyze the impact of the competitor’s retail price-dependence coefficient of demand γ
on the profit, RΠ and Rα. Figure 3.8 illustrates the results for values of γ between 1.92 and 3.36.
We explain the findings:
(1) Sub-figure 3.8a evidence that an increment on γ has a positive impact on the optimal profit
of the SC agents. This is evident because as consumers get more sensitive to the price of the
competitor’s final product, the demand on its own product will raise.
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(a) Effect of θ on profit
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(b) Effect of θ on RΠ and Rα
Figure 3.7: Effect of θ on profit, RΠ and Rα
(2) In Sub-figure 3.8b we notice that as γ increases, both the profit and level of technology acqui-
sition of the decentralized system get closer to those of the centralized system. We conclude
that this situation takes place because the market demand is more sensitive to γ when the
members of the SC work independently compared to the scenario of an unique entity.
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(a) Effect of γ on profit
1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4













(b) Effect of γ on RΠ and Rα
Figure 3.8: Effect of γ on profit, RΠ and Rα
Figure 3.9 shows the scenario of how the technology-dependence coefficient of demand β af-
fects the negotiation. The results shown consider values of β ranging from 15.20 to 24.80. We make
the following observations:
(1) From Sub-figure 3.9a we can appreciate that β has a positive impact on the optimal profit of
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the system. This is evident as the proposed SC model considers that the end consumers are
technology-aware. Hence, increasing their sensitivity to new technologies will lead to higher
benefits when the SC members decide to invest on them.
(2) Sub-figure 3.9b shows how an increment on β translates into higher values of RΠ and Rα.
We conclude that because the centralized system has more availability of resources to invest
in new technologies, when the sensitivity on new technologies increases, then the centralized
system is able to invest on a higher level of technology that results on higher profits compared
to the decentralized scenario.
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(a) Effect of β on profit
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(b) Effect of β on RΠ and Rα
Figure 3.9: Effect of β on profit, RΠ and Rα
Lastly, Figure 3.10 presents the effect of the cost coefficient of technology acquired η on the SC
negotiation. The figure considers values of η between 2280 and 3720. We explain the findings:
(1) As expected, Sub-figure 3.10a illustrates that for a given value of β, increasing the cost on
new technologies will have an averse effect on the market demand and on the optimal profit
of the system.
(2) Sub-figure 3.10b exhibits the negative impact of η on RΠ and Rα. We conclude that this
situation occurs because the loss rate of profit and technology level is more pronounced in the
centralized system.
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(a) Effect of η on profit
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(b) Effect of η on RΠ and Rα
Figure 3.10: Effect of η on profit, RΠ and Rα
3.6.2 Sensitivity analysis
We use the same numerical example to investigate the effects of the parameters θ, γ, β and η on
the SC system coordination strategies. The study is performed by modifying each of the parameters
by +8 %, +4 %, -4 % and -8%, changing one parameter at a time while keeping the rest unchanged.
In this sensitivity analysis we consider for the CR contract the value of the decision variables to be
φ1=0.6 and φ2=0.7; and for the TPT contract the value of the decision variables are set to t1=1500
and t2=800. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the results for the CR and TPT contracts, respectively.
From Table 3.5, we explain the following findings:
(1) In the CR contract, the retail price-dependence coefficient of demand θ has a negative impact
on the retail prices, wholesales prices, level of technology acquisition and on the profit of each
of the members of the system. As the market increases its sensitivity against the retail price
of the final product, retailers are urged to reduce their retail prices. Due to the cooperation
with the OEM, this reduction is also undertaken on the wholesale prices it charges to both
retailers. Because in our example θ has higher impact on the market demand compared to
β, this increment on θ also leads the parties to reduce their investment on new technologies.
Consequently, the optimal profit of all members of the SC is cut down.
(2) In the CR contract, opposite to θ, the competitor’s retail price-dependence coefficient of
demand γ has a positive impact on the retail prices, wholesales prices, level of technology
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acquisition and on the profit of the SC parties. Because the value of γ < θ, we can appreciate
that the marginal increment on the values of the decision variables and optimal profits is less
pronounced compared to the marginal reduction of the value of the decision variables and
optimal profits when modifying the value of parameter θ. We conclude that an increment in
γ is favorably perceived by the end consumers increasing the market demand of the products.
This favorable perception encourages the retailers to augment their retail prices, allowing the
OEM to charge higher wholesale prices to both retailers. Furthermore, due to the improved
perception of the customers on the final products, the SC agents decide to further invest in
new technologies. At last, this chain of decisions translates into improved optimal profits for
the OEM and both retailers.
(3) In theCR contract, it is interesting to notice that when the technology-dependence coefficient
of demand β increases, the retail prices, wholesale prices, level of technology acquisition and
optimal profit of the OEM increase, whereas the optimal profit of both retailers decrease.
Investment on new technologies have two opposite effects on the negotiation. On the one
hand, it favors the expansion of the market demand benefiting the revenue of the agents. But
on the other hand, it increases the cost incurred by them. Depending on how the contract is
designed, an increment on α could result on the detriment of the optimal profit for some of the
members of the negotiation. In this example in particular, we notice that while the OEM’s
optimal profit increases along with β, for bothR1 andR2 an increment on β diminishes their
respective optimal profits.
(4) In the CR contract, we notice that as the cost coefficient of technology acquired η increases,
the retail prices, wholesale prices, level of technology acquisition and optimal profit of the
OEM decrease, while the optimal profit of both retailers increase. Similar to β, parameter η
is directly related to α. Therefore, even-tough and increment on η translates in a reduction on
α, it is possible for some agents of the system to increase their optimal profit.
From Table 3.6 we observe:
(1) In the TPT contract, when the retail price-dependence coefficient of demand θ increases,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































members of the system decrease. As expected, we observe that the value of the decision
variables p1, p2 and α remain the same for both coordination mechanisms. It is interesting to
notice that the profit of the retailers in the TPT contract has a higher sensitivity to θ than that
in the CR contract. For example, when θ changes from 4.6 to 5.4, the profits of R1 and R2
in the TPT contract decrease by 79.20% and 64.79%, respectively, while the profits of R1
andR2 in the CR contract decrease by 39.18% and 34.97%, respectively. With respect to the
OEM’s profit, now the CR contract shows to be more sensitive to changes on θ, although
this difference is less pronounced. For the same values of θ the profit of the OEM in the
TPT and CR contracts decrease by 51.45% and 60.98%, respectively.
(2) In the TPT contract, when the competitor’s retail price-dependence coefficient of demand γ
increases, the retail prices, wholesale prices, level of technology acquisition and profit of each
of the members of the system increase. Similar to θ, we notice that the optimal profits of both
retailers in the TPT contract are more sensitive to changes in γ, while theOEM’ profit in the
CR contract is more sensitive to changes in this parameter. For example, when γ increases
from 2.88 to 3.24, the profits of R1 and R2 in the TPT contract increase by 40.36% and
55.70%, respectively, while the profits of R1 and R2 in the CR contract increase by 5.26%
and 20.85%, respectively. With respect to the OEM’s profit, the profit of the OEM in the
TPT and CR contracts increase by 45.13% and 56.48%, respectively.
(3) In the TPT contract, the technology-dependence coefficient of demand β has a positive im-
pact on the retail prices, wholesale prices, level of technology acquisition and profit of each
of the SC parties. It is interesting to notice that while an increase of β in the TPT contract
benefits the optimal profit of both retailers, in the CR contract, however, their profits are
reduced.
(4) In the TPT contract, the cost coefficient of technology acquired η has a negative impact on
the retail prices, wholesale prices, level of technology acquisition and profit of each of the
SC parties. On this numerical example we observe that an increase of η in the TPT contract




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.7 Conclusions and future research
This chapter studies the technology investment strategy in a two echelon supply chain consisting
of one manufacturer and two competing retailers. By comparing a non-collaborative scenario with
wholesale price contract and collaborative scenarios with Cost-revenue sharing (CR) and Two-part
tariff (TPT ) contracts, we analyze whether a collaborative technology enhancement initiative is
beneficial to all supply chain parties. We demonstrate that under specific conditions both, the CR
and TPT contracts, are capable of coordinating the supply chain system. Furthermore, with the use
of a numerical example we illustrate that both the CR and TPT contracts can offer a win-win-win
state for all SC parties.
This chapter can be further extended in a number of directions. Firstly, in this chapter we
study coordination in a one-manufacturer two-retailer system. For practical applications, it would
be interesting to extend our conclusions for the scenario of a single-manufacturer multi-retailer.
Secondly, in this work we consider that the OEM makes the decision on the level of technology
α to acquire. It would be important to investigate the behavior of a system formed by two-supplier
one-manufacturer where each supplier decides on the level of technology α1 and α2 they acquire,
respectively. Lastly, this chapter focuses on examining the investment on new technologies as a
coordination tool in which the technology is obtained from an external entity out of the supply
chain system, or through the R&D of a single party in the system. Another direction of our research
would review how the transfer of technologies among members of the same SC could be of benefit
for coordinating the system.
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Chapter 4
Technology Investment in a
Multi-supplier Single-manufacturer
Supply Chain
In Chapter 4 we review the effect of technology investment on coordinating a supply chain
formed by multiple complementary suppliers and a single original equipment manufacturer. We
assume that the suppliers are required to invest in new technologies in order to participate in the
supply chain negotiations. While the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader, who offers a
wholesale price (WS) contract to the suppliers. Through our research we prove that if the supply
chain members decide to cooperate and coordinate the system, they could increase the overall ex-
pected profit by at least 1/3 compared to the non-cooperative scenario. We then find that although
the cost-sharing (CS) contract is unable to coordinate the system, the cost-revenue sharing (CR)
contract is capable of coordinating the multi-supplier and single-manufacturer supply chain. More-
over, we establish the conditions at which the CR contract offers a win-win profit scenario to all
parties of the negotiation and review how bargaining analysis can lead to the optimal negotiation
ability of each member. Results shown in Chapter 4 have been submitted for review on the journal
Production and Operations Management.
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4.1 Introduction
A report from Forbes (2018) make it evident that increasingly industries are turning their com-
petitive advantage focus from a cost-reduction strategy to a more robust high-tech manufacturing.
Cutting-edge technologies enable companies to develop advanced processes and products which
offer higher levels of productivity and quality, and that are better perceived by the end customer.
McKinsey Global Institute (2017) reveals that the manufacturing sector in U.S. currently represents
35% of the productivity growth, 60% of exports, 70% of R&D in the private sector , 9% of employ-
ment and 12% of GDP. This report suggests that by 2025, with the contribution of state-of-the-art
technology, U.S. manufacturing industry could augment their value up to US$530 billion which
represents a 20% increase, in addition to add 2.4 million jobs to the economy. U.S.-based manufac-
turing companies have taken note on this potential benefits. A survey from The Boston Consulting
Group (2015) reveals that 72% of the large-size companies interviewed have plans to invest in new
advanced technologies in the next five years.
There exist different mechanisms for companies to get access to avant garde technology. Among
them we can mention the merge and acquisition of tech-companies, internal R&D efforts, to name
but a few. According to Thomson Reuters (2016), from the 46,055 merger transactions taken place
worldwide on 2016, 13% (US$487.63 billion) were acquisitions of high-tech companies. Value
only surpassed by merges in the energy and power sector. We can mention cases like Qualcomm’s
US$39 billion purchase of NXP Semiconductors (The New York Times, 2017), Ulta acquisition of
QM Scientific and GlamST (Digiday UK, 2019), and Intel’s US$13.8 billion purchase of Mobileye
(J.P. Morgan, 2018). Regarding the efforts on internal R&D, Forbes (2018) reported that 86% of the
top 100 companies investing into R&D worldwide belong to the manufacturing sector. Among them
it is worth to mention Ford investment on digital design, simulation, and integration technologies
for developing aluminum castings used for engines, that had helped the company to save more than
US$120 million and reduced the development time by 15%-25% (The Boston Consulting Group,
2015). To present the importance of investment on R & D, Figure 4.1a illustrates the private-sector
investment per country, and Figure 4.1b shows the investment per industry sector on 2018.
In this globalized economy, the fierce competence in the market, added to the increasingly
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(a) Private-sector expenditure in R&D per country
(source: Unesco (2018))

































(b) Expenditure in R&D per company (source: Strat-
egy& (2018))
Figure 4.1: Expenditure in R&D (2018)
exigences from customers demanding products with more added value and lower prices, force or-
ganizations to be always at the vanguard to maintain their positioning in the market. One critical
ingredient for maintaining the competitive advantage is the acquisition and implementation of new
technologies for achieving process and product enhancement. This is specially the case for high-
tech industries in sectors like aerospace, pharmaceutic and telecommunication, to name but a few.
But investment in new technologies is a challenging decision due to its complexity for implementa-
tion and the cost involved. Configuration of the SC plays also a crucial role in this decision-making
process as high-tech products are commonly assembled using components from a number of suppli-
ers, each of them in need of different levels of technological upgrade. Table 4.1 shows an example
of how complex are two-echelon SC in the aerospace sector. Therefore, it is of utmost importance
to understand the effect of new technologies on the performance of the acquiring company and on
its supply chain.
Although the existence of an ample number of empirical studies in the current literature de-
scribing the relation between supply chain (SC) performance and new technologies investment,
analytical research on this matter is quite scarce. In this chapter, our aim is to model and analyze
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Table 4.1: Number of suppliers for different high-tech products (source: Oliver Wyman (2015))
Company Type Product model Number of suppliers
Airbus OEM A380 200a
A350 90a
Embraer OEM EMB 145 350
EMB 170/190 38
Rolls-Royce Tier 1 Trent 500 250
Trent 900 140
Trent 1000 75
a Number of Tier 1 suppliers.
the impact of new technologies investment on the SC members performance and to demonstrate
how it can lead to the coordination of the system. Specifically, we aim to answer the following
questions:
• Can SC coordination be achieved in a multi-supplier single-manufacturer system in presence
of technology investment?
• What is the impact of the coordination contracts on the pricing and technology acquisition
decisions of the system?
• If the CS and CR contracts reach SC coordination, can these contracts be designed to offer
a win-win scenario for all parties of the negotiation?
• What is the influence of bargaining power on the negotiation?
The contributions and results of this chapter can be summarized as follow: (i) we prove that a
supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and a single manufacturer can reach coordination in
presence of technology investment decisions. In addition, we show the specific conditions under
which the CR contract is capable of coordinating the system, (ii) we present the particular con-
ditions under which coordination of the supply chain brings a reduction on the retail price, while
increasing at the same time the level of technology acquisition, (iii) we identify the CR contract
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parameter values that allow the contract design to reach a win-win state for all agents in the sup-
ply chain, (iv) and we demonstrate the increasing benefit of coordinating a supply chain system in
presence of technology investment when augmenting the number of participants in the negotiation.
4.2 Literature review
The literature review is divided in two main directions: (1) a review of the impact of technology
in the SC, and (2) the literature on SC coordination through coordination contracts.
4.2.1 Technology and its role in the supply chain
Traditionally, supply chain (SC) management has centered its attention in studying how mate-
rials, monetary funds and information influence the competitive advantage of the SC agents (Cer-
chione & Esposito, 2016); but a fourth dimension, knowledge, has become an increasingly im-
portant factor to be considered (Jiabin et al., 2010; Kang & Jiang, 2011). The field of knowledge
management makes a clear distinction between information and knowledge (Erickson & Rothberg,
2014). Information is seen as descriptions that support the understanding of a specific subject and
that is explicit and easily transferred (Rowley, 2007). There exist a vast literature on analytical
studies that tackle the impact of different types of information on SC performance and how its ac-
cessibility can be of benefit for the SC members. Examples can be found for demand forecast (Ha et
al., 2011; Leng & Parlar, 2009; T. Li & Zhang, 2015; Rached et al., 2015), production plans (Huang
et al., 2003), inventory level (Rached et al., 2015; H. Zhang et al., 2010), order quantities (Xue et al.,
2011), shipment information (Scott, 2015; C. Zhang et al., 2006), lead time (F. Chen & Yu, 2005;
Rached et al., 2015), quality level (H.-c. P. Choi et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2011; Xue et al., 2011),
product return information (J. Chen, 2011; R. Yan & Cao, 2017), and cost information (Gu¨ler et al.,
2018).
Knowledge stands a step further from information as the accumulation of learning, expertise and
know-how useful for the problem solving process but that at the same time poses more difficulties
when being managed and shared (Rowley, 2007). Battistella et al. (2016) highlighted that the SC
knowledge consists of four basic components, one of them been the technological component. This
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latter is the subject of our research. Technology is seen as a key element for competitive advantage
(Reisman, 2005) that can lead companies to access wider markets, sales increment, cost reduction,
brand enhancement, to name but a few (da Silva et al., 2019; Kumar et al., 2015). And its benefits
are not limited only to the owner of the technology but they can be translated into the performance
improvement of the SC as a whole (Kang & Jiang, 2011).
An example on this field is the work of Wang and Shin (2015). The authors model a one-supplier
one-manufacturer system that considers innovation initiatives. They propose three contract for the
negotiation: wholesale price contract, quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and revenue-
sharing contract. The authors demonstrate that although the three contracts are capable to coordinate
the system, both the wholesale price contract and quality-dependent wholesale price contract should
fulfill certain conditions to do so. Another interesting example is found in the work of Chakraborty
et al. (2019). They review the impact of new technologies on product quality improvement and
prove that collaborative contracts can be of benefit for all SC members. Lastly, Bhaskaran and
Krishnan (2009) develop a model to represent the process of new products between two firms with
different R&D capabilities and study how revenue, technological innovation and investment sharing
can benefit the overall performance of the SC system.
Regarding the impact of new technology investment on SC performance, we notice that the
analytical research on this area is quite scarce. Hence, our main objective for this chapter is to
model and analyze the impact of new technologies investment on the SC members performance
and to determine how it can lead to the coordination of the SC system. Furthermore, our aim is
to prove that on specific conditions, sharing the cost of the technology investment among the SC
parties could result into a win-win state for all agents of the negotiation.
4.2.2 Supply chain contract coordination
Supply chain contract coordination is one of the main mechanisms studied in the literature for
achieving coordination. Among these contracts, the cost sharing contract and the cost and revenue
sharing contract are well-known and extensively adopted in many organizations. F. Yang, Shan, and
Jin (2017) examine the performance of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer
and one retailer under stochastic demand. For the negotiation the authors propose and compare
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two contracts, the full and the partial capacity cost sharing contracts. From their findings, they
demonstrate that when using the first contract the retailer would tend to share a higher cost but fewer
capacity quantity with the manufacturer. They also identify the threshold of capacity level at which
each agent of the SC would prefer a given contract. Chakraborty et al. (2019) study a SC formed by
one retailer and two competing suppliers and analyze how collaborative quality improvement can be
of benefit for all the parties. The authors propose different coordination mechanisms to incentive the
retailer and suppliers to share the cost on quality investment. Their results show that with the cost-
sharing contract the SC can attain higher quality improvement levels and higher profits compared to
the wholesale price contract. Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan (2009) formulate a two-echelon SC model
with quality improvement efforts. The authors introduce two product recall cost-sharing contracts,
based in selective and in complete root cause analysis, as mechanisms to coordinate the negotiation
between the manufacturer and the supplier. They find that although both contracts can coordinate
the supply chain, they offer different levels of profit to the manufacturer. Furthermore, the authors
review how information asymmetry in quality can affect the negotiation. Ghosh and Shah (2015)
explore the benefit of cost sharing contracts over a supplier-manufacturer SC negotiation committed
towards green initiatives. Utilizing a game theoretic approach, the authors identify how the proposed
contract can influence the product greening levels and profits of the SC participants. They further
prove that implementation of the cost sharing contract results in higher profits for both parties and
for the SC as a whole. X. Yan, Zhao, and Tang (2015) formulate a penalty cost sharing contract
model for a supplier-buyer system and analyze how it can enhance quality improvement efforts and
profits in the SC. The authors consider two different strategies for the negotiation, the first in which
the buyer sets the quality requirement to the supplier (QR), and a second one in which the buyer
allows the supplier to decide the promised quality level (QP). The study reveals that if the quality
verification cost is sufficiently small, then the buyer tends to prefer the QP design. Otherwise, it
will opt for the QR model. Additionally, the authors extend their research to consider how more
complex scenarios (asymmetric information and competitor suppliers) affect the negotiation.
The cost and revenue sharing contract is another contract extensively adopted in industry. T. Li
et al. (2019) review a model considering carbon emission reduction efforts. The authors propose
three coordination mechanisms to motivate participation of the manufacturer on green investment
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initiatives. Furthermore, the authors extend the original models to consider the bargaining power of
the SC agents. From their results they notice that the basic models are capable of coordinating the
SC, while bargaining scenarios are not. Zheng et al. (2015) model the behavior of a system impacted
by demand disruption and marketing effort. The study demonstrates the conditions at which the
revenue and marketing cost sharing contract is capable to coordinates the SC in both the normal and
the disrupted demand scenarios. H. Yang and Chen (2018) analyze a manufacturer-retailer system
affected by carbon emission abatement efforts subject to carbon taxation. The authors propose
the cost, the revenue, and the cost-revenue sharing contracts to analyze their impact on the SC
negotiation. They find that under specific conditions the three contracts can offer benefits to both
parties while increasing the abatement level in the SC. Kunter (2012) review a contract of royal
payments between a manufacturer and a retailer. The study shows that supply chain coordination
can be achievable if both parties engage into marketing cost and revenue sharing efforts. Inaba
(2018) studies a revenue and cost sharing contract as a mechanism to enhance the remanufacturer-
retailer SC. The author investigates the scenario when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader of
the negotiation, and the one when the leader is the remanufacurer. Xie et al. (2018) explore a
SC consisting on one manufacturer and one retailer. The authors consider that the manufacturer
sells products online, while the retailer conducts offline sales and recycles used products through
the reverse-channel. The authors demonstrate that the revenue-sharing contract can mitigate the
online and offline channel conflict between the parties, whereas that the cost-sharing contract can
motivate the remanufacturing efforts of the retailer. Bai et al. (2017) examine a sustainable SC
formed by one manufacturer and one retailer with deteriorating items and under carbon cap-and-
trade regulation. The authors propose two coordination mechanisms in their research, the revenue
and promotional cost-sharing contract and the two-part tariff contract. They demonstrate that both
contracts are capable to reach coordination and they determine the win-win conditions for the SC
members. Moreover, the authors prove that the two-part tariff contract is more robust compared to
the revenue and promotional cost-sharing contract.
Different to previous research, in this chapter, we further approach to a real SC scenario by
considering a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and one manufacturer. In addition, in
this chapter, we review how the cost-sharing contract and the cost-revenue sharing contract are
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affected by critical factors such as the positive effect of technology investment in a technology-
aware market and the associated costs.
Table 4.2 presents the literature positioning of our research.
Table 4.2: Literature positioning of this research
SC decisions SC characteristics Findings
Technology Retail Wholesale multi-supplier Stochastic Coordination Win-win Bargaining
Paper investment pricing pricing single-manufacturer demand condition situation effect
Bai et al. (2017) X X X X X
Battistella et al. (2016) X
Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009) X X
Brunswicker and Vanhaverbeke (2015) X
Chakraborty et al. (2019) X X X X X
Chao et al. (2009) X
da Silva et al. (2019) X
Ghosh and Shah (2015) X X X X X
Gu¨nsel (2015) X
Inaba (2018) X X
Kang and Jiang (2011) X
Kumar et al. (2015) X
Kunter (2012) X X X
T. Li et al. (2019) X X X X X X
Liu et al. (2016) X
Reisman (2005) X
Tatikonda and Stock (2003) X
Wang and Shin (2015) X X X X X
Xie et al. (2018) X X
X. Yan et al. (2015) X
F. Yang et al. (2017) X X
H. Yang and Chen (2018) X X X
Zheng et al. (2015) X X X
Our paper X X X X X X X X
4.3 Base models
4.3.1 Supply chain model
We consider in this chapter a supply chain (SC) consisting of multiple complementary suppliers
(Si, where i=1,2,...,m) who sell a component (i) to one original equipment manufacturer (OEM )
that uses them to assembly the final product to be sold in the market. The schematic diagram of the
SC operation is illustrated by Figure 4.2.
We consider that the upstream component suppliers need to invest in certain level of technology
0 < αi < 1 in order to participate in the SC negotiation. This technology could be required
by the suppliers for meeting manufacturing regulations (Bai et al., 2017), enhance quality level
(Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009; Chakraborty et al., 2019), to name but a few. The new technology















Figure 4.2: Schematic diagram of the SC operation
to the work of Ghosh and Shah (2015), we consider an increasing and convex cost structure for
the technology improvement in order to reflect the increasingly level of investment as higher level
technologies are acquired. We further establish that the investment on technology does not affect
the cost structure of the system, as assumed in the work of Chakraborty et al. (2019) and H. Yang
and Chen (2018). After receiving the customer’s order, the OEM sends it to the Si that follow a
make-to-order (MTO) manufacturing policy. The MTO policy is particularly adopted by upstream
suppliers participating in high-tech customized SCs such as in the aerospace sector (Buergin et
al., 2018). The unit production cost and unit wholesale price for component (i) are ci and wi
respectively. The unit retail price of the final product is p. The relation between the pricing values
is p >
∑m
i=1wi and wi > ci. These inequalities assure the non-negative profit for the parties. It is
further considered that the market demand D(p, αi, ξ) is stochastic, price dependent (Chakraborty
et al., 2019; Ghosh & Shah, 2015), and technology dependent (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009). It is
formulated as:
D(p, αi, ξ) = d− θp+
m∑
i=1
βiαi + ξ, (37)
where d > 0 is the base demand, θ > 0 and βi > 0 are the demand sensitivity coefficient to
p and to αi respectively, and ξ is the demand uncertainty with E[ξ] = 0 and Var[ξ] = σ2. Similar
to the work of H. Yang and Chen (2018), we consider that all information is symmetric between
the members, and that the market can accurately perceive the technology enhancement in the final
product. Finally, for the negotiation the OEM acts as the leader while Si are the followers.
The sequence of decisions in this Stackelberg game is as follows: (1) the OEM decides about
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the unit retail price p; (2) knowing p, Si react by simultaneously deciding the unit wholesale price
wi and the level of technology αi to acquire. Figure 4.3 depicts the model timeline.
t₁
OEM makes the 
contract offer.
Suppliers decide whether 
or not to accept terms.
t₂
OEM decides p.
Suppliers observe p, 
and decide αᵢ level to invest.
t₃




OEM assemblies final 
products, and sells them 




Figure 4.3: The model timeline
Table 4.3 summarizes the notation used in this chapter.
Table 4.3: Notation used in the models
Notation Meaning
m Number of suppliers participating in the SC
ci Unit production cost of component i from Si
wi Unit wholesale price of component i from Si
p Unit retail price of final product
αi Percentage of technology acquired by Si (0 ≤ αi ≤ 1)
ηi Cost coefficient of technology acquired by Si
D Market demand
d Base demand
θ Retail price-dependence coefficient of demand
βi Technology-dependence coefficient of demand from Si
ξ Uncertainty component of demand
E[ξ] Expected value of demand uncertainty
Var[ξ] Variance of demand uncertainty
φi Technology-cost sharing percentage in CS contract
Technology-cost and revenue sharing percentage in CR contract
ΠOEM Manufacturer’s profit
ΠSi Supplier i’s profit
ΠSC Supply chain’s profit
WS Wholesale price contract
CS Cost sharing contract
CR Cost-revenue sharing contract
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4.3.2 Profit objective functions
For simplicity we use F (m) to denote all expressions considering the case of m-supplier. First,

















where Wm = {w1, w2, ..., wm}, Am = {α1, α2, ..., αm} and Jm is the index set for Wm
and Am. Similarly, Eqs. (40) and (41) show the profit and expected profit functions for Si,
(i=1,2,3,...,m), respectively:


















Eq. (42) illustrates the expected profit function for the SC:
Eξ[ΠWSSC (p,∀w ∈Wm, ∀α ∈ Am)] (m) =Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)] (m) +
∑
j∈Jm
Eξ[ΠWSSj (wj , αj)] (m)
(42)
In addition, all proofs are shown in Appendix B.
4.4 Equilibrium analysis
4.4.1 Decentralized supply chain considering the Wholesale price contract
We review now the optimal pricing and technology-acquisition decisions of theWS contract by






and Ψm = d − θ
∑
j∈Jm cj . Because Si (i = 1, 2, 3, ...,m) are the followers, we first find the
optimal values for wholesale price and level of technology.
Proposition 15. For Si, (i=1,2,3,...,m), with a given retail price p, a unique Nash equilibrium exists
for the wholesale price and level of technology decisions, and its optimal wholesale pricewWS∗i and
optimal level of technology acquired αWS∗i can be expressed as:
wWS∗i |p (m) =ci +
d− pθ
Ωm − θ .
(43)
αWS∗i |p (m) =
βi (d− pθ)
ηi (Ωm − θ) . (44)
Substituting Eqs. (43) and (44) on Eq. (39), we obtain the OEM’s expected optimization ob-
jective function at the equilibrium wholesale prices wWS∗i and level of technology α
WS∗
i for a given
retail price p. It can be expressed as Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)](m) = Eξ[ΠWSOEM(wWS∗i |p, αWS∗i |p)](m). Opti-






Proposition 16. The Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)](m) is a strictly concave function of p; and the optimal retail
price pWS∗ can be expressed as:
pWS∗ (m) =
2mdθ − (Ψm − 2d) (Ωm − θ)
2θ [Ωm + (m− 1) θ] . (45)
Proposition 16 proofs the concavity of Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)](m) and the existence of an unique optimal
retail price pWS∗. By replacing Eq. (45) in Eqs. (43) and (44) it is derived Proposition 17.
Proposition 17. The Eξ[ΠWSSi (wi, αi)](m) is a strictly concave function of wi and αi; and the
optimal wholesale price wWS∗i and technology level α
WS∗
i can be expressed as:
wWS∗i (m) =ci +
Ψm
2 [Ωm + (m− 1) θ] . (46)
αWS∗i (m) =
βiΨm
2ηi [Ωm + (m− 1) θ] . (47)
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Proposition 17 evidences that in the decentralized SC, the optimal wholesale price wWS∗i and
technology level αWS∗i in the Stackelberg equilibrium uniquely exist and are given by Eqs. (46) and
(47), respectively.
4.4.2 Behavior of the centralized system
We now consider that Si (i=1,2,...,m) and the OEM belong to the same system. Under this
assumption, the profit and expected value of profit for the SC can be expressed as:




























Next it is shown the optimal pricing and technology-acquisition decisions for the SC in the
centralized system.
Proposition 18. The Eξ[ΠSC(p,∀α ∈ Am)](m) is a strictly concave function of p and αi; and the
optimal retail price p∗ and technology level α∗i can be expressed as:
p∗ (m) =











Proposition 18 demonstrates that in the centralized SC, the optimal retail price p∗ and technol-
ogy level α∗i in the Stackelberg equilibrium uniquely exist.
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4.4.3 Comparison of the decentralized and centralized supply chain models
Comparing the decision variables from the decentralized system pWS∗ (m), αWS∗i (m) and its
optimal demand function DWS∗ (m) with their counterparts from the centralized system, p∗ (m),
α∗i (m) and D
∗ (m), we found that:
Proposition 19. The relation between pWS∗ (m) and p∗ (m), αWS∗i (m) and α∗i (m), DWS∗ (m)
and D∗ (m) is:
(a)
Ωm > θ =⇒ p∗ (m) < pWS∗ (m) . (52)
(b)
α∗i (m) > α
WS∗
i (m) . (53)
(c)





Proposition 19(a) reveals a quite interesting peculiarity. Commonly, it would be expected a re-
duction of the retail price when the system reaches coordination, but in this model in particular there
exist a specific condition that requires to be fulfilled in order to attain this outcome. Interestingly,
Propositions 19(b) and 19(c) show that a coordinated SC always favors the investment on new tech-
nologies and also entails further opening of the market demand. Moreover, a review of both the
decentralized and centralized SC models lead us to the following interesting observations:
Proposition 20. If the supply chain members decide to cooperate and reach coordination, they can
increase the expected optimal profit of the supply chain at least 1/3 compared to the decentralized
scenario.
Proposition 20 justify the reason why the SC should seek the system coordination. Next section
shows 2 contracts designed to coordinate the SC. These contracts are tested to verify: (1) their
ability to coordinate and reach the maximum expected profit for the system, and (2) the existence
of win-win conditions that will lead to an increment of the profit for all members of the SC.
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In the sections below we proceed to analyze the Technology-cost sharing (CS) contract, and the
Technology-cost and Revenue sharing (CR) contract to determine if they can achieve the supply
chain coordination and the win-win conditions.
4.5 Technology-cost sharing (CS) contract
4.5.1 CS contract model
The model described in this subsection further assumes that theOEM decides to share a fraction
of the technology cost paid by Si, i.e. ηi(1−φi)2 . Eqs. (55) and (56) present the profit and expected
























ηj(1− φj)α2j . (56)
Eqs. (57) and (58) present the profit and expected profit functions for Si, (i = 1, 2, ...,m),
respectively:


















4.5.2 CS contract coordination analysis
We now find the optimal values for wholesale price and level of technology in the CS contract.
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Proposition 21. For Si, (i=1,2,...,m), with a given retail price p, its optimal wholesale price wCS∗i ,
and optimal level of technology acquired αCS∗i can be expressed as:

















Previous results allow us to analyze the conditions at which the CS contract can coordinate the
SC.
For analyzing if the Technology-cost sharing contract of the decentralized model can reach
coordination, we equal αCS∗i |p = α∗i and then from these results we determine if pCS∗ = p∗.
Proposition 22. The Technology-cost sharing contract is unable of coordinating the supply chain.
The CS contract can achieve pCS∗ = p∗ only when φi = 1, value at which it develops into the
WS contract. Hence, the CS contract does not provide the necessary incentives to the participants
of the negotiation to reach system coordination. Now, we propose a new contract which is able to
reach coordination and the win-win state for all members of the SC.
4.6 Technology-cost and Revenue sharing (CR) contract
4.6.1 CR contract model
For the CR contract it is now assumed that the OEM is willing to share a fraction of the
technology cost paid by Si, i.e. ηi(1−φi)2 , while on the other hand Si agree to share a fraction of its
revenue with the OEM, i.e. wi(1− φi). For simplicity we utilize the parameter φi to express both
the fraction of cost and revenue shared among the parties. Although its simplicity, this assumption
is quite realistic since organizations usually prefer to engage into less complex contracts due to
their practical implementation. This is specially the case for multi-product supply chains (Shen et
83




























Similarly, Eqs. (63) and (64) show the profit and expected profit functions for Si, (i = 1, 2, ...,m),
respectively:


















4.6.2 CR contract coordination analysis
In order to derive the optimal pricing and technology-acquisition decisions of the CR contract,
we proceed to find the optimal values for wholesale price and level of technology.
Proposition 23. For Si, (i = 1, 2, ...,m), with a given retail price p, its optimal wholesale price
wCR∗i , and optimal level of technology acquired α
CR∗
i can be expressed as:





Ωm − θ . (65)
αCR∗i |p (m) =
βi (d− pθ)
ηi (Ωm − θ) . (66)
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In order to test if the CR contract of the decentralized model can reach coordination, we set
αCR∗i |p = α∗i and then from these results determine if pCR∗ = p∗.
Proposition 24. We reach to the following observations:
(a) The CR contract coordinates the supply chain.
(b) pCR∗ = p∗ and αCR∗i = α
∗
i .
Proposition 24 shows that the CR contract can successfully coordinate the SC. Furthermore,
it is proved that pCR∗ = p∗ and αCR∗i = α
∗
i , meaning that the CR contract can attain perfect
coordination of the supply chain. Now, it is analyzed the behavior of the wholesale price and the
win-win conditions of this contract.








Comparing the wholesale price from the CR contract wCR∗i (m) with its counterpart from the
decentralized system wWS∗i (m) and with the retail price from the centralized system p
∗ (m), we
found that:
Proposition 26. The relation between wCR∗i (m), wWS∗i (m) and p∗ (m) is:
(a)
wCR∗i (m) > w
WS∗





cj =⇒ wCR∗i (m) < p∗ (m) . (69)
Proposition 26(a) exposes an interesting behavior of the CR contract. Contrary to the expected
outcome, the wholesale price in the CR contract is always higher than its counterpart in the decen-
tralized system. Although at first this happening could seem an unusual phenomenon, its explana-
tion is quite simple. In the CR contract, on the one hand, the supplier pays a fraction φ of the tech-
nology cost and receives a fraction φ of the revenue generated by selling its component to theOEM.
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On the other hand, the OEM pays the remaining fraction 1 − φ of the technology cost and gets in
return the remaining fraction 1 − φ of the revenue generated by the supplier when selling its com-
ponent. Hence, in the CR contract the unit revenue for the suppliers is wCR∗i φi (m) < w
CR∗
i (m).
Proposition 26(b) presents a quite interesting phenomenon in which under given conditions a sup-
plier could charge a higher wholesale price to the OEM compared to the retail price of the market.
But again, this occurrence can be easily explained because both the supplier and the OEM share
a fraction φ and 1 − φ of the wholesale price, respectively. Comparing the optimal expected profit
functions of the OEM and Si for both the WS and CR contract lead us to the next interesting
findings.
4.6.3 Win-win condition
Proposition 27. We reach to the following observations:
(a) There exist a feasible solution for φi that offers a win-win condition for the OEM and the Si
in the CR contract.
(b) The value of φi for reaching the win-win condition state of the SC is delimited by the bounds:
φi (m) ≥ LBφi(m) =
Ω2m
4 [Ωm + (m− 1) θ]2
. (70)
















[Ωm + (m− 1) θ]
.
(71)
Proposition 27 presents the value of φi at which the OEM and Si increase their profits when
compared to the decentralized system. This condition is of utmost importance for the successful
implementation of the CR contract. Although a contract could prove to coordinate the SC, if it
can not be designed to reach a win-win state for all participants, then these members could lack
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incentive to engage into the negotiation. In addition, it is interesting to see in Proposition 27(b) that
there exist a unique LBφi .
4.6.4 Bargaining analysis
An extension of the proposed CR contract considers now the bargaining process of the decision
variable φi between the parties of the negotiation. Similar to the work of Ghosh and Shah (2015),
we assume that the SC members follow the Nash bargaining process. The optimal φi obtained from
the bargaining model is presented in Eq. 72
φCR∗i (m) =arg max
φi
Eξ[ΠCRBi (p




CR∗, wCR∗i , α
CR∗








substituting Eqs. 50, 51 and 67 in Eq. 72 and by solving latter expression, it is derived Proposition
28.
Proposition 28. The Eξ[ΠCRBi (p
CR∗, wCR∗i , α
CR∗
i )](m) is a strictly concave function of φi; and the







Proposition 28 is of special interest for the parties as it reflects the optimal negotiation ability
of each member of the negotiation. Furthermore, we notice that there exist a distinct value of
φCR∗i (m) depending on the Si negotiating with the OEM. This is expected as although the SC
members are cooperating, each of the suppliers is an independent decision maker. Furthermore, we
derive the relation between the optimal value of φi in the CR contract under bargain with respect to
the technology-dependence coefficient of demand βi and the cost coefficient of technology acquired
ηi. Findings are summarized in Proposition 29.
Proposition 29. The cost-revenue sharing decision variable [1 − φCR∗i (m)] is increasing in the
technology-dependence coefficient of demand βj (j = 1, 2, ..,m) and decreasing in the cost coeffi-
cient of technology acquired ηj (j = 1, 2, ..,m).
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Proposition 29 means that under high cost of technology investment the OEM and Si would
share a lower portion of the technology cost and revenue, respectively. This is to expect because
with higher level investments the members have less incentives to cooperate in order to protect
their profitability. However, when the technology sensitivity of the market is high, the parties share
a higher portion. Opposite to the previous finding, now we notice that the SC parties decide to
further cooperate in the acquisition of new technologies as it benefits their profitability. Therefore,
the cost-revenue sharing decision of the OEM and Si is influenced by the technology acquisition
cost and the market sensitivity to the new technologies.
4.7 Numerical analysis
Now we introduce a numerical example to gain some managerial insights from the proofs shown
in previous sections.
4.7.1 Numerical example
In this example the parameter values are d=10000, θ=180. In addition, the parameter values
of c, β, η, φ for the SC systems considering m= 1, 2, 4, 10, 30, 50 suppliers are summarized in
Table D.1. With this given data we calculate the optimal values for the market demand, the decision
variables and the expected profit for the SC members. Computational results for the cases of m=
1, 2, 4, 10, 30, 50 suppliers are shown in Table D.2. A summary of the computational results is
presented in Table 4.4.
From the results we conclude:
(1) Considering the 1-supplier 1-manufacturer SC (m = 1), the profit in the centralized sys-
tem and the corresponding level of technology acquisition are 31.75 and 0.2857, respectively.
The level of technology acquisition is a percentage value where 0 signifies the no investment
on technology, and values near to 1 mean investment on state-of-the-art technology, which
normally implies higher costs and product enhancement. Decisions on how to interpret the
percentage value of technology investment is part of the negotiation process of the SC parties.
The profit in theWS contract and the corresponding level of technology acquisition are 23.81
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Table 4.4: The optimal solution for the example
Decision variables Profit
m Model D p µw σw µα σα ΠOEM µΠSm σΠSm ΠSC
1 Centralized system 114.29 55.63 — — 0.2857 0.0000 — — — 31.75
Decentralized system 57.14 55.60 55.32 0.00 0.1429 0.0000 15.87 7.94 0.00 23.81
CR contract
µφA=0.1500 σφA=0.0000 114.29 55.63 367.30 0.00 0.2857 0.0000 26.98 4.76 0.00 31.75
µφB=0.2500 σφB=0.0000 114.29 55.63 220.63 0.00 0.2857 0.0000 23.81 7.94 0.00 31.75
µφC=0.3500 σφC=0.0000 114.29 55.63 157.78 0.00 0.2857 0.0000 20.63 11.11 0.00 31.75
µφD=0.4500 σφD=0.0000 114.29 55.63 122.86 0.00 0.2857 0.0000 17.46 14.29 0.00 31.75
2 Centralized system 3979.74 33.61 — — 0.5896 0.2085 — — — 87664.82
Decentralized system 1324.94 48.25 13.11 6.01 0.1963 0.0694 29185.44 9734.50 12.77 48654.44
CR contract
µφA=0.100 σφA=0.0707 3979.74 33.61 70.44 25.93 0.5896 0.2085 70107.42 8778.70 6198.84 87664.82
µφB=0.175 σφB=0.1061 3979.74 33.61 49.61 17.68 0.5896 0.2085 56937.33 15363.75 9295.38 87664.82
µφC=0.250 σφC=0.1414 3979.74 33.61 41.40 13.13 0.5896 0.2085 43767.23 21948.80 12391.92 87664.82
µφD=0.325 σφD=0.1768 3979.74 33.61 36.97 10.41 0.5896 0.2085 30597.14 28533.84 15488.46 87664.82
4 Centralized system 3761.73 34.90 — — 0.6448 0.1760 — — — 78160.41
Decentralized system 749.73 51.44 7.67 2.09 0.1285 0.0351 15577.77 3118.26 3.54 28050.82
CR contract
µφA=0.0650 σφA=0.0580 3761.73 34.90 106.54 53.82 0.6448 0.1760 57764.35 5099.01 4549.87 78160.41
µφB=0.0875 σφB=0.0613 3761.73 34.90 64.58 8.21 0.6448 0.1760 50699.63 6865.19 4806.04 78160.41
µφC=0.1075 σφC=0.0680 3761.73 34.90 54.68 5.82 0.6448 0.1760 44420.83 8434.89 5331.01 78160.41
µφD=0.1325 σφD=0.0789 3761.73 34.90 47.77 4.09 0.6448 0.1760 36574.83 10396.39 6182.91 78160.41
10 Centralized system 3492.38 36.26 — — 0.1603 0.0369 — — — 67569.82
Decentralized system 316.76 53.81 3.45 0.87 0.0145 0.0033 6128.63 557.28 0.08 11701.38
CR contract
µφA=0.0192 σφA=0.0150 3492.38 36.26 172.05 174.84 0.1603 0.0369 54556.73 1301.31 1014.30 67569.82
µφB=0.0384 σφB=0.0299 3492.38 36.26 95.72 87.42 0.1603 0.0369 41543.63 2602.62 2028.59 67569.82
µφC=0.0576 σφC=0.0449 3492.38 36.26 70.28 58.28 0.1603 0.0369 28530.54 3903.93 3042.89 67569.82
µφD=0.0768 σφD=0.0599 3492.38 36.26 57.56 43.71 0.1603 0.0369 15517.45 5205.24 4057.18 67569.82
30 Centralized system 3129.32 38.47 — — 0.1645 0.0605 — — — 53942.49
Decentralized system 100.15 55.01 1.26 0.31 0.0053 0.0019 1726.28 55.70 0.01 3397.31
CR contract
µφA=0.0071 σφA=0.0045 3129.32 38.47 532.84 1406.9 0.1645 0.0605 42422.85 383.99 243.24 53942.49
µφB=0.0141 σφB=0.0089 3129.32 38.47 275.11 703.45 0.1645 0.0605 30903.21 767.98 486.49 53942.49
µφC=0.0212 σφC=0.0134 3129.32 38.47 189.20 468.97 0.1645 0.0605 19383.57 1151.96 729.73 53942.49
µφD=0.0282 σφD=0.0179 3129.32 38.47 206.39 314.05 0.1645 0.0605 28575.67 845.56 683.28 53942.49
50 Centralized system 2242.03 43.48 — — 0.1343 0.0684 — — — 27504.73
Decentralized system 43.32 55.32 0.86 0.38 0.0026 0.0013 531.49 10.42 0.00 1052.70
CR contract
µφA=0.0043 σφA=0.0031 2242.03 43.48 436.29 884.95 0.1343 0.0684 21488.54 120.32 87.73 27504.73
µφB=0.0086 σφB=0.0063 2242.03 43.48 224.37 442.48 0.1343 0.0684 15472.35 240.65 175.46 27504.73
µφC=0.0129 σφC=0.0094 2242.03 43.48 153.73 294.98 0.1343 0.0684 9456.15 360.97 263.19 27504.73
µφD=0.0172 σφD=0.0126 2242.03 43.48 118.41 221.24 0.1343 0.0684 3439.96 481.30 350.92 27504.73
and 0.1429, respectively. This means that when the OEM and S1 decide to coordinate the
system, the profit of the SC raises by 33.35%, and at the same time the level of technology
acquisition raises by 99.93%. This occurrence can be explained due to the decision of the
OEM of sharing with S1 a fraction of its technology acquisition cost. Thanks to this agree-
ment, the SC is able to further invest in technology enhancement for the end product, which
in return helps to double the market demand due to the technology awareness of the end cus-
tomers. In addition, it is interesting to see in this example that p∗ = 55.63 > pWS∗ = 55.60,
due to the non fulfillment of the condition in Proposition 19(a). Regarding the results from
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the CR contract, it is evident that depending on the level of φ1 selected, a win-win state could
be reached for both agents of the negotiation. For example, by comparing the profits from the
OEM in the decentralized scenario with its counterpart from the CR contract, we can notice
that for case C (when φ1 = 0.35), ΠOEM passed from 15.87 to 20.63, representing a 29.99%
increase. Similarly, ΠS1 augmented from 7.94 to 11.11, which is an improvement of 39.92%
.
(2) For the 2-supplier 1-manufacturer SC (m = 2), we notice that the SC’s profit in the cen-
tralized and decentralized scenarios are 87664.82 and 48654.44, respectively. This means
that when both S1, S2 and the OEM decide to cooperate, the profit of the system increases
by 80.18%. Furthermore, the level of technology acquisitions in the centralized system are
α∗1 = 0.4422 and α∗2 = 0.7370, while in the decentralized system are αWS∗1 = 0.1472 and
αWS∗2 = 0.2454. Comparable to the profit’s behavior, in the centralized scenario when the
three agents decide to work together as an unique entity, the level of α1 and α2 acquired triple.
Considering the CR contract results, we observe that cases A and B do not offer a beneficial
scenario for all parties. For example, for caseA (when φ1 = 0.100 and φ2 = 0.175), the profit
of the agents are ΠCROEM = 70107.42, Π
CR
S1 = 13161.94, Π
CR
S2 = 4395.46. The value of profit
of their counterparts in the decentralized system are ΠWSOEM = 29185.44, Π
WS
S1 = 9725.47,
ΠWSS2 = 9743.53. Therefore, the profit value of the OEM, S1 and S2 in the CR contract
is modified by 140.21%, 35.33%, and -57.89%, respectively. Because of the profit reduc-
tion for S2, this agent will be reluctant to engage in this negotiation. Hence, the terms of φ
need to be decided considering Proposition 27(b) in order to assure a win − win scenario
for all the SC participants. Finally, it is interesting to see in case D for the CR contract that
wCR2 = 29.61 < p = 33.61, due to the fulfillment of the condition in Proposition 26(b).
(3) For the 4-supplier 1-manufacturer SC (m = 4), we notice that the optimal retail price in the
centralized scenario is p = 34.90, and the wholesale price for the suppliers in the CR con-
tract for case A are wCR1 = 62.57, w
CR
2 = 180.90, w
CR
3 = 110.90, w
CR
4 = 71.81. Thus,
each of the wholesale prices from the suppliers are higher than the retail price of the OEM.
Although at first this happening could seem an unusual phenomenon, its explanation is quite
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simple. In the CR contract, on the one hand, the supplier pays a fraction φ of the technology
cost and receives a fraction φ of the revenue generated by selling its component to theOEM.
On the other hand, the OEM pays the remaining fraction 1 − φ of the technology cost and
gets in return the remaining fraction 1 − φ of the revenue generated by the supplier when
selling its component. So for the CR contract in case A, the unit revenue for the suppliers
can be expressed as wCR1 φ1 = 7.51, w
CR
2 φ2 = 1.81, w
CR
3 φ3 = 2.22, w
CR
4 φ4 = 7.90.
Latter unit revenues for the suppliers are lower than the unit retail price of the OEM. More-
over, we observe that wCR1 φ1 = 7.51 < w
WS
1 = 9.17, w
CR
2 φ2 = 1.81 < w
WS
2 = 5.77,
wCR3 φ3 = 2.22 < w
WS
3 = 5.97, w
CR
4 φ4 = 7.90 < w
WS
4 = 9.77. This occurrence can
be explained due to the double marginalization effect appearing in the decentralized system.
Because the OEM and suppliers decide to work independently, each of them try to maxi-
mize only its own profit by increasing the wholesale prices charged to OEM and the retail
price charged to the end customer. At the same time, because the suppliers bare alone the
cost of the new technologies, their investment level is moderate. As a consequence of this
chain of actions, the market reacts adversely to the increment on retail prices and moderate
technological enhancement of the product by reducing the demand of the final product that
translates in lower profit for the SC. On the other hand, in the centralized system the three
agents decide to work together as an unique entity. Consequently, a reduction of the retail
price is achievable and also an increment on the investment on the new technologies. Both
decisions are beneficial to the end customer, who in return augment the market demand and
the total profit of the SC system.
(4) In the case of the 10-supplier 1-manufacturer SC (m = 10), we note that the SC’s profit in the
centralized and decentralized systems are 67569.82 and 11701.38, respectively, which signi-
fies an increment of 477.45%. But despite this high raise on the total profit, depending on the
terms of φ, not all the parties of the negotiation could benefit form the CR contract agree-
ment. As example, by comparing the decentralized scenario with the CR contract in case B,
we observe that the profit of S2 and S10 decrease by 63.53% and by 14.91%, respectively.
(5) For the 30-supplier 1-manufacturer SC (m = 30), we again observe that the CR contract
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offers an incentive for the SC parties to cooperate, but depending on the terms of φ, not nec-
essarily all the agents of the negotiation will benefit from the agreement. Using Proposition
27(b) we can calculate the lower bound of φ at which all the members of the SC will reach
a win-win state on their profits. For this example, the value φ ≥ LBφ = 0.001024. In case
C, the values of φ lower than 0.001024 are φ7 = 0.0006 and φ24 = 0.0003. Therefore, both
S7 and S24 are affected by a decrement on their profits when compared to the decentralized
system (a reduction of 41.41% for S7, and of 70.71% for S24).
(6) In the case of the 50-supplier 1-manufacturer SC (m = 50), we note that thanks to the
cooperation of the SC members, the system is able to increment the level of technology
acquisition for each of the suppliers allowing the SC system to reach coordination and at
the same time increasing the total profit when compared to the decentralized scenario. The
example also shows us that the bargain power of each party during the negotiation is of utmost
importance when deciding the fraction φ of cost-revenue shared by the members. For the
scenario of m = 50, φ ≥ LBφ = 0.000373. It is observed in case D that all values of φ are
greater than 0.000373, and therefore all suppliers and OEM are capable to reach a win-win
state for their respective profits.
As discussed, the CR contract is able to reach a win-win state for all SC parties under certain
conditions. By using the parameter values from scenario m = 2 in Table D.1, Figure 4.4 is con-
structed to illustrate this occurrence. Sub-figure 4.4a presents the optimal profit for the SC agents
for given values of φ1 and φ2. Sub-figures 4.4b, 4.4c and 4.4d show the optimal profit for S1, S2
and OEM respectively. We can notice the plane formed by the values of φ1 and φ2 on which the
three SC agents obtain higher optimal profits compared to the decentralized system.
Figure 4.5 shows that the win-win-win region has a triangular shape delimited by the vertices
(φ1= 0.11 ;φ2= 0.11), (φ1= 0.55;φ2= 0.11) and (φ1= 0.11;φ2= 0.55). Hence, aCR contract designed
considering values of φ1 and φ2 inside this triangular plane attains a win-win-win profit state for all
parties of the negotiation.
Using scenario m = 2 in Table D.1, we analyze the relation of the parameter θ on the profit and
on the demand market for both the decentralized and centralized scenarios. Figure 4.6 shows the
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(a) Optimal profit for SC in CR contract (b) Optimal profit for S1 in CR contract
(c) Optimal profit for S2 in CR contract (d) Optimal profit forOEM inCR contract
Figure 4.4: Optimal profit in CR contract
Figure 4.5: Win-win-win region in CR contract
results obtained for values of θ from 144 to 360. We make the following observations:
(1) From Sub-figure 4.6a it is noticed that variations on θ have a significant impact on reducing
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the profit in both the centralized and decentralized systems. This is specially evident for the
OEM because in this numerical example it holds the largest portion of profit among the SC
parties.
(2) As θ increases, both the demand market on the decentralized and centralized systems de-
crease. It is interesting to see in Figure 4.6b the linear decrement trend for both scenarios.
In this example in particular, the reduction slope of the market demand on the centralized
system is three times higher than the one in the decentralized scenario. We conclude that
this takes place because as θ increases, the suppliers and the OEM in the centralized system
are dissuaded faster to invest in the new technologies compared to the decentralized scenario,
impacting in a faster rate the reduction of the demand due to the technology awareness of the
end customers.
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(b) Effect of θ on market demand
Figure 4.6: Effect of θ on profit and market demand
We also analyze the impact of θ, β and η on the level of technology acquisition α using the
scenario m = 2 in Table D.1. Figure 4.7 illustrates the results for values of θ = [144, 360],
β1 = [35, 65], β2 = [7, 13], η1 = [2000, 5000] and η2 = [240, 600]. We explain the findings:
(1) Sub-figure 4.7a evidences that an increment on θ has a negative impact on the optimal level
of technology acquisition α. This is evident because as consumers get more sensitive to the
retail price, they become less predisposed to acquire the final product. As a result, the SC
members are less stimulated on enhancing their components and end product through new
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technologies investment. This phenomenon appears in both the decentralized and centralized
scenarios.
(2) In Sub-figure 4.7b we notice that even though β has a positive effect on α, the effect of β1
is insignificant on α2, while the effect of β2 is insignificant on α1. Furthermore, we observe
that there exist a linear incremental trend between β1 and α1, and between β2 and α2. We
conclude that this situation takes place because of the relation between β and α on the market
demand, that incentives the parties of the SC system to further invest on new technologies in
the expectation of improving their benefits.
(3) From Sub-figure 4.7c we can appreciate the negative impact of the cost coefficient of tech-
nology η on α. Similar to β, we notice that the effect of η1 is insignificant on α2, while the
effect of η2 is insignificant on α1. Unlike β, we can comment that there exist a non-linear
incremental trend between η1 and α1, and between η2 and α2.
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(a) Effect of θ on α (b) Effect of β on α (c) Effect of η on α
Figure 4.7: Effect of θ, β and η on α
We further investigate the effect of the number of suppliers participating in the SC m using
the results from Table 4.4. We let RΠ = ΠSCΠWSSC
represent the benefit in profit when the SC agents




represent the increment on the average level of technology
acquisition when the system attains coordination. Figure 4.8 shows the results obtained for values
of m = 1, 2, 4, 10, 30, 50. We make the following observations:
(1) It is interesting to see that an increment of m leads to higher values of RΠ. We conclude that
this takes place because when the number of suppliers increases in the decentralized system,
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the summation of the bullwhip effect created by each of them has a higher negative impact
on the profit of the system when compared to a scenario with fewer suppliers. Thanks to the
cooperation of the SC members in the centralized scenario, the bullwhip effect disappears
allowing the reduction of the retail price charged to the end customer, and the reduction of the
wholesale prices charged to theOEM. Thanks to this occurrence, when having more suppli-
ers participating in the negotiation, this cooperation further incentive the demand growth and
ameliorate the subsequent profits of the participants.
(2) Similar to RΠ, we observe that m has a positive influence on Rα. Having a larger number of
suppliers in the centralized system favors the demand boost when compared to the decentral-
ized scenario. Because of this, a higher number of cooperative suppliers encourages also the
system to further invest in new technologies for the components used to assembly the final
product.
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Figure 4.8: Effect of m on RΠ and Rα
4.7.2 Sensitivity analysis
We use scenario m = 4 in Table D.1 to investigate the effects of the parameters θ, β and η on
the SC system coordination strategies. We modify each of the parameters by +10%, +5%, -5% and
-10%, changing one parameter at a time while keeping the rest unchanged. We assume for the CR
contract the value of the decision variables to be φ1=0.20, φ2=0.05, φ3=0.08 and φ4=0.20. From
Table 4.5, we explain the following findings:
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(1) The parameter θ has a negative impact on the market demand, retail price, wholesale prices,
levels of technology acquisition and on the profit of all participants. As the retail price-
dependence coefficient of demand increases, the OEM decides to lower its retail price. This
decision is also followed by the the suppliers who decrease the wholesale prices charged to the
OEM. Because in our example θ has higher impact on the market demand compared to β1,
β2, β3 and β4, an increase on θ force the SC to reduce their investment on new technologies.
Consequently, the optimal profit of all members of the SC decrease.
(2) The parameter β has a positive effect on the demand market, retail price, wholesale prices,
levels of technology acquisition and on the profit of the system. Higher values of β1, β2,
β3 and β4 favor the expansion of the market demand due to the technology awareness of the
end customers. Because of this occurrence, the parties are more willing to further invest in
new technologies for the components used to assembly the final product. As an outcome, the
four suppliers and the OEM see their respective profits augmented thanks to the cooperative
agreement.
(3) As the parameter η increases, the market demand, retail price, wholesale prices, levels of tech-
nology acquisition and the profit of each of the members of the system decrease. As the new
technologies become more expensive, the members of the SC are discourage to enhance the
components used to assembly the final product. This decision has a negative reaction on the
end customers, who in return opt to cut down the market demand. As a contingency measure,
the OEM lower the retail price as an attempt to minimize the demand shrink. Because the
suppliers and the OEM agree to cooperate, the reduction on the retail price is also assumed
by the suppliers, who decide to lower the wholesale prices charged to the OEM. As a final
result, the profit for all members of the system is negatively affected by the increment of η1,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.8 Conclusions and future research
This chapter studies the technology investment strategy in a two echelon supply chain consisting
of multiple complementary suppliers and one manufacturer. By comparing a decentralized system
with wholesale price contract and collaborative scenarios with cost-sharing (CS) and cost-revenue
sharing (CR) contracts, we review if a collaborative technology investment initiative is beneficial
to all supply chain parties. Specifically, the main findings in this research are:
(1) If the SC members decide to cooperate and coordinate the system, they could increase the
overall expected profit by at least 1/3 compared to the non-cooperative scenario.
(2) Under particular conditions, coordination of the SC can lead to a reduction on the retail price,
and at the same time can lead to an increment on the level of technology acquisition.
(3) Although the CS contract does not offer the necessary incentives to coordinate the SC, the
CR contract proves to reach perfect coordination of the system.
(4) There exist a feasible solution for LBφi ≤ φi ≤ UBφi that offers a win-win condition for the
OEM and Si in the CR contract.
(5) Through bargaining analysis it is possible to determine the optimal negotiation ability of each
SC member.
(6) The numerical example shows that as the number of suppliers involved in the negotiation in-
crease, benefits on profit and level of technology acquisition further improve when compared
to the decentralized scenario.
This chapter can be further extended in a number of directions. Firstly, in this chapter we study
coordination in a two echelon supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and a single manufac-
turer. For practical applications, it would be interesting to extend our conclusions for the scenario
of a multi-echelon supply chain where lower tier level suppliers are also considered. Secondly, in
this work we consider that all the participants of the negotiation are risk-neutral. Because the ac-
quisition of new technologies entails high level investments, it would be important to investigate the
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behavior of a system formed by risk-averse parties. Lastly, this chapter focuses on examining the
investment on new technologies as a coordination tool in which the technology is obtained from an
external entity out of the supply chain system, or through the R&D of a single party in the system.
Another direction of our research would review how the transfer of technologies among members
of the same SC could be of benefit for coordinating the system.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future research
5.1 Conclusions
Companies especially in the high-tech sector pursue the acquisition and implementation of new
technologies as a mean to achieve process and product enhancement. But new technologies invest-
ment is a difficult decision because of the costs related and the complexity for its implementation.
Hence, it becomes crucial to understand the impact of new technologies on the performance of the
acquiring company and on its supply chain. Therefore, we propose two main directions of research
to model and analyze this phenomenon. Firstly, we study the effect of transferring an existing
technology in a supply chain from its owner to a different member in the system. Secondly, we
investigate the effect of new technology investment when it is independently acquired by one of the
members in the supply chain, i.e. obtained from a third-party or through internal R&D.
Following the first research direction, in Chapter 2 we model and discuss the dynamics of using
technology transfer as a tool to obtain market share from a supplier’s country. We consider uncertain
product quality level and market share portions and propose three related models: (i) a supply chain
system with neither technology transfer nor supplier’s market sharing, (ii) a system that takes into
consideration technology transfer but without supplier’s market sharing, and (iii) a supply chain
affected by technology transfer and supplier’s market sharing. In Chapter 3 we study the tech-
nology investment strategy in a two echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two
competing retailers. By comparing a non-collaborative scenario with wholesale price contract and
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collaborative scenarios with Cost-revenue sharing (CR) and Two-part tariff (TPT ) contracts, we
analyze whether a collaborative technology enhancement initiative is beneficial to all supply chain
parties. Lastly, in Chapter 4 of this thesis, we review a model consisting of multiple complementary
suppliers and one manufacturer. We perform an analysis to determine if the cost-sharing (CS) and
cost-revenue sharing (CR) contracts are capable of coordinating the supply chain. Furthermore,
we study whether or not this contracts are able to offer a win-win scenario for all members of the
negotiation and review how bargaining analysis can lead to the optimal negotiation ability of each
member.
5.2 Future research
The research work presented in this thesis can be extended in several directions. First for Chap-
ter 2, it can include and analyze the supplier’s benefits in deciding the optimal manufacturer’s order
quantity. A supply chain system in aerospace industry, for example, normally consists of several
different tiers of suppliers. Therefore it is also of interest to study how technology transfer may
affect multi-echelon supply chains. Furthermore, the models proposed in Chapter 2 are based on
the assumption of deterministic demand. It is of interest and practical importance to include demand
uncertainties in extending the models for practical applications.
In Chapter 3 we study coordination in a one-manufacturer two-retailer system. For practical ap-
plications, it would be interesting to extend our conclusions for the scenario of a single-manufacturer
multi-retailer supply chain. In addition, this chapter focuses on examining the investment on new
technologies as a coordination tool in which the technology is obtained from an external entity out
of the supply chain system, or through the R&D of a single party in the system. Another direction of
our research would review how the transfer of technologies among members of the same SC could
be of benefit for coordinating the system.
Chapter 4 reviews coordination in a two echelon supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers
and a single manufacturer. Additional work can be done to extend our conclusions for the scenario
of a multi-echelon supply chain where lower tier level suppliers are also considered. In addition,
in Chapter 4 we consider that all the participants of the negotiation are risk-neutral. Because the
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acquisition of new technologies entails high level investments, it would be important to investigate
the behavior of a system formed by risk-averse parties. Lastly, in this work we have considered the
acquisition of a general type of technology. It will be interesting to investigate the attributes and
particular impacts of specific technologies, i.e. additive manufacturing, advanced robotics, etc., on
the supply chain performance.
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Mathematical proofs Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 6: We first check if the profit function for Ri is concave in pi by calculating
the first and second order derivatives:
∂Eξ[ΠWSRi (pi)]
∂pi








= 0 we obtain:
pWS∗i |pj ,wi,α =
di + wiθ + γpj + βα
2θ
, where i 6= j. (74)
Finally, solving Equation 74 for i = 1, 2 leads to Equation 15.
Proof of Proposition 7: After finding pWS∗i |w1,w2,α, we proceed to calculate the optimal wholesale
price wWS∗i and level of technology α
WS∗ for the OEM. By solving Equation 13 using Equation
15 it is obtained:
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Now we proceed to verify the mathematical properties of the profit function for the OEM. We
calculate the Hessian matrix to verify if it is concave in wi and α. The following first and second






2θdi + γdj −
(
2θ2 − γ2) (2wi − ci) + θγ (2wj − cj) + βα (2θ + γ)]




θβ (w1 + w2 − c1 − c2)




−2θ (2θ2 − γ2)













4θ2 − γ2 .









































The determinant |HEξ[ΠWSOEM]| =
−4θ2[(θ2−γ2)(2θ−γ)η−θβ2(θ+γ)]
(4θ2−γ2)(2θ−γ) . Then, we have proved that
Eξ[ΠWSOEM(w1, w2, α)] is a strictly concave function of wi and α as long as
(
θ2 − γ2) (2θ − γ) η >




= 0 and ∂E[Π
WS
OEM]
∂α = 0 we obtain:
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2θdi + γdj + θγ (2wj − cj) + βα (2θ + γ)
2 (2θ2 − γ2) . (76)
αWS∗|w1,w2 =
θβ (w1 + w2 − c1 − c2)
η (2θ − γ) . (77)
Finally, solving Equations 76 and 77 yields to Equations 16 and 17.
Proof of Proposition 8: Substituting Equations 16 and 17 in Equation 15 leads to Equation 18.
Proof of Proposition 9: We first calculate the Hessian matrix to verify if it is concave in pi and α.
From Equation 20 the following first and second order derivatives are obtained:
∂Eξ[ΠSC ]
∂pi










































The determinant |HE[ΠSC ]| = −4 (θ + γ)
[
(θ − γ) η − β2]. We have proved thatEξ[ΠSC(p1, p2, α)]
is a strictly concave function of pi and α as long as (θ − γ) η > β2 holds. Now, by setting
∂E[ΠSC ]
∂α = 0 and
∂E[ΠSC ]
∂pi




(p1 + p2 − c1 − c2). (78)
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p∗i |pj ,α =
1
2θ
[di + θci + γ (2pj − cj) + βα] , where i 6= j. (79)
By solving Equations 78 and 79 we obtain Equations 21 and 22, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 10: The optimal expected profit for the decentralized supply chain is obtained
by replacing the values of pWS∗i , w








η2 (θ − γ) (28θ3 − 6γ3 − 28θ2γ + 15θγ2)− ηθβ2 (20θ2 + 9γ2 − 20θγ)+ 4θ2β4]
8 [η (2θ − γ) (θ − γ)− θβ2]2 (2θ + γ)2
− 2d1d2θ
[
η2 (θ − γ) (4θ3 − 2γ3 − 36θ2γ + 25θγ2)− ηθβ2 (12θ2 + 7γ2 − 28θγ)+ 4θ2β4]
8 [η (2θ − γ) (θ − γ)− θβ2]2 (2θ + γ)2
− 4θη (2θ + γ)
2
(θ − γ) [η (3θ − 2γ) (θ − γ)− θβ2] [d1 + d2 − c (θ − γ)] c
8 [η (2θ − γ) (θ − γ)− θβ2]2 (2θ + γ)2 .
(80)
The optimal expected profit for the centralized supply chain is obtained by replacing the values
of p∗i and α
∗ in Equation 20:
Eξ[Π∗SC ] =
(
2θη − β2) (d21 + d22)+ 2 (2γη + β2) d1d2 − 4 (θ2 − γ2) η [d1 + d2 − (θ − γ) c] c
8 (θ + γ) [(θ − γ) η − β2] .
(81)
Comparing Equation 80 and Equation 81, we demonstrate that the relationship between the cen-
tralized and decentralized system isEξ[ΠWS∗SC (pWS∗1 , pWS∗2 , wWS∗, αWS∗)] < Eξ[Π∗SC(p∗1, p∗2, α∗)].
Proof of Proposition 11: We first check if the profit function for Ri is concave in pi by calculating
the first and second order derivatives:
∂Eξ[ΠCRRi (pi)]
∂pi









= 0 we obtain:
pCR∗i |pj ,wi,α =
(di + γpj + βα)φi + θwi
2θφi
. (82)
Finally, solving Equation 82 for i = 1, 2 leads to Equation 27.














2θγη + β2 (2θ + γ)
]
dj − β2 (2θ − γ) (θ + γ) (c1 + c2)




By further substituting Equation 21 in Equation 83 yields to Equation 28. Finally, knowing that
for the CR contract to be feasible wCR∗i > 0, Equation 29 should hold.
Proof of Proposition 13: We first check if the profit function for Ri is concave in pi by calculating
the first and second order derivatives:
∂Eξ[ΠTPTRi (pi)]
∂pi








= 0 we obtain:
pTPT∗i |pj ,wi,α =
di + γpj + θwi + βα
2θ
, where i 6= j. (84)
Finally, solving Equation 84 for i = 1, 2 leads to Equation 34.
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Proof of Proposition 14: From pTPT∗i |w1,w2,α = p∗i we get:
wTPT∗i |α =
[




2θγη + β2 (2θ + γ)
]
dj − (2θ − γ) (θ + γ)β2 (ci + cj)
4θ (θ + γ) [(θ − γ) η − β2]
+




By further substituting Equation 21 in Equation 85 yields to Equation 35. Finally, knowing that
for the TPT contract to be feasible wTPT∗i > 0, Equation 36 should hold.
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Appendix B
Mathematical proofs Chapter 3
In this section it is presented first the proof of results for a three-supplier and one-manufacturer
SC model, whose formulas are denoted as F (m = 3). Then these results are generalized consider-
ing a multi-supplier and single-manufacturer SC system, whose expressions are denoted as F (m).
Through the use of mathematical induction we verify that all F (m) equations hold. For the math-
ematical induction proof we analyze: (i) the case of (m + 1) suppliers denoted as F (m + 1), and
(ii) the case of a single supplier denoted as F (m = 1). Table B.1 presents the sets and index sets






Ψm=3 = d− θ
∑3





, Ψm+1 = d− θ
∑
j∈Jm+1 cj , Ωm=1 = 2θ −
β21
η1
and Ψm=1 = d− θc1
Proof of Proposition 15: We first check the mathematical properties of the profit function for S1
(similar results can be derived for S2 and S3). We calculate the Hessian matrix to verify if it is
concave in w1 and α1. By replacing p = ∆ +
∑3
j=1wj in Eq. (41) it is obtained the following first
and second order derivatives:











=β1(w1 − c1)− η1α1; (87)
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Table B.1: Set and index set notation
(m)-supplier (m+ 1)-supplier
Set Index set Set Index set
Wm = {w1, w2, ..., wm}
Jm
Wm+1 = Wm + {wm+1}
Jm+1
WWS∗m = {wWS∗1 , wWS∗2 , ..., wWS∗m } WWS∗m+1 = WWS∗m + wWS∗m+1
Am = {α1, α2, ..., αm} Am+1 = Am + {αm+1}
AWS∗m = {αWS∗1 , αWS∗2 , ..., αWS∗m } AWS∗m+1 = {αWS∗1 , αWS∗2 , ..., αWS∗m , αWS∗m+1}
A∗m = {α∗1, α∗2, ..., α∗m} A∗m+1 = {α∗1, α∗2, ..., α∗m, α∗m+1}
Φm = {φ1, φ2, ..., φm} Φm+1 = Φm + {φm+1}
Ŵm = {w ∈Wm|w → wi(w)}
Ĵm
Ŵm+1 = {w ∈Wm+1|w → wi(w)}
Ĵm+1
Φ̂m = {φ ∈ Φm|φ→ φi(φ)} Φ̂m+1 = {φ ∈ Φm+1|φ→ φi(φ)}
Ŵ cm = Wm − Ŵm Ĵcm
Ŵ cm+1 = Wm+1 − Ŵm+1 Ĵcm+1
Φ̂cm = Φm − Φ̂m Φ̂cm+1 = Φm+1 − Φ̂m+1
∂2Eξ[ΠWSS1 (w1, α1)]
∂w21




























The determinant |HE[ΠWSS1 ]| = 2θη1 − β
2
1 . We have proved that Eξ[ΠWSS1 (w1, α1)] is a strictly












= 0 we obtain:











(wi − ci), where i = 1, 2, 3. (94)
Replacing Eq. (94) in Eq. (93) yields to:












Using wWS∗2 |p,w1,w3 (m = 3) to solve Eq. (95) yields to:
wWS∗1 |p,w3 (m = 3) =c1 +











By replacing wWS∗3 |p,w1 (m = 3) into Eq. (96) we obtain:
wWS∗1 |p (m = 3) =c1 +
d− pθ
Ωm=3 − θ .
(97)
Finally, substituting Eq. (97) in Eq. (94) yields to Eq. (98).
αWS∗1 |p (m = 3) =
β1 (d− pθ)
η1 (Ωm=3 − θ) . (98)
Eqs. (86), (93), (95) - (96), (97) and (98) are now generalized using Eqs. (171), (174), (177),
(43) and (44), respectively, for the scenario of (m) supplier. Eq. (43) is a particular case of Eq. (177)




replace a given w ∈ Ŵm in wWS∗i |p,∀w∈Ŵm (m)
update Ŵm
until |Ŵm| = 0
Now we proceed to prove that Equations representing a supply chain system with (m) suppliers
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and a single manufacturer hold. Using Mathematical induction we review two cases:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (171), (174), (177), (43) and (44) are true, we
analyze if Eqs. (172), (175), (178), (179) and (181) hold. By replacing p = ∆ +
∑
j∈Jm+1 wj
in Eξ[ΠWSSi (wi, αi)] (m+ 1) = (wi − ci)
(
d− θp+∑j∈Jm+1 βjαj) − 12ηiα2i , and by solving
∂Eξ[ΠWSSi (wi,αi)](m+1)
∂wi




= 0 we obtain Eq. (175). Substituting Eq. (94) in Eq. (175) yields to Eq.
(178). Eq. (179) is a particular case of Eq. (178) when |Ŵm+1| = 0. By replacing Eq. (179) into
Eq. (94) we get Eq. (181).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (171), (174), (43) and (44) are true, we review if
Eqs. (173), (176), (180) and (182) hold. Proofs for Eq. (177) is disregarded for the case of (m = 1)











= 0 we obtain Eq. (176). Substituting Eq. (94) into Eq. (176) leads to
Eq. (180). Replacing Eq. (180) in Eq. (94) yields to Eq. (182).
Proof of Proposition 16: After finding wWS∗i |p and αWS∗i |p, we proceed to calculate the optimal
retail price pWS∗ for the OEM. Solving Eq. (39) using Eqs. (97) and (98) it is obtained:










For Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)](m = 3) we then proceed to verify if it is concave in p by calculating the first


















−2θ2 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
(Ωm=3 − θ)2
. (101)











holds. Finally, by setting ∂E[Π
WS
OEM](m=3)
∂p = 0 we obtain
Eq. (102).
pWS∗(m = 3) =
6dθ − (Ψm=3 − 2d) (Ωm=3 − θ)
2θ (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
. (102)
General expressions for Eqs. (99), (100), (101) and (102) are Eqs. (183), (186), (189) and (45),
respectively. Now we proceed to prove latter Equations using Mathematical induction:
(i) Case of (m+1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (183), (186), (189) and (45) are true, we review if
Eqs. (184), (187), (190) and (192) hold. Substituting Eqs. (179) and (181) intoEξ[ΠWSOEM(p)] (m+ 1) =(
p−∑j∈Jm+1 wj)(d− θp+∑j∈Jm+1 βjαj), leads to Eq. (184). Using Eq. (184) to solve
∂Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)](m+1)




(190). By isolating p from Eq. (187) we reach to Eq. (192).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (183), (186), (189) and (45) are true, we review if
Eqs. (185), (188), (191) and (193) hold. Replacing Eqs. (180) and (182) intoEξ[ΠWSOEM(p)] (m = 1) =




to Eq. (188). By using Eq. (188) to solve ∂
2Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)](m=1)
∂p2
we obtain Eq. (191). Solving p from
Eq. (188) leads to Eq. (193).
Proof of Proposition 17: By replacing Eq. (102) in Eqs. (97) and (98) it is obtained Eqs. (103) and
(104).
wWS∗1 (m = 3) =c1 +
Ψm=3
2 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
. (103)
αWS∗1 (m = 3) =
β1Ψm=3
2η1 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
. (104)
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Similar results can be derived for S2 and S3. General expressions for Eqs. (103) and (104)
are Eqs. (46) and (47), respectively. With the use of mathematical induction we prove that latter
Equations hold. We analyze two scenarios:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (46) and (47) are true, we review if Eqs. (194)
and (196) hold. By replacing Eq. (192) in Eq. (179) it is obtained Eq. (194). Substituting Eq. (192)
into Eq. (181) yields to Eq. (196).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (46) and (47) are true, we review if Eqs. (195)
and (197) hold. Replacing Eq. (193) in Eq. (180), leads to Eq. (195). By replacing Eq. (193) in Eq.
(182) we get Eq. (197).
Proof of Proposition 18: We first calculate the Hessian matrix to verify if it is concave in p and α1.
From Eq. (49) it is obtained the following first and second order derivatives:
















∂2Eξ[ΠSC(p, α1, α2, α3)]
∂p2
= −2θ; (107) ∂
2Eξ[ΠSC(p, α1, α2, α3)]
∂α1∂p
= β1; (108)
∂2Eξ[ΠSC(p, α1, α2, α3)]
∂α21
= −η1; (109) ∂




∂2Eξ[ΠSC(p, α1, α2, α3)]
∂α2∂α1
= 0; (111)
∂2Eξ[ΠSC(p, α1, α2, α3)]
∂α3∂α1
= 0. (112)
Similar results can be obtained for S2 and S3. The Hessian matrix for the supply chain system






































−2θ β1 β2 β3
β1 −η1 0 0
β2 0 −η2 0
β3 0 0 −η3












We have proved that Eξ[ΠSC(p, α1, α2, α3)](m = 3) is a strictly concave function of p, α1, α2










holds. Now, by setting ∂E[ΠSC ]∂p = 0 and
∂E[ΠSC ]
∂α1
= 0 we obtain:

















Solving Eqs. (114) and (115) yields to Eqs. (116) and (117).
p∗ (m = 3) =












General expressions for Eqs. (105), (106), (113), (114), (115), (116) and (117) are Eqs. (198),
(201), (204), (207), (210), (50) and (51), respectively. We verify the validity of latter Equations
through the use of mathematical induction. We specifically check two cases:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (198), (201), (204), (207), (210), (50) and
(51) are true, we review if Eqs. (199), (202), (205), (208), (211), (213) and (215) hold. By using
expression Eξ[ΠSC(p,∀α ∈ Am+1)] (m+ 1) =
(








∂p it is obtained Eq. (199). UsingEξ[ΠSC(p, ∀α ∈
Am+1)] (m+ 1) =
(
p−∑j∈Jm+1 cj)(d− θp+∑j∈Jm+1 βjαj) − 12 ∑j∈Jm+1 ηjα2j to solve
∂Eξ[ΠSC(p,∀α∈Am+1)](m+1)
∂αi
it is obtained Eq. (202). |HE[ΠSC ](m+1)| can be expressed as:
|HE[ΠSC ](m+1)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2θ β1 β2 · · · βm βm+1
β1 −η1 0 · · · 0 0







βm 0 0 · · · −ηm 0





ηj − (−1)2mηm+1|HE[ΠSC ](m)|
By solving the latter expression we get Eq. (205). Setting Eq. (199) to zero and by isolating p
from the expression, we reach to Eq. (208). By setting Eq. (202) to zero and by isolating αi from
the expression, it is obtained Eq. (211). Replacing Eq. (211) into Eq. (208) leads to Eq. (213).
Finally, substituting Eq. (213) in Eq. (211) yields to Eq. (215).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (198), (201), (204), (207), (210), (50) and
(51) are true, we review if Eqs. (200), (203), (206), (209), (212), (214) and (216) hold. Us-
ing Eξ[ΠSC(p, α1)] (m = 1) = (p− c1) (d− θp+ β1α1) − 12η1α21 to solve
∂Eξ[ΠSC(p,α1)](m=1)
∂p










By solving the latter expression we obtain Eq. (206). By setting Eq. (200) to zero and by
isolating p from the expression, we reach to Eq. (209). Setting Eq. (203) to zero and by isolating
α1 from the expression, it is obtained Eq. (212). Substituting Eq. (212) into Eq. (209) leads to Eq.
(214). Replacing Eq. (214) in Eq. (212) yields to Eq. (216).
Proof of Proposition 19: Firstly, let’s assume that Inequality (118) holds.
Ωm=3 > θ =⇒ p∗ (m = 3) < pWS∗ (m = 3) . (118)
Replacing Eqs. (102) and (116) in Inequality (118) leads to:
Ψm=3 (Ωm=3 + 4θ) (Ωm=3 − θ)
From Eq. (117) we know that Ψm=3 > 0. Then, Eq. (118) holds as long as Ωm=3 − θ > 0 is
fulfilled. Secondly, let’s assume that Inequality (119) holds.
α∗1 (m = 3) > α
WS∗
1 (m = 3) . (119)
Replacing Eqs. (117) and (104) in Inequality (119) yields to:
β1η1Ψm=3 (Ωm=3 + 4θ) > 0
Latter expression proves that Eq. (119) holds. Similar results can be obtained for i = 2, 3.
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Lastly, let’s assume that Inequality (120) holds.




(m = 3) . (120)
Replacing Eqs. (102), (104), (116) and (117) in Inequality (120) leads to:




Latter expression proves that Eq. (120) holds.
General expressions for Inequalities (118), (119) and (120) are Inequalities (52), (53) and (54),
respectively. Now we verify if latter Inequalities hold with the use of mathematical induction. We
review two cases:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming Inequalities (52), (53) and (54) are true, we review
if Inequalities (217), (219) and (221) hold. By replacing Eqs. (192) and (213) in Inequality (217)
leads to:
Ψm+1 (Ωm+1 + 2mθ) (Ωm+1 − θ)
From Eq. (215) we know that Ψm+1 > 0. Then, Inequality (217) holds as long as Ωm+1−θ > 0
is fulfilled. Secondly, let’s assume that Inequality (219) holds. Replacing Eq. (215) and (196) in
Inequality (219) yields to:
βiηiΨm+1 (Ωm+1 + 2mθ) > 0
Latter expression proves that Eq. (219) holds. Lastly, let’s assume that Inequality (221) holds.
Replacing Eqs. (192), (196), (213) and (215) in Inequality (221) leads to:
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Latter expression proves that Eq. (221) holds.
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Inequalities (52), (53) and (54) are true, we review
if Inequalities (218), (220) and (222) hold. By replacing Eqs. (193) and (214) in Inequality (218)
leads to:
Ψm=1Ωm=1 (Ωm=1 − θ)
From Eq. (216) we know that Ψm=1 > 0. Then, Eq. (218) holds as long as Ωm=1 − θ > 0
is fulfilled. Secondly, let’s assume that Inequality (220) holds. Replacing Eqs. (216) and (197) in
Inequality (220) yields to:
β1η1Ψm=1Ωm=1 > 0
Latter expression proves that Eq. (220) holds. Lastly, let’s assume that Inequality (222) holds.




Latter expression proves that Eq. (222) holds.
Proof of Proposition 20: Replacing the values of pWS∗, wWS∗i and α
WS∗
i in Eq. (42) for the case





pWS∗, wWS∗1 , wWS∗2 ,
wWS∗3 , αWS∗1 , αWS∗2 ,
αWS∗3

 (m = 3) = (3Ωm=3 + 8θ) Ψ
2
m=3
8 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2 . (121)
Substituting the values of p∗ and α∗i in Eq. (49) for the case of (m = 3) suppliers, we get the
optimal expected profit for the centralized supply chain:




By comparing E[ΠWS∗SC ](m = 3) and E[Π∗SC ](m = 3) we reach to:
Eξ[ΠWS∗SC ](m = 3)
Eξ[Π∗SC ](m = 3)
=
(3Ωm=3 + 8θ) Ωm=3
4 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2 . (123)
Eq. (123) can be expressed as:
Eξ[ΠWS∗SC ](m = 3)
Eξ[Π∗SC ](m = 3)
=
4 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2 + 4 (Ωm=3 + 2θ) Ωm=3 − Ω2m=3 − 4 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)2
4 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2
=1− (Ωm=3 + 4θ)
2






2 > 0 proves that
Eξ[ΠWS∗SC ](m=3)
Eξ[Π∗SC ](m=3)
< 1. We have demonstrated that the
decentralized model can not reach coordination.




can also be expressed as:
Eξ[Π∗SC ](m = 3)
Eξ[ΠWS∗SC ](m = 3)
=
4 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2
(3Ωm=3 + 8θ) Ωm=3
.
From the concavity condition of Proposition 18 we know that Ωm=3 > 0 holds, then it holds
that 8θ (2Ωm=3 + 6θ) ≥ 0. We have:
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8θ (2Ωm=3 + 6θ) ≥0
12 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2 ≥4 (3Ωm=3 + 8θ) Ωm=3
4 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2
(3Ωm=3 + 8θ) Ωm=3
≥4
3
Furthermore, this result allows us to compare the optimal expected profits as:
Eξ[Π∗SC ](m = 3)− Eξ[ΠWS∗SC ](m = 3)




General expressions for Eqs. (121), (122), (123), (124) and (125) are Eqs. (223), (226), (229),
(232) and (235), respectively. Now we verify if latter Equations hold with the use of mathematical
induction. We review two cases:
(i) Case of (m+ 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (223), (226), (229), (232) and (235) are true, we
analyze if Eqs. (224), (227), (230), (233) and (236) hold. Replacing Eqs. (192), (194) and (196)
into the expression Eξ[ΠWSSC (p,∀w ∈ Wm+1,∀α ∈ Am+1)] (m+ 1) = Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)] (m+ 1) +∑
j∈Jm+1 Eξ[Π
WS
Sj (wj , αj)] (m+ 1) leads to Eq. (224). Substituting Eqs. (213) and (215) in
Eξ[ΠSC(p, ∀α ∈ Am+1)] (m+ 1) =
(
p−∑j∈Jm+1 cj)(d− θp+∑j∈Jm+1 βjαj)−12 ∑j∈Jm+1 ηjα2j




we get Eq. (230). Eq.
(230) can be expressed also as Eq. (233). From the concavity condition of Proposition 18 we know
that Ωm+1 > 0 holds, then 4mθ (2Ωm+1 + 3mθ) ≥ 0 also holds. We have:
4mθ (2Ωm+1 + 3mθ) ≥0
12 (Ωm+1 +mθ)
2 ≥4 (3Ωm+1 + 4mθ) Ωm+1
4 (Ωm+1 +mθ)
2
(3Ωm+1 + 4mθ) Ωm+1
≥4
3




leads to Eq. (236).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (223), (226), (229), (232) and (235) are true, we
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review if Eqs. (225), (228), (231), (234) and (237) hold. Replacing Eqs. (193), (195) and (197) in
Eξ[ΠWSSC (p, w1, α1)] (m = 1) = Eξ[ΠWSOEM(p)] (m = 1) + Eξ[ΠWSS1 (w1, α1)] (m = 1) leads to Eq.








(231). Eqs. (231) and (234) are equal. Finally, by using Eq. (234) to solve the expression
Eξ[Π∗SC ](m=1)−Eξ[ΠWS∗SC ](m=1)
Eξ[ΠWS∗SC ](m=1)
yields to Eq. (237).
Proof of Proposition 21: Considering S1 as example, we first check the mathematical properties of
its profit function. We calculate the Hessian matrix to verify if it is concave in w1 and α1. By
replacing p = ∆ +
∑3
j=1wj in Eq. (58), we get the following first and second order derivatives:











=β1(w1 − c1)− η1φ1α1; (127)
∂2Eξ[ΠCSS1 (w1, α1)]
∂w21



























The determinant |HE[ΠCSS1 ]| = 2θη1φ1 − β
2
1 . We have proved that Eξ[ΠCSS1 (w1, α1)](m = 3)
is a strictly concave function of w1 and α1 as long as 2θη1φ1 > β21 holds. Now, by replacing
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∆ = p−∑3j=1wj in ∂E[ΠCSS1 ]∂w1 and setting ∂E[ΠCSS1 ]∂w1 = 0 and ∂E[ΠCSS1 ]∂α1 = 0 we obtain:










(wi − ci) where i = 1, 2, 3. (133)
Replacing Eq. (133) in Eq. (132) yields to:












Using wCS∗2 |p,w1,w3(m = 3) to solve Eq. (134) yields to:
wCS∗1 |p,w3 (m = 3) =c1 +











Using wCS∗3 |p,w1 (m = 3) to solve Eq. (135) yields to:









Finally, by replacing Eq. (136) into Eq. (133) we get:








General expressions for Eqs. (126), (132), (134) - (135), (136) and (137) are Eqs. (238), (241),
(244), (59) and (60), respectively. Eq. (59) is a particular case of Eq. (244) when |Ŵm| = 0. The




replace a given w ∈ Ŵm in wCS∗i |p,∀w∈Ŵm (m)
update Ŵm
until |Ŵm| = 0
Now we proceed to prove the validity of latter Equations using mathematical induction:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (238), (241), (244), (59) and (60) are true, we
review if Eqs. (239), (242), (245), (246) and (248) hold. By replacing p = ∆ +
∑
j∈Jm+1 wj
in Eξ[ΠCSSi (wi, αi)] (m+ 1) = (wi − ci)
(
d− θp+∑j∈Jm+1 βjαj) − 12ηiφiα2i , and by solving
∂Eξ[ΠCSSi (wi,αi)](m+1)
∂wi




= 0 we get Eq. (242). Replacing Eq. (133) into Eq. (242) yields to Eq. (245).
Eq. (246) is a particular case of Eq. (245) when |Ŵm+1| = 0. Finally, by substituting Eq. (246)
into Eq. (133) we reach to Eq. (248).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (238), (241), (59) and (60) are true, we review if
Eqs. (240), (243), (247) and (249) hold. Eq. (244) is disregarded for the case of (m = 1) supplier.








= 0 we obtain Eq. (243). Replacing Eq. (133) in Eq. (243) leads to Eq. (247).
Using Eq. (247) into Eq. (133) yields to Eq. (249).
Proof of Proposition 22: From αCS∗1 |p = α∗1 we get:










From pCS∗|αCS∗1 |p=α∗1 = p
∗ it is obtained:












Using φ2|φ1,φ3(m = 3) to solve Eq. (139) yields to:
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Finally, using φ3|φ1 (m = 3) to solve Eq. (140) leads to:
φi =1. (141)
General expressions for Eqs. (138), and (139) - (140) are Eqs. (250), and (253), respectively.
The relation between Eqs. (253) and (141) can be summarized in the following algorithm:
φi:
repeat
replace a given φ ∈ Φ̂m in φi|∀φ∈Φ̂m (m)
update Φ̂m
until |Φ̂m| = 0
Now we use mathematical induction to prove that latter Equations hold. We are interested in
two scenarios:
(i) Case of (m+1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (250), and (253) are true, we review if Eqs. (251),
and (254) hold. By equating Eqs. (248), and (215), and isolating variable p from the expression
leads to Eq. (251). Then by equating Eqs. (251) and (213), and isolating variable φi from the
expression yields to Eq. (254).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eq. (250) is true, we review if Eqs. (252) hold. Eq.
(253) is disregarded for the case of (m = 1) supplier. Equating Eqs. (249) and (216), and isolating
variable p from the expression leads to Eq. (252). Equating Eqs. (252) and (214), and isolating
variable φ1 from the expression yields to φ1 = 1.
Proof of Proposition 23: For the case of S1, we first check the mathematical properties of the profit
function. We calculate the Hessian matrix to verify if it is concave in w1 and α1. By replacing
p = ∆ +
∑3
j=1wj in Eq. (64), it is obtained the following first and second order derivatives:
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The determinant |HE[ΠCRS1 ]| = 2θη1φ
2
1 − β21φ21. We have proved that Eξ[ΠCRS1 (w1, α1)] is a
strictly concave function of w1 and α1 as long as 2θη1 > β21 holds. Now by replacing ∆ =
p−∑3j=1wj in ∂E[ΠCRS1 ]∂w1 and setting ∂E[ΠCRS1 ]∂w1 = 0 and ∂E[ΠCRS1 ]∂α1 = 0 we obtain:













(wiφi − ci), where i = 1, 2, 3. (149)
Replacing Eq. (149) in Eq. (148) yields to:









Using wCR∗2 |p,w1,w3 (m = 3) to solve Eq. (150) leads to:










θ −∑2j=1 β2jηj . (151)
Substituting wCR∗3 |p,w1 (m = 3) into Eq. (151) yields to:





Ωm=3 − θ . (152)
Finally, by replacing Eq. (152) in Eq. (149) we get:
αCR∗1 |p (m = 3) =
β1 (d− pθ)
η1 (Ωm=3 − θ) . (153)
General expressions for Eqs. (142), (148), (150) - (151), (152) and (153) are Eqs. (255), (258),
(261), (65) and (66), respectively. Eq. (65) is a particular case of Eq. (261) when |Ŵm| = 0. The
relation between Eqs. (261) and (65) can be summarized in the following algorithm:
wCR∗i |p (m):
repeat
replace a given w ∈ Ŵm in wCR∗i |p,∀w∈Ŵm (m)
update Ŵm
until |Ŵm| = 0
Validity of latter Equations is tested through the use of mathematical induction. Specifically we
analyze two cases:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (255), (258), (261), (65) and (66) are true,
we review if Eqs. (256), (259), (262), (263) and (265) hold. Substituting p = ∆ +
∑
j∈Jm+1 wj
in Eξ[ΠCRSi (wi, αi)] (m+ 1) = (wiφi − ci)
(
d− θp+∑j∈Jm+1 βjαj) − 12ηiφiα2i , and solving
∂Eξ[ΠCRSi (wi,αi)](m+1)
∂wi




= 0 we obtain Eq. (259). Replacing Eq. (149) into (259) leads to Eq. (262).
Eq. (263) is a particular case of Eq. (262) when |Ŵm+1| = 0. Finally, by substituting Eq. (263)
into Eq. (149) we reach to Eq. (265).
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(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (255), (258), (65) and (66) are true, we review if
Eqs. (257), (260), (264) and (266) hold. Eq. (261) is disregarded for the case of (m = 1) supplier.








= 0 we get Eq. (260). Substituting Eq. (149) into Eq. (260) leads to Eq.
(264). Replacing Eq. (264) in Eq. (149) yields to Eq. (266).
Proof of Proposition 24: For the scenario of (m = 3) suppliers, from αCR∗i |p(m = 3) = α∗i (m =
3) we get Eq. (116). By considering multiple suppliers we can infer that αCR∗i |p (m) = α∗i (m)
leads to Eq. (50).
Now we proceed to prove latter statement using mathematical induction:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: By equating Eqs. (265) and (215), and by isolating p from the
latter expression we get Eq. (213).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Equating Eqs. (266) and (216), and isolating p from the latter
expression leads to Eq. (214).
Proof of Proposition 25: Eq. (116) is used to solve Eq. (152), and it is obtained:







General expression for Eq. (154) is Eq. (67). We review if latter Equation holds using mathe-
matical induction method:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming Eq. (67) is true, we proceed to prove that Eq. (267)
holds. Using Eq. (213) to solve Eq. (263), it is obtained Eq. (267).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eq. (67) is true, we proceed to prove that Eq. (268)
holds. Substituting Eq. (214) into Eq. (264), yields to Eq. (268).
Proof of Proposition 26: Let’s assume that Inequality (155) holds.
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wCR∗i (m = 3) > w
WS∗
i (m = 3) . (155)
Replacing Eqs. (154) and (103) in Inequality (155) leads to:
φ1Ψm=3 (Ωm=3 + 4θ) + 2 (1− φ1) c1Ωm=3 (Ωm=3 + 2θ) > 0
From Eq. (117) we know that Ψm=3 > 0. Then, Eq. (155) holds. Similar results can be




cj =⇒ wCR∗1 (m) < p∗ (m) . (156)






Then, Inequality (156) holds as long as c1 < φ1
∑3
j=1 cj is fulfilled.
General expression for Inequalities (155) and (156) are Inequalities (68) and (69). Now we
verify if latter Inequalities hold with the use of mathematical induction. We review two cases:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming that Inequalities (68) and (69) are true, we review if
Inequalities (269) and (271) hold. By replacing Eqs. (267) and (194) in Inequality (269) leads to:
φ1Ψm+1 (Ωm+1 + 2mθ) + 2 (1− φ1) c1Ωm+1 (Ωm+1 +mθ) > 0
From Eq. (215) we know that Ψm+1 > 0. Then, Inequality (269) holds. Secondly, substituting







Then, Inequality (271) holds as long as ci < φi
∑
j∈Jm+1 cj is fulfilled.
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Inequality (68) is true, we review if Inequality (270)
holds. By replacing Eqs. (268) and (195) in Inequality (270) leads to:
φ1Ψm=1Ωm=1 + 2 (1− φ1) c1Ω2m=1 > 0
From Eq. (216) we know that Ψm=1 > 0. Then, Eq. (270) holds. Lastly, substituting Eqs.
(268) and (214) in Inequality (272) leads to:
Ω2m=1 (φ1c1 − c1)
Then, Inequality (272) holds as long as c1 < φ1c1 is fulfilled.
Proof of Proposition 27: Let DWS∗ = d − θpWS∗ + ∑3j=1 βjαWS∗j be the expected demand in
the WS contract under optimal conditions, and let DCR∗ = d − θpCR∗ + ∑3j=1 βjαCR∗j be the
expected demand in the CR contract under optimal conditions. By setting Eξ[ΠWS∗OEM(pWS∗)](m =






























i )](m = 3) ≤ Eξ[ΠCR∗Si (wCR∗i , αCR∗i )](m = 3) it is obtained
the win condition for Si:
141











2 − wCR∗i DCR∗
. (158)
By replacing φj by UBφj in Eq. (157) it is obtained:
(Ωm=3 + 4θ)
2 Ψ2m=3
8 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2 Ωm=3
> 0 (159)









. Therefore the previous expression holds, proving that there exist a feasi-
ble solution for φi. Compering Eqs. (157) and (158) let to the win-win conditions of φi for the CR
contract shown in Eqs. (160) and (161).
φi (m = 3) ≥ LBφi(m=3) =
Ω2m=3
4 (Ωm=3 + 2θ)
2 . (160)



















General expression for Eqs. (157), (159), (160) and (161) are Eqs. (273), (276), (70) and (71),
respectively. Now we proceed to prove latter Equations using mathematical induction:
(i) Case of (m+ 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (273), (276), (70) and (71) are true, we review if







d−θpCR∗+∑j∈Jm+1 βjαCR∗j . By setting Eξ[ΠWS∗OEM(pWS∗)](m+1) ≤ Eξ[ΠCR∗OEM(pCR∗)](m+1)





i )](m+ 1) ≤ Eξ[ΠCR∗Si (wCR∗i , αCR∗i )](m+ 1) and using Eq. (273)
it is obtained Eqs. (279) and (281).
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (273), (276), (70) and (71) are true, we review
if Eqs. (275), (278), (280) and (282) hold. Let DWS∗m=1 = d − θpWS∗ + β1αWS∗1 , and DCR∗m=1 =
d − θpCR∗ + β1αCR∗1 . By setting Eξ[ΠWS∗OEM(pWS∗)](m = 1) ≤ Eξ[ΠCR∗OEM(pCR∗)](m = 1) it is
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i )](m = 1) ≤ Eξ[ΠCR∗Si (wCR∗i , αCR∗i )](m = 1) and using Eq. (275)
it is obtained Eqs. (280) and (282).
Proof of Proposition 28: For the case of Eξ[ΠCRB1 (p
CR∗, wCR∗1 , αCR∗1 )](m = 3), we first substitutes
Eqs. (116), (117) and (154) in latter expression and verify if it is concave in φ1 by calculating the
first and second order derivatives:
∂Eξ[ΠCRB1 (p
CR∗, wCR∗1 , α
CR∗





























We have proved that Eξ[ΠCRB1 (p







= 0 we obtain Eq. (164).















Using φCR∗2 |φ1,φ3(m = 3) to solve Eq. (164) yields to:









Finally, using φCR∗3 |φ1(m = 3) to solve Eq. (165) leads to:






General expressions for Eqs. (162), (163), (164) - (165) and (166) are Eqs. (283), (286), (289)
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replace a given φ ∈ Φ̂m in φCRi |∀φ∈Φ̂m (m)
update Φ̂m
until |Φ̂m| = 0
Now we use mathematical induction to prove that latter Equations hold. We are interested in
two scenarios:
(i) Case of (m + 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (283), (286), (289) and (73) are true, we re-
view if Eqs. (284), (287), (290) and (291) hold. Substituting Eqs. (213), (215) and (267) into
Eξ[ΠCRBi (p
CR∗, wCR∗i , α
CR∗



















= 0 and isolating variable φi from the expression yields to Eq.
(290). Eq. (291) is a particular case of Eq. (290) when |Φ̂m+1| = 0.
(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Assuming Eqs. (283), (286) and (73) are true, we review
if Eqs. (285), (288) and (292) hold. Eq. (289) is disregarded for the case of (m = 1) sup-
plier. Replacing Eqs. (214), (216) and (268) into Eξ[ΠCRB1 (p




















and isolating variable φ1 from the expression yields to Eq. (292).
Proof of Proposition 29: The partial derivative of φCR∗1 (m = 3) with respect to β1 gives:












The partial derivative of φCR∗1 (m = 3) with respect to β2 leads to:
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The partial derivative of φCR∗1 (m = 3) with respect to η1 yields to:












The partial derivative of φCR∗1 (m = 3) with respect to η2 gives:








Similar results can be obtained for φCR∗2 (m = 3) and φCR∗3 (m = 3). General expressions for
Eqs. (167), (168), (169) and (170) are Eqs. (293), (295), (297) and (299), respectively.
Using mathematical induction we prove that latter Equations hold. We are interested in two
scenarios:
(i) Case of (m+ 1) suppliers: Assuming Eqs. (293), (295), (297) and (299) are true, we review



















(ii) Case of (m = 1) supplier: Eqs. (293), (295), (297) and (299) are disregarded for the case
of (m = 1) supplier.
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m+ 1 d− θ
2wi + ∑
j∈Jm+1;j 6=i




m = 1 d− θ (2w1 + ∆− c1) + β1α1 (173)





 , where α ∈ Am (174)






 , where α ∈ Am+1 (175)
m = 1 c1 +
1
θ
(d− θp+ β1α1) (176)














, where w ∈ Ŵm (177)














, where w ∈ Ŵm+1 (178)
m = 1 −−−
wWS∗i |p m Eq. (43)
m+ 1 ci +
d− pθ
Ωm+1 − θ (179)
m = 1 c1 +
d− pθ
Ωm=1 − θ (180)
αWS∗i |p m Eq. (44)
m+ 1
βi (d− pθ)
ηi (Ωm+1 − θ) (181)
m = 1
β1 (d− pθ)
η1 (Ωm=1 − θ) (182)
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m −2θ2 [Ωm + (m− 1) θ]
(Ωm − θ)2
(189)
m+ 1 −2θ2 [Ωm+1 +mθ]
(Ωm+1 − θ)2
(190)
m = 1 −2θ2Ωm=1
(Ωm=1 − θ)2
(191)
pWS∗ m Eq. (45)
m+ 1




2dθ − (Ψm=1 − 2d) (Ωm=1 − θ)
2θΩm=1
(193)
wWS∗i m Eq. (46)

















































m = 1 β1 (p− c1)− η1α1 (203)










































(d+ θc1 + β1α1) (209)
















p∗ m Eq. (50)
m+ 1











Table C.2: Centralized model summary (continued)
Expression Suppliers









p∗ vs. pWS∗ m Eq. (52)
m+ 1 Ωm+1 > θ =⇒ p∗ (m+ 1) < pWS∗ (m+ 1) (217)
m = 1 Ωm=1 > θ =⇒ p∗ (m = 1) < pWS∗ (m = 1) (218)
α∗i vs. α
WS∗
i m Eq. (53)
m+ 1 α∗i (m+ 1) > α
WS∗
i (m+ 1) (219)
m = 1 α∗i (m = 1) > α
WS∗
i (m = 1) (220)














(m = 1) (222)
Eξ[ΠWS∗SC (pWS∗,∀wWS∗, ∀αWS∗)]m [3Ωm + 4 (m− 1) θ] Ψ
2
m
8 [Ωm + (m− 1) θ]2
, where wWS∗ ∈WWS∗m , αWS∗ ∈ AWS∗m (223)
m+ 1




2 , where w
WS∗ ∈WWS∗m+1 , αWS∗ ∈ AWS∗m+1 (224)













, where α∗ ∈ A∗m+1 (227)








[3Ωm + 4 (m− 1) θ] Ωm
4 [Ωm + (m− 1) θ]2
(229)
m+ 1












m 1− [Ωm + 2 (m− 1) θ]
2
4 [Ωm + (m− 1) θ]2
, (232)













m+ 1 ≥ 1
3
(236)
















m+ 1 d− θ
2wi + ∑
j∈Jm+1;j 6=i




m = 1 d− θ (2w1 + ∆− c1) + β1α1 (240)





 , where α ∈ Am (241)






 , where α ∈ Am+1 (242)
m = 1 c1 +
1
θ
(d− θp+ β1α1) (243)














, where w ∈ Ŵm (244)














, where w ∈ Ŵm+1 (245)
m = 1 −−−





















































































, where φ ∈ Φ̂m+1 (254)
m = 1 −−−
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m = 1 φ1 [d− θ (2w1 + ∆) + β1α1] + c1θ (257)
























(d− θp+ β1α1) (260)





































, where w ∈ Ŵm+1 (262)
m = 1 −−−












Ωm=1 − θ (264)
αCR∗i |p m Eq. (66)
m+ 1
βi (d− pθ)
ηi (Ωm+1 − θ) (265)
m = 1
β1 (d− pθ)
η1 (Ωm=1 − θ) (266)




















i m Eq. (68)
m+ 1 wCR∗i (m+ 1) > w
WS∗
i (m+ 1) (269)
m = 1 wCR∗1 (m = 1) > w
WS∗
1 (m = 1) (270)
wCR∗i vs. p
∗ m Eq. (69)
m+ 1 ci < φi
∑
j∈Jm+1
cj =⇒ wCR∗i (m+ 1) < p∗ (m+ 1) (271)





























j , and D
CR∗





































≥ (pWS∗ − wWS∗1 )DWS∗m=1 − pCR∗DCR∗m=1 + 12η1αCR∗1 2
(275)
Ratio m [Ωm + 2 (m− 1) θ]
2 Ψ2m
8 [Ωm + (m− 1) θ]2 Ωm
> 0 (276)





















































































































































) , where φ ∈ Φ̂m+1 (290)
m = 1 −−−

































m = 1 −−−
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m = 1 −−−
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Table D.1: Data from Numerical example
φ
m Supplier c β η Case A Case B Case C Case D
1 1 55.00 450.00 1000 0.1500 0.2500 0.3500 0.4500
2 1 10.00 50.00 2500 0.1500 0.2500 0.3500 0.4500
2 1.50 10.00 300 0.0500 0.1000 0.1500 0.2000
4 1 5.00 20.00 580 0.1200 0.1500 0.1800 0.2000
2 1.60 5.00 240 0.0100 0.0300 0.0400 0.0500
3 1.80 10.00 360 0.0200 0.0400 0.0600 0.0800
4 5.60 25.00 620 0.1100 0.1300 0.1500 0.2000
10 1 0.82 5.28 592 0.0393 0.0786 0.1179 0.1572
2 0.02 3.65 396 0.0015 0.0030 0.0045 0.0060
3 1.96 15.60 2549 0.0133 0.0266 0.0399 0.0532
4 0.98 6.27 610 0.0436 0.0872 0.1308 0.1744
5 2.16 17.04 2316 0.0115 0.0230 0.0345 0.0460
6 1.26 6.42 561 0.0070 0.0140 0.0210 0.0280
7 2.34 20.01 2725 0.0334 0.0668 0.1002 0.1336
8 2.40 16.71 2940 0.0221 0.0442 0.0663 0.0884
9 2.78 20.64 2160 0.0169 0.0338 0.0507 0.0676
10 2.14 19.35 2888 0.0035 0.0070 0.0105 0.0140
30 1 1.01 15.89 2578 0.0098 0.0196 0.0294 0.0392
2 0.62 10.91 599 0.0098 0.0196 0.0294 0.0392
3 1.22 17.69 2404 0.0056 0.0112 0.0168 0.0224
4 0.53 10.25 963 0.0151 0.0302 0.0453 0.0604
5 1.01 18.49 2716 0.0100 0.0200 0.0300 0.0400
6 1.09 20.40 2437 0.0067 0.0134 0.0201 0.0268
7 1.18 15.03 2568 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008
8 0.63 7.02 625 0.0036 0.0072 0.0108 0.0144
9 0.11 2.17 247 0.0162 0.0324 0.0486 0.0648
10 0.38 5.54 735 0.0108 0.0216 0.0324 0.0432
11 0.42 6.17 676 0.0069 0.0138 0.0207 0.0276
12 0.41 8.11 544 0.0026 0.0052 0.0078 0.0104
13 0.83 20.44 2529 0.0022 0.0044 0.0066 0.0088
14 0.67 7.46 725 0.0048 0.0096 0.0144 0.0192
15 0.46 5.72 929 0.0126 0.0252 0.0378 0.0504
16 0.47 5.60 602 0.0073 0.0146 0.0219 0.0292
17 0.24 5.07 266 0.0119 0.0238 0.0357 0.0476
18 0.94 15.77 2068 0.0049 0.0098 0.0147 0.0196
19 0.89 20.64 2134 0.0057 0.0114 0.0171 0.0228
20 0.42 8.44 627 0.0048 0.0096 0.0144 0.0192
21 0.79 17.01 2017 0.0061 0.0122 0.0183 0.0244
22 0.92 18.27 2543 0.0040 0.0080 0.0120 0.0160
23 1.14 18.02 2865 0.0086 0.0172 0.0258 0.0344
24 0.54 7.79 811 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004
25 0.52 7.62 952 0.0160 0.0320 0.0480 0.0640
26 0.37 1.42 130 0.0051 0.0102 0.0153 0.0204
27 0.52 6.73 906 0.0028 0.0056 0.0084 0.0112
28 1.11 18.03 2808 0.0061 0.0122 0.0183 0.0244
29 0.64 9.27 625 0.0007 0.0014 0.0021 0.0028
30 1.00 18.20 2978 0.0108 0.0216 0.0324 0.0432
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Table D.1: Data from Numerical example (continued)
φ
m Supplier c β η Case A Case B Case C Case D
50 1 0.19 5.32 183 0.0050 0.0100 0.0150 0.0200
2 0.02 4.46 171 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004
3 0.32 5.67 235 0.0006 0.0012 0.0018 0.0024
4 0.58 10.96 581 0.0078 0.0156 0.0234 0.0312
5 0.09 5.05 520 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020
6 0.75 18.24 2998 0.0049 0.0098 0.0147 0.0196
7 0.36 5.99 343 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020
8 1.27 20.47 2260 0.0014 0.0028 0.0042 0.0056
9 0.14 5.55 295 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004
10 0.20 3.62 397 0.0028 0.0056 0.0084 0.0112
11 0.54 9.56 756 0.0043 0.0086 0.0129 0.0172
12 1.09 20.32 2515 0.0098 0.0196 0.0294 0.0392
13 1.01 20.63 2459 0.0046 0.0092 0.0138 0.0184
14 0.77 15.58 2540 0.0012 0.0024 0.0036 0.0048
15 0.55 9.16 695 0.0070 0.0140 0.0210 0.0280
16 0.93 17.53 2303 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008
17 1.20 18.22 2028 0.0078 0.0156 0.0234 0.0312
18 0.19 2.30 473 0.0047 0.0094 0.0141 0.0188
19 0.95 16.33 2948 0.0013 0.0026 0.0039 0.0052
20 0.14 2.90 243 0.0088 0.0176 0.0264 0.0352
21 0.63 6.25 576 0.0041 0.0082 0.0123 0.0164
22 0.28 2.49 376 0.0007 0.0014 0.0021 0.0028
23 0.34 3.37 368 0.0016 0.0032 0.0048 0.0064
24 0.83 18.34 2491 0.0051 0.0102 0.0153 0.0204
25 0.61 10.93 574 0.0039 0.0078 0.0117 0.0156
26 0.06 5.86 408 0.0089 0.0178 0.0267 0.0356
27 0.03 3.37 218 0.0009 0.0018 0.0027 0.0036
28 0.64 8.02 540 0.0035 0.0070 0.0105 0.0140
29 1.18 20.93 2475 0.0048 0.0096 0.0144 0.0192
30 0.28 3.27 459 0.0097 0.0194 0.0291 0.0388
31 0.96 18.24 2063 0.0031 0.0062 0.0093 0.0124
32 0.05 1.78 345 0.0076 0.0152 0.0228 0.0304
33 0.75 17.21 2795 0.0090 0.0180 0.0270 0.0360
34 0.87 18.50 2798 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008
35 0.89 16.38 2423 0.0086 0.0172 0.0258 0.0344
36 0.45 5.80 619 0.0079 0.0158 0.0237 0.0316
37 0.51 6.89 728 0.0026 0.0052 0.0078 0.0104
38 0.88 17.46 2901 0.0068 0.0136 0.0204 0.0272
39 0.65 9.81 744 0.0013 0.0026 0.0039 0.0052
40 0.96 18.09 2630 0.0019 0.0038 0.0057 0.0076
41 0.82 19.76 2117 0.0095 0.0190 0.0285 0.0380
42 0.16 2.28 280 0.0018 0.0036 0.0054 0.0072
43 1.32 20.95 2321 0.0016 0.0032 0.0048 0.0064
44 0.54 5.78 762 0.0023 0.0046 0.0069 0.0092
45 0.47 10.49 640 0.0080 0.0160 0.0240 0.0320
46 0.63 10.30 910 0.0018 0.0036 0.0054 0.0072
47 0.66 7.45 954 0.0069 0.0138 0.0207 0.0276
48 0.93 20.36 2684 0.0080 0.0160 0.0240 0.0320
49 1.36 19.44 2669 0.0053 0.0106 0.0159 0.0212
50 0.99 20.20 2878 0.0047 0.0094 0.0141 0.0188
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